Editing Marian reforms (section)

=== Contemporary historiography ===

The belief in the Marian reforms, by the late 20th century, largely rested on the argument that they reflected a manpower shortage.{{sfn|Faszcza|2021|p=32}} [[William Vernon Harris]], an American classicist, showed in 1979 that complaints about conscription largely emerged only during campaigns which offered few prospects for plunder; this recast Marius' call in 107&nbsp;BC for volunteers as reflecting less a dearth of soldiers but rather the relatively little plunder expected for service in Numidia.<ref>{{harvnb|Faszcza|2021|p=33}}, citing {{Cite book |last=Harris |first=William V |title=War and imperialism in republican Rome: 327-70 BC |date=1979 |publisher=Clarendon Press |isbn=978-0-19-814866-1 |location=Oxford}}</ref> J&nbsp;W Rich then showed in a 1983 article in ''Historia'' that there was no general manpower shortage in Italy and that Marius' use of voluntary enlistment was in fact precedented, undermining the main proposed rationale for recruiting the {{lang|la|proletarii}}.{{sfnm|Cadiou|2018|1pp=49–50|Faszcza|2021|2p=34}} Further work on the demography of second-century Italy, especially by Nathan Rosenstein in the early 2000s, showed more definitively from the basis of archaeology there had been no population decline in the decades before Marius' first consulship, as had previously been believed.<ref>{{harvnb|Cadiou|2018|p=400}}, citing, among others, {{Cite book |last=Rosenstein |first=Nathan|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CGgwN9ZLaPYC |title=Rome at war: farms, families, and death in the middle republic |date=2004 |publisher=University of North Carolina Press |isbn=978-0-8078-2839-7 }}</ref>

François Cadiou, in his 2018 book {{lang|fr|L'armée imaginaire}}, largely disproved the traditional narrative that Marius' volunteers had a substantial impact on the composition of the army, that the late republic's armies were made up largely of volunteers, and that those armies were largely drawn from the landless poor.{{sfnm|Gauthier|2020|1p=283|Rafferty|2021}} Cadiou, moreover, argued that historians' unwillingness to discard the theory that Marius decisively changed army recruitment, despite the limited evidence for it, emerged from the attractiveness of the theory as a simple explanation for the republic's collapse.{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|p=117}}

The changes to the Roman army during the 1st century&nbsp;BC are now more attributed to the [[Social War (91–87 BC)|Social War]] and the civil wars from 49 to 31&nbsp;BC.<ref>{{harvnb|Taylor|2023|p=162}}; {{harvnb|Gauthier|2020|p=284|ps=. "I... instead look at the Social War, as well as the civil wars, as the periods of pivotal change".}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Probst|2008|ps=. "The first act that revolutionised the Roman army was Sulla’s march on Rome in 88".}}</ref> After the Social War, the state also started to keep men under arms for longer periods to maintain available experienced manpower, and coupled this with longer terms for commanders, particularly [[Julius Caesar|Caesar]] and [[Pompey]]. Client armies emerged not in the 100s&nbsp;BC but rather in the decades before [[Caesar's civil war]], which broke out in 49{{Nbsp}}BC.{{sfn|Taylor|2023|p=162}} The large-scale downsizing of Roman cavalry detachments likely emerged from the extension of citizenship to all of Italy. Because Italy's enfranchisement meant that Rome was now directly liable for the cavalry's upkeep rather than their local communities, Rome instead levied {{Lang|la|auxilia}} from allies who, by treaty, were responsible for their contingents' upkeep.{{sfn|Gauthier|2020|p=286}}

Contrary to the traditional story of quiescent client armies following their generals, contemporary historiography has established that Roman soldiers during the civil wars needed to be convinced of the legitimacy of their generals' causes.{{sfn|Cadiou|2018|pp=419–20}}<ref>{{harvnb|Cadiou|2018|p=420 nn. 82–83}}, citing {{harvnb|Morstein-Marx|2011}}.</ref> For [[Sulla]] and [[Lucius Cornelius Cinna|Cinna]], such appeals were rooted in the consuls' legitimacy and prerogatives given as a gift of the people.{{sfn|Morstein-Marx|2011|pp=276–78}} Client armies, instead of being a consequence of putative changes in recruitment, emerged from the prolonged civil wars – themselves fought between armies which believed they were defending the republic{{sfn|Rosenstein|2022|pp=243–44}} – and generals' attempts to secure military loyalty with pay increases.{{sfn|Rosenstein|2022|p=245}}