Editing Consent decree (section)

==Effects==
Scholars find advantages and disadvantages to using the consent decree.{{sfn|Isenbergh|Rubin|1940|p=386}}{{sfn|Mengler|1987|p=294}}{{sfn|Resnik|2015|p=85}} In addition, consent decrees can affect those outside of the litigants, such as third parties and [[public interest]]s.{{sfn|Epstein|2007|p=4}}{{sfn|Dabney|1963|p=1053}}<ref>{{cite journal |last=Fieweger |first=Michael |date=January 1, 1993 |title=Consent Decrees in Prison and Jail Reform: Relaxed Standard of Review for Government Motions to Modify Consent Decrees |url= https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6766&context=jclc |journal=Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology |volume=83 |issue=4 |pages=1024–1054 |doi=10.2307/1143880 |jstor=1143880 |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

===Advantages and disadvantages===
The following are advantages of using consent decrees:
* Save financial costs of [[litigation]]: Consent decrees forgo a [[court trial]] that allows for both parties and the courts to save [[legal expense]]s.{{sfn|Fieweger|1993|p=1025}}{{sfn|Consent Decrees|1922|pp=345–346}}{{sfn|Epstein|2007|p=4}}{{sfn|Baradaran-Robinson|2003|p=1340}}{{sfn|Isenbergh|Rubin|1940|p=387}}<ref>{{cite journal |last=Keating |first=Gregory C. |title=Settling through Consent Decree in Prison Reform Litigation: Exploring the Effects of ''Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail'' |journal=Boston College Law Review |date=1992 |pages=163–201 |url= http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1967&context=bclr |volume=34 }}</ref>
* Save the time of prolonged litigation: The parties and the courts save the time it would take for a court trial to occur{{sfn|Baradaran-Robinson|2003|p=1340}} and the courts more quickly clear their [[Docket (court)|dockets]].{{sfn|Resnik|2015|p=67}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|p=164}}
* Ability to get results of a [[trial]]: The parties are able to obtain similar results of a court trial, specifically where a change is required to appease the dispute.{{sfn|Resnik|2015|p=63}}{{sfn|Isenbergh|Rubin|1940|pp=387, 405}}
* Parties avoid the uncertainties of a trial: Consent decrees forgo a trial and its unknown outcome, the necessity of [[legal burden of proof|proof]], and any [[guilt (law)|guilt]] is taken for granted (because no one is accused by the consent decree).{{sfn|Fieweger|1993|p=1025}}{{sfn|Consent Decrees|1922|pp=345–346}}{{sfn|Resnik|2015|p=63}}{{sfn|Baradaran-Robinson|2003|p=1340}}{{sfn|Isenbergh|Rubin|1940|p=387}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|p=164}}
* Parties have control of the remedial plan: Consent decrees allow both parties to have greater latitude in deciding how to remedy their issues.{{sfn|Fieweger|1993|p=1025}}{{sfn|Epstein|2007|p=4}}{{sfn|Baradaran-Robinson|2003|pp=1339–1340}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|p=164}} This is an advantage "because the parties, not the court, determine the remedy, [and] the assumption is that the remedy is better suited to the parties' needs".{{sfn|Resnik|2015|p=64}}
*More compliance and authoritativeness: Both parties more voluntarily implement their agreements if obtained by consent than by force.{{sfn|Resnik|2015|pp=63–64}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|p=191}} Moreover, to fail to act under the consent decree seems to be more a [[Infraction|violation]] of the "[[law]]" than if under a [[contract]] because the parties are "bound" and not "[[Obligation (law)|obligated]]" by the consent decree.{{sfn|Resnik|2015|pp=63–64}}{{sfn|Mengler|1987|p=292}} Its authoritativeness is reinforced by the practice that a return to court for a consent decree has a priority in the court queue.{{sfn|Resnik|2015|pp=63–64}}
*Sustained [[judicial oversight]] and [[judicial interpretation|interpretation]]: Courts can supervise that consent decrees are upheld for an indefinite period of time.{{sfn|Baradaran-Robinson|2003|p=1338}}{{sfn|Epstein|2007|p=6}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|p=164}}

