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Basel II
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=== International consistency === One of the most difficult aspects of implementing an international agreement is the need to accommodate differing cultures, varying structural models, complexities of public policy, and existing regulation. Banks' senior management will determine corporate strategy, as well as the country in which to base a particular type of business, based in part on how Basel II is ultimately interpreted by various countries' legislatures and regulators.{{Citation needed|date=November 2012}} To assist banks operating with multiple reporting requirements for different regulators according to geographic location, there are several software applications available. These include capital calculation engines and extend to automated reporting solutions which include the reports required under [[COREP]]/[[FINREP]]. For example, U.S. [[Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]] Chair [[Sheila Bair]] explained in June 2007 the purpose of capital adequacy requirements for banks, such as the accord: : There are strong reasons for believing that banks left to their own devices would maintain less capital—not more—than would be prudent. The fact is, banks do benefit from implicit and explicit government safety nets. Investing in a bank is perceived as a safe bet. Without proper capital regulation, banks can operate in the marketplace with little or no capital. And governments and deposit insurers end up holding the bag, bearing much of the risk and cost of failure. History shows this problem is very real ... as we saw with the U.S. banking and S & L crisis in the late 1980s and 1990s. The final bill for inadequate capital regulation can be very heavy. In short, regulators can't leave capital decisions totally to the banks. We wouldn't be doing our jobs or serving the public interest if we did.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/spjun2507.html|title=FDIC: Speeches & Testimony|author=Sheila Bair|work=fdic.gov|access-date=2008-12-16|archive-date=2020-02-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200204170216/https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/spjun2507.html|url-status=dead}}</ref>
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