Editing Sino-Soviet split (section)

===Personal attacks and USSR technical support ceased===
In the 1960s, public displays of acrimonious quarrels about Marxist–Leninist doctrine characterized relations between hardline Stalinist Chinese and post-Stalinist Soviet Communists. At the [[Romanian Communist Party|Romanian Communist Party Congress]], the CCP's senior officer [[Peng Zhen]] quarrelled with Khrushchev, after the latter had insulted Mao as being a Chinese nationalist, a geopolitical adventurist, and an [[Deviationism|ideological deviationist]] from Marxism–Leninism. In turn, Peng insulted Khrushchev as a [[Anti-revisionism|revisionist]] whose régime showed him to be a "patriarchal, arbitrary, and tyrannical" ruler.<ref>Allen Axelrod, ''The Real History of the Cold War: A New Look at the Past'', p.&nbsp;213.</ref> In the event, Khrushchev denounced the PRC with 80 pages of criticism to the congress of the PRC.

In response to the insults, Khrushchev withdrew 1,400 Soviet technicians from the PRC, which cancelled some 200 joint scientific projects. According to Chinese records, the Soviet Union suddenly withdrew 1390 technicians and ended 600 contracts with PRC in 1960.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Zhenyou |date=2015-01-12 |title=20世纪60年代初期苏联驻华商务机构撤销问题的历史考察 |url=http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0112/c83867-26370025.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240611070122/http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0112/c83867-26370025.html |archive-date=2024-06-11 |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=[[People's Daily|People's Net]] |publisher=Contemporary China History Studies (当代中国史研究) |language=zh}}</ref> In response, Mao justified his belief that Khrushchev had somehow caused China's great economic failures and the famines that occurred in the period of the Great Leap Forward. Nonetheless, the PRC and the USSR remained pragmatic allies, which allowed Mao to alleviate famine in China and to resolve Sino-Indian border disputes. To Mao, Khrushchev had lost political authority and ideological credibility, because his US-Soviet ''[[détente]]'' had resulted in successful military (aerial) espionage against the USSR and public confrontation with an unapologetic capitalist enemy. Khrushchev's miscalculation of person and circumstance voided US-Soviet diplomacy at the [[1960 Paris Summit|Four Powers Summit in Paris]].{{sfnp|Chi-Kwan|2013|pages=49–50}}