Editing Consequentialism (section)

==Issues==

===Action guidance===
One important characteristic of many [[Normative ethics|normative]] moral theories such as consequentialism is the ability to produce practical moral judgements. At the very least, any moral theory needs to define the standpoint from which the goodness of the consequences are to be determined. What is primarily at stake here is the ''[[moral responsibility|responsibility]]'' of the agent.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stables |first1=Andrew |date=2016 |title=Responsibility beyond rationality: The case for rhizomatic consequentialism |journal=International Journal of Children's Spirituality  |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=219–225|doi=10.1080/1364436042000234404 |s2cid=214650271 }}</ref>

====The ideal observer====
One common tactic among consequentialists, particularly those committed to an [[Altruism|altruistic]] (selfless) account of consequentialism, is to employ an ideal, neutral observer from which moral judgements can be made. [[John Rawls]], a critic of utilitarianism, argues that utilitarianism, in common with other forms of consequentialism, relies on the perspective of such an [[Ideal observer theory|ideal observer]].<ref name="Scheffler"/> The particular characteristics of this ideal observer can vary from an [[Omniscience|omniscient]] observer, who would grasp all the consequences of any action, to an ideally informed observer, who knows as much as could reasonably be expected, but not necessarily all the circumstances or all the possible consequences. Consequentialist theories that adopt this paradigm hold that right action is the action that will bring about the best consequences from this ideal observer's perspective.{{Citation needed|date=February 2012}}

====The real observer====
In practice, it is very difficult, and at times arguably impossible, to adopt the point of view of an [[Ideal observer theory|ideal observer]]. Individual [[Moral agency|moral agents]] do not know everything about their particular situations, and thus do not know all the possible consequences of their potential actions. For this reason, some theorists have argued that consequentialist theories can only require agents to choose the best action in line with what they know about the situation.<ref name="Mackie">{{Cite book|last=Mackie |first=J. L. |author-link=J. L. Mackie |orig-date=1977 |title=Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong |publisher=Penguin |location=London |isbn=978-0-14-013558-9 |year=1990}}</ref> However, if this approach is naïvely adopted, then moral agents who, for example, recklessly fail to reflect on their situation, and act in a way that brings about terrible results, could be said to be acting in a morally justifiable way. Acting in a situation without first informing oneself of the circumstances of the situation can lead to even the most well-intended actions yielding miserable consequences. As a result, it could be argued that there is a moral imperative for agents to inform themselves as much as possible about a situation before judging the appropriate course of action. This imperative, of course, is derived from consequential thinking: a better-informed agent is able to bring about better consequences.{{Citation needed|date=February 2012}}

===Consequences for whom===

Moral action always has consequences for certain people or things. Varieties of consequentialism can be differentiated by the beneficiary of the good consequences. That is, one might ask "Consequences for whom?"

====Agent-focused or agent-neutral====
A fundamental distinction can be drawn between theories which require that agents act for ends perhaps disconnected from their own interests and drives, and theories which permit that agents act for ends in which they have some personal interest or [[motivation]].  These are called "agent-neutral" and "agent-focused" theories respectively.

'''Agent-neutral''' consequentialism ignores the specific value a state of affairs has for any particular agent. Thus, in an agent-neutral theory, an actor's personal goals do not count any more than anyone else's goals in evaluating what action the actor should take. '''Agent-focused''' consequentialism, on the other hand, focuses on the particular needs of the moral agent. Thus, in an agent-focused account, such as one that [[Peter Railton]] outlines, the agent might be concerned with the general welfare, but the agent is ''more'' concerned with the immediate welfare of herself and her friends and family.<ref name="Scheffler">{{Cite book | title = Consequentialism and Its Critics | year = 1988 | last = Scheffler | first = Samuel | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0-19-875073-4 | url-access = registration | url = https://archive.org/details/consequentia_xxxx_1988_000_9240564 }}</ref>

These two approaches could be reconciled by acknowledging the tension between an agent's interests as an individual and as a member of various groups, and seeking to somehow optimize among all of these interests.{{Citation needed|date=October 2012}} For example, it may be meaningful to speak of an action as being good for someone as an individual, but bad for them as a citizen of their town.

====Human-centered?====
Many consequentialist theories may seem primarily concerned with human beings and their relationships with other human beings. However, some philosophers argue that we should not limit our ethical consideration to the interests of human beings alone. [[Jeremy Bentham]], who is regarded as the founder of [[utilitarianism]], argues that animals can experience pleasure and pain, thus demanding that 'non-human animals' should be a serious object of moral concern.<ref name="Bentham">{{Cite book|title=An Introduction to the Principles of Moral Legislation |year=1996 |last=Bentham |first=Jeremy |author-link=Jeremy Bentham |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |isbn=978-0-19-820516-6 |url=http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/ipml/ipml.toc.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080105091421/http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/ipml/ipml.toc.html |archive-date=January 5, 2008 }}</ref>

More recently, [[Peter Singer]] has argued that it is unreasonable that we do not give equal consideration to the interests of animals as to those of human beings when we choose the way we are to treat them.<ref name="Singer">{{Cite book| title = Unsanctifying Human Life | last = Singer | first = Peter | author-link = Peter Singer | editor = Helga Kuhse| year = 2002 | publisher = Blackwell | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0-631-22507-2}}</ref> Such equal consideration does not necessarily imply identical treatment of humans and non-humans, any more than it necessarily implies identical treatment of all humans.

