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False imprisonment
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====Elements==== ===== Intentional or reckless ===== An example of reckless imprisonment may be a janitor locking up a school for the night, knowing that someone ''might'' still be inside, but without bothering to check. Whereas, regarding intention, intention to imprison a person is what matters and not necessarily an intention to falsely imprison someone. For example, in ''[[R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex p Evans]]'',<ref name=Brockhill>''R v Governor of Brockhill Prison ex parte Evans'' [1997] QB 443</ref> it did not matter if the decision to imprison the claimant was in good faith, or considered lawful, it still constituted false imprisonment. False imprisonment does not require a literal prison, but a restriction of the claimant's freedom of movement (''complete restraint''). According to the ''[[Termes de la Ley]]'', 'imprisonment is the restraint of a man's liberty, whether it be in the open field, or in the stocks, or in the cage in the streets or in a man's own house, as well as in the common gaole'. Imprisonment does not have to involve seizure of the claimant; touching and informing him that he is under arrest are sufficient.<ref>{{cite book |first1=Simon F. |last1=Deakin |author-link1=Simon Deakin |last2=Adams |first2=Zoe |first3=Basil |last3=Markesinis |author-link3=Basil Markesinis |title=Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law |edition=8th |publisher=Oxford University Press |date=2019 |ISBN=9780198747963}}</ref> Tagging and an imposed curfew can be false imprisonment.<ref>''R (Gedi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department'' [2015] EWHC 276 (Admin), [2016] EWCA Civ 409</ref><ref>''R (Jollah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department'' [2018] EWCA Civ 1260</ref> The restriction must also be total, meaning that the claimant is restricted to an area delimited by the defendant. The larger the area, the less likely the claimant will be deemed to be imprisoned. For example, confining a person to a house would constitute the tort of false imprisonment. However, confining someone to the land mass of the USA would not. Therefore, false imprisonment is not just about locking someone within a room, the following examples have all been found to constitute false imprisonment: * Where a defendant might position themselves in a doorway to prevent someone leaving a room, as in ''Walker v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis'' [2014].<ref name=Walker>''Walker v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis'' [2014] EWCA Civ 897</ref> * Where a defendant might threaten violence if the claimant leaves, which could thus be both false imprisonment and assault.<ref>''[[Collins v Wilcock]]'' [1984] 3 All ER 374, 380 (QBD)</ref> * Where a defendant ensures someone stays in a room simply by asserting their authority, as in ''Harnett v Bond'' and ''Meering v Grahame-White Aviation.''<ref>''Harnett v Bond'' [1925] AC 669 (HL)</ref><ref>''Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd'' (1920) 122 LT 44</ref> Finally, where a claimant accedes to authority that does not necessarily mean they consent to being detained, as in ''Warner v Riddiford'' (1858).<ref>''Warner v Riddiford'' (1858) 4 CBNS 180, 140 ER 1052</ref> ===== Complete restraint ===== 'Imprisonment is, as I apprehend, a total restraint of the liberty of the person, for however, short a time, and not a partial obstruction of his will, whatever inconvenience it may bring on him.'<ref name=":2">Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2007] EWCA Civ 989</ref> There must be complete restraint, therefore, if there are alternative routes that can be taken this is not false imprisonment. Such as in ''Bird v Jones [1845]''<ref name=":5">Bird v Jones [1845] EWHC 7 QB 742</ref> where the claimant wanted to walk over Hammersmith bridge but the defendant had cordoned off the public footpath, however, this did not constitute false imprisonment because, through using a longer route, the claimant could have still reached their destination. Therefore, if there is a means of escape, this is not false imprisonment. There must be no reasonable means of escape and you may be [[Compensatory damages|compensated]] for any damages caused in order for you to escape reasonably. However, if you have not taken a reasonable route of escape/reasonable action you will not be awarded damages.<ref>Hicks v Young [2015] EWHC 1144 (QB)</ref> ===== Awareness ===== It is still false imprisonment even where the claimant does not know at the time. So secretly locking someone in a room is false imprisonment. It may also be false imprisonment where a person is rendered unconscious, for example, by being punched (also a battery), or when their drink is spiked by drugs (also wilful harm or negligence), because their freedom of movement is thereby restricted.<ref>Professor Matthew Channon (Exeter University Law School)</ref> For example, in the case of ''Meering v Grahame-White Aviation [1918]''<ref>Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1920) 122 LT 44</ref> the claimant was told to stay in an office because property was going missing and if they tried to leave the office they would have been stopped. This was held to be a false imprisonment even though the claimant did not know they were being imprisoned. ===== Omission ===== ''Can the tort of false imprisonment be committed by omission?'' In the majority of circumstances/generally, the answer is no, as there must be a positive act. Yet, in certain circumstances defendants may still be found liable if they are under a positive obligation to release the claimant and the claimant has the legal right to be released. In the case of ''Prison Officer's Association v Iqbal''<ref name=":0">''Prison Officer's Association v Iqbal'' [2009]</ref> where a defendant could not leave their cell due to the prison officers being on strike, it was held at [61] that: {{quote|'It seems to me that the general rule that an omission or refusal to release the claimant from confinement will not amount to false imprisonment should not be overridden save in circumstances where the claimant has a legal right to be released and the defendant is under a positive obligation to release the claimant.'