In contrast, the following are disadvantages of using consent decrees:
*Duration: Some argue that "consent decrees often last for too long a period".{{sfn|Epstein|2007|p=6}} Although consent decrees are a solution to a particular issue, the context around that issue or the issue itself may change.{{sfn|Epstein|2007|p=6}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|p=167}}{{sfn|Fieweger|1993|p=1025}} However, the consent decree is neither as easy to modify nor adapt and thus can become inadequate.{{sfn|Epstein|2007|p=6}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|p=167}}
*Ambition: Consent decrees can be an avenue for those seeking to enact a future-oriented change that is more general and not case-specific.{{sfn|Epstein|2007|p=6}}{{sfn|Isenbergh|Rubin|1940|p=408}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|pp=164, 187}} Consent decrees are thus used "as a tool of enforcement [that is] less expensive, and sometimes more far-reaching, than [[adjudication]]",{{sfn|Resnik|2015|p=67}} especially in [[United States antitrust law|antitrust]] cases and those involving [[public institution (United States)|public institutions]].{{sfn|Epstein|2007|p=6}}{{sfn|Isenbergh|Rubin|1940|p=407}}
*Complexity: Consent decrees can be complex in questions of modification, either before{{sfn|Isenbergh|Rubin|1940|p=409}} or after{{sfn|Epstein|2007|p=6}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|p=167}} it is enacted: "the decree issued by consent cannot be modified, except by consent. Only where the consent has been obtained by fraud or given by mistake will a bill be entertained to set it aside".{{sfn|Consent Decrees|1922|p=346}}
*Ambiguity: There is ambiguity in the source of power of the consent decree,{{sfn|Resnik|2015|p=54}} the role of judges,{{sfn|Isenbergh|Rubin|1940|p=407}} and the guidelines for a consent decree.{{sfn|Resnik|2015|p=54}} Some see that "neither [[judge]]s, [[lawyer]]s, nor [[Party (law)|parties]] know exactly what they give or get when a consent decree is entered&nbsp;... [which may bear] testimony to the negative consequences of the ambiguity that surrounds consent decrees".{{sfn|Resnik|2015|p=62}}

===Third parties and public interests===
The consent decree can impact those outside of the [[party (law)|parties]], who resolve their disputes with a consent decree, especially in settling [[public institution (United States)|institutional]] reform and [[United States antitrust law|antitrust]] cases.{{sfn|Fieweger|1993|p=1025}}{{sfn|Stedman|1965|p=647}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|pp=186–187}} From ''[[Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail]]''<ref name=rufo /> and ''[[Swift and Company v. United States|Swift & Co. v. United States]]'',<ref name=":7" /> the [[Supreme Court of the United States|Supreme Court]] acknowledges that "the effects of the decree on [[Third-party beneficiary|third parties]] and the [[public interest]] should be taken into account when determining whether or not a change in fact warrants&nbsp;... the decree".{{sfn|Fieweger|1993|p=1024}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|p=191}} There is criticism that "the antitrust consent decree is an opaque form of [[government regulation]] that operates without many of the [[checks and balances]] that constrain and shape ordinary [[regulatory agency|regulatory]] programs".{{sfn|Epstein|2007|p=vii}} So, some argue that the use of consent decrees in [[United States antitrust law|antitrust]] cases and with [[public institution (United States)|public institutions]] can negatively affect [[third-party beneficiary|third parties]] and [[public interest]]s.{{sfn|Stedman|1965|p=629}}{{sfn|Isenbergh|Rubin|1940|pp=407, 409}}{{sfn|Keating|1992|p=165, 187}}{{sfn|Mengler|1987|p=292}}