Editing Pyotr Bagration (section)

==Tactics and doctrine==
[[File:Рис. и грав. Д.Дайтона. 1814 г.jpg|thumb|Bagration by D. Dayton, 1814]]
Bagration, heavily influenced by [[Alexander Suvorov]], was an innovative tactician who favoured mobile offensive warfare, even though many of the battles in which he was engaged with the French were of a defensive nature. He refused what he perceived as obsolete positioning tactics and instead would give the Russian army strategic objects and tactical manoeuvers, always going for the quick confrontation, where speed and accuracy were most important, in order to deny the enemy any chance to react, respond or even organize. This led to much tension and rivalry between him and general Barclay de Tolly, who was given overall command and relied mostly on the search for adequate positions to entrench and wait for the enemy. Bagration's applied doctrines were ahead of their time solid concepts for both offensive and defensive warfare, as even his retreats were conducted in equally good and impressive fashion, given the sometimes impossible odds he was facing.

Bagration's strategic views defined also his insights about the character of tactical military action. It is possible to discern these insights by considering the famous order to the forces of the 2nd Western Army, dated 25 June 1812. In the order, written by Bagration with his own hand, instructions were given concerning actions to be taken against the French armies if they invaded Russian territory. He wrote:

{{blockquote|For