Editing Divine command theory (section)

===Pluralism===
Austin considers the view that, in a world of [[religious pluralism]], it is impossible to know which god's or religion's commands should be followed, especially because some religions contradict others, leaving it impossible to accept all of them. Within religions there are also various interpretations of what is commanded. Austin notes that some of the responses to the autonomy objection may be relevant, as an agent must choose whichever [[religion and morality]] they judge to be correct. He argues that divine command theory is also consistent with the view that [[Ethics in religion|moral truths can be found in all religions]] and that moral revelation can be found [[Morality without religion|apart from religion]].<ref name=austin/> Heimir Geirsson and Margaret Holmgren argue against the view that different religions can lead to the same God because some religions are incompatible with each other (monotheistic and polytheistic religions have contrasting views of divinity, for example, and some Greek or Norse gods magnified human weaknesses). They argue that determining which god should be listened to remains a problem and that, even within a religion, contrasting views of God exist – the commands of God in the [[Old Testament|Old]] and [[New Testament]]s could seem to contradict each other.<ref>{{harvnb|Geirsson|Holmgren|2010|pp=37–38}}</ref>