<ref name=":0" />}} Thus, the defendants were liable for omission under the tort of false imprisonment. Moreover, in the case of ''[[R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex p Evans]]'',<ref name=Brockhill/> where the claimant should be released from prison and they weren't, due to a genuine mistake meaning they were held in prison for longer, this was still held to be false imprisonment. ===== Lawful imprisonment ===== ====== Performance of a contract ====== This can be looked at as consent, therefore, the imprisonment is not unlawful nor false imprisonment, for example, when flying, you consent to be on the plane for that duration of time through contract. The courts have said it is not unlawful to refuse to open a train door when the train is on a bridge, even though the passenger is thereby restricted inside the train.<ref name=":1" /> Likewise, a master of a ship,<ref>''Hook v Cunard Steamship Co Ltd'' [1953] 1 All ER 1021</ref> or the pilot of a plane<ref>Civil Aviation Act 1982 s. 94</ref> can detain people during a voyage or flight when they have a reasonable cause or grounds to believe it necessary for the safety of their other passengers. Suddenly saying "I would like to leave now" is dangerous and thus, they have no reason to let you leave, moreover, you are contractually obligated to remain onboard. Therefore, this would not constitute false imprisonment. Additionally, when a claimant is following a work contract the employer may not be held for false imprisonment for not allowing them to leave early due to a breach of contract and potential losses that could result from them leaving. In the case of ''Herd v Weardale Steel Coal''<ref>''Herd v Weardale Steel Coal & Coke Co Ltd'' [1915] AC 67</ref> where the claimant was in a mine, they were working and they wanted to leave the mine. The employer refused to let them leave at that time and the court held that the employer was under no obligation to allow them to do so. ====== Police ====== Under [[English law]], police have the right to arrest under a warrant issued by a magistrate,<ref name=":1" /> and following conditions set out in [[Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984|PACE]] Code G. Or without a warrant, police may make an arrest pursuant to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984:<ref name=PACE>Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984</ref> 'anyone who is about to commit, is committing or has committed an offence or is so suspected on reasonable grounds may be arrested.' Also, arrest may be lawful if the police have reason to believe that the person arrested poses an imminent risk of harm to themselves or others. Private citizens can also make an arrest for crimes being committed/that have been committed but only in relation to indictable offences ('citizen's arrest').<ref name=":1" /> When a prisoner is lawfully held, it is not false imprisonment just because the conditions are unsanitary such as in the case of ''R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison'',<ref>''R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison ex p Hague'' [1992] 1 AC 58 (HL)</ref> 'although this may instead be found to be [[negligence]] or the tort of misfeasance in a public office.'<ref name=":1" /> Another example would again be the case of ''Austin v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis'' [2007],<ref name=":2" /> a case concerning the alleged unlawful detention of hundreds of members of the public during the [[International Workers' Day#United Kingdom|May Day riots of 2001]] in London, England. The police, using the tactic of "[[kettling]]", held a large crowd in [[Oxford Circus]] without allowing anyone to leave. Lois Austin, a peaceful protester who had not broken the law, and Geoffrey Saxby, an innocent passer-by who was not involved in the demonstration, claimed that they were falsely imprisoned by the London [[Metropolitan Police]] and that their detention was in breach of the [[European Convention of Human Rights]].<ref name="bbc1">{{cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1956323.stm |title=Police sued over May Day protest |date=2002-04-28|work=BBC News|access-date=2009-04-16 |location=London |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040509095234/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1956323.stm|archive-date=2004-05-09 |url-status=live}}</ref> The pair lost their court action in 2005,<ref name="bbc2">{{cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/4374853.stm|title=Pair lose protest damages claim|work=BBC News|access-date=2017-11-06|date=2005-03-23|location=London|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170629115905/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/4374853.stm|archive-date=2017-06-29|url-status=live}}</ref> when the High Court ruled that the police had not acted unlawfully. An appeal against the ruling also failed in 2007.<ref name="bbc2" /> A ruling by the [[House of Lords]] declared that 'even in the case of an absolute right, the High Court was entitled to take the "purpose" of the deprivation of liberty into account before deciding if human rights law applied at all.'<ref name="lords2009">{{cite web|title=Judgments - Austin (FC) (Appellant) & another v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent) (2009)|url=https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldjudgmt/jd090128/austin-1.htm|website=www.parliament.uk|publisher=U.K. Parliament|access-date=6 November 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171107024959/https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldjudgmt/jd090128/austin-1.htm|archive-date=2017-11-07|url-status=live}}</ref>
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