===Value of consequences===
One way to divide various consequentialisms is by the types of consequences that are taken to matter most, that is, which consequences count as good states of affairs. According to [[utilitarianism]], a good action is one that results in an increase in [[pleasure]], and the best action is one that results in the most pleasure for the greatest number. Closely related is [[eudaimonia|eudaimonic]] consequentialism, according to which a full, flourishing life, which may or may not be the same as enjoying a great deal of pleasure, is the ultimate aim. Similarly, one might adopt an aesthetic consequentialism, in which the ultimate aim is to produce beauty. However, one might fix on non-psychological goods as the relevant effect. Thus, one might pursue an increase in [[Equality of outcome|material equality]] or [[Freedom (political)|political liberty]] instead of something like the more ephemeral "pleasure". Other theories adopt a package of several goods, all to be promoted equally. As the consequentialist approach contains an inherent assumption that the outcomes of a moral decision can be quantified in terms of "goodness" or "badness," or at least put [[Order theory|in order of increasing preference]], it is an especially suited moral theory for a [[Probability|probabilistic]] and [[Decision theory|decision theoretical]] approach.<ref>Simmons, H. J. 1986. "[https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/5782/1/fulltext.pdf The quantification of 'happinenss' in utilitarianism]" ([[Ph.D. thesis]]). Hamilton, ON: [[McMaster University]].</ref><ref>[[Robert Audi|Audi, Robert]]. 2007. "Can Utilitarianism Be Distributive? Maximization and Distribution as Criteria in Managerial Decisions." ''[[Business Ethics Quarterly]]'' 17(4):593–611.</ref>

===Virtue ethics===
Consequentialism can also be contrasted with [[arete (moral virtue)|aretaic]] moral theories such as [[virtue ethics]]. Whereas consequentialist theories posit that consequences of action should be the primary focus of our thinking about ethics, virtue ethics insists that it is the character rather than the consequences of actions that should be the focal point. Some virtue ethicists hold that consequentialist theories totally disregard the development and importance of moral character. For example, [[Philippa Foot]] argues that consequences in themselves have no ethical content, unless it has been provided by a virtue such as benevolence.<ref name="Scheffler"/>

However, consequentialism and virtue ethics need not be entirely antagonistic. [[Iain King]] has developed an approach that reconciles the two schools.<ref>[[Iain King|King, Iain]]. 2008. ''[[How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time|How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time: Solving the Riddle of Right and Wrong]],'' London: [[Continuum Books|Continuum]].{{page needed|date=August 2018}}</ref><ref name="24 and Philosophy King">{{cite web|title=24 and Philosophy|author=Chandler Brett|url=http://andphilosophy.com/2014/07/16/24-and-philosophy|publisher=Blackwell|date=2014-07-16|access-date=2019-12-27}}</ref><ref name=MedicalEthics>{{cite book|first=Eldo|last=Frezzo |title=Medical Ethics: A Reference Guide|publisher= Routledge | date=2018-10-25|isbn=978-1138581074|page=5}}</ref><ref name=Zuckerman>{{cite book|first=Phil|last= Zuckerman |title=What it Means to be Moral|publisher= Counterpoint | date=2019-09-10  |isbn=978-1640092747|page=21}}</ref> Other consequentialists consider effects on the character of people involved in an action when assessing consequence. Similarly, a consequentialist theory may aim at the maximization of a particular virtue or set of virtues. Finally, following Foot's lead, one might adopt a sort of consequentialism that argues that virtuous activity ultimately produces the best consequences.{{Clarify|What issue in consequentialism is being discussed here?|date=February 2012}}
[[File:Max Weber 1894.jpg|thumb|Max Weber]]

===Ultimate end===
The ''[[ultimate end]]'' is a concept in the moral philosophy of [[Max Weber]], in which individuals act in a faithful, rather than rational, manner.<ref name=":2" />

{{blockquote|We must be clear about the fact that all ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can be oriented to an ''ethic of ultimate ends'' or to an ''ethic of responsibility''. [...] There is an abysmal contrast between conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of ultimate ends — that is in religious terms, "the Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord" — and conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's action.|Max Weber, ''[[Politics as a Vocation]]'', 1918<ref>Originally a speech at Munich University, 1918. Published as "Politik als Beruf," (Munich: Duncker & Humblodt, 1919). Later in Max Weber, ''Gesammelte Politische Schriften'' (Munich, 1921), 396-450. In English: H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. and ed., in ''Max Weber: Essays in Sociology'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77-128.
</ref>}}