Editing Spoofing attack (section)

===Preventing GNSS spoofing===
The Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center ([[NCCIC]]) and the National Coordinating Center for Communications ([[National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center|NCC]]), released a paper which lists methods to prevent this type of spoofing. Some of the most important and most recommended to use are:<ref>The Department of Homeland Security. [https://icscert.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Improving_the_Operation_and_Development_of_Global_Positioning_System_(GPS)_Equipment_Used_by_Critical_Infrastructure_S508C.pdf "Improving the Operation and Development of Global Positioning System (GPS) Equipment Used by Critical Infrastructure"]. Retrieved November 12, 2017.</ref>
#Obscure [[Antenna (radio)|antennas]]. Install antennas where they are not visible from publicly accessible locations or obscure their exact locations by introducing impediments to hide the antennas.
#Add a sensor/blocker. Sensors can detect characteristics of interference, [[Radio jamming|jamming]], and spoofing signals, provide local indication of an attack or anomalous condition, communicate alerts to a remote monitoring site, and collect and report data to be analyzed for forensic purposes.<ref>{{cite web |title=Novel Timing Antennas for Improved GNSS Resilience |first1=Erik |last1=Lundberg |first2=Ian |last2=McMichael |date=2018 | publisher=Mitre Corporation |url=https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr18-0336-novel-timing-antennas-for-improved-gnss-resilience.pdf}}</ref>
#Extend data spoofing whitelists to sensors. Existing data spoofing whitelists have been and are being implemented in government reference software, and should also be implemented in sensors.
#Use more GNSS signal types. Modernized civil GPS signals are more robust than the L1 signal and should be leveraged for increased resistance to interference, jamming, and spoofing.
#Reduce latency in recognition and reporting of interference, jamming, and spoofing. If a receiver is misled by an attack before the attack is recognized and reported, then backup devices may be corrupted by the receiver before hand-over.
These installation and operation strategies and development opportunities can significantly enhance the ability of GPS receivers and associated equipment to defend against a range of interference, jamming, and spoofing attacks.
A system and receiver agnostic detection software offers applicability as cross-industry solution. Software implementation can be performed in different places within the system, depending on where the GNSS data is being used, for example as part of the device's firmware, operating system, or on the application level.{{cn|date=December 2021}}

A method proposed by researchers from the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the [[University of Maryland, College Park]] and the School of Optical and Electronic Information at Huazhong University of Science and Technology that aims to help mitigate the effects of GNSS spoofing attacks by using data from a vehicles controller area network (CAN) bus. The information would be compared to that of received GNSS data and compared in order to detect the occurrence of a spoofing attack and to reconstruct the driving path of the vehicle using that collected data. Properties such as the vehicles speed and steering angle would be amalgamated and regression modeled in order to achieve a minimum error in position of 6.25 meters.<ref>Wang, Qian & Lu, Zhaojun & Qu, Gang. (2018). Edge Computing based GPS Spoofing Detection Methods. 10.1109/ICDSP.2018.8631600.</ref> Similarly, a method outlined by researchers in a 2016 [[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers|IEEE]] Intelligent Vehicles Symposium conference paper discuss the idea of using cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) and vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communications in order to achieve a similar goal. In this method, the communication abilities of both cars and radar measurements are used to compare against the supplied GNSS position of both cars to determine the distance between the two cars which is then compared to the radar measurements and checked to make sure they match. If the two lengths match within a threshold value, then no spoofing has occurred, but above this threshold, the user is notified so that s/he can take action.<ref name=carson16>{{cite conference |author1= Carson, N. |author2= Martin, S. |author3= Starling, J. |author4= Bevly, D. |date=2016 |title=GPS spoofing detection and mitigation using Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control system |conference=2016 IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium (IV), 2016- |pages=1091–1096 |doi=10.1109/IVS.2016.7535525}}</ref>