Editing Expected utility hypothesis (section)

===Conservatism in updating beliefs===
Psychologists have discovered systematic violations of probability calculations and behavior by humans. This has been evidenced by examples such as the [[Monty Hall problem]], where it was demonstrated that people do not revise their degrees on belief in line with experimented probabilities and that probabilities cannot be applied to single cases. On the other hand, in updating probability distributions using evidence, a standard method uses [[conditional probability]], namely the [[Bayes's rule|rule of Bayes]]. An experiment on [[belief revision]] has suggested that humans change their beliefs faster when using Bayesian methods than when using informal judgment.<ref>Subjects changed their beliefs faster by conditioning on evidence (Bayes's theorem) than by using informal reasoning, according to a classic study by the psychologist Ward Edwards:<br />
* {{cite book| vauthors = Edwards W | chapter=Conservatism in Human Information Processing|editor=Kleinmuntz, B| title=Formal Representation of Human Judgment|publisher=Wiley|year=1968}}
* {{cite book| vauthors = Edwards W | chapter=Conservatism in Human Information Processing (excerpted)|editor=[[Daniel Kahneman]], [[Paul Slovic]] and [[Amos Tversky]]| title=Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1982}}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Phillips LD, Edwards W |chapter=Chapter 6: Conservatism in a simple probability inference task (''Journal of Experimental Psychology'' (1966) 72: 346-354) |title=A Science of Decision Making:The Legacy of Ward Edwards  | veditors = Weiss JW, Weiss DJ |isbn=978-0-19-532298-9 |page=536 |date=October 2008 |publisher= Oxford University Press}}</ref>

According to the empirical results, there has been almost no recognition in decision theory of the distinction between the problem of justifying its theoretical claims regarding the properties of rational belief and desire. One of the main reasons is that people's basic tastes and preferences for losses cannot be represented with utility as they change under different scenarios.<ref name=":7">{{cite journal| vauthors = Vind K |date= February 2000 |title=von Neumann Morgenstern preferences |journal=Journal of Mathematical Economics|volume=33|issue=1|pages=109–122|doi=10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00004-x|issn=0304-4068}}</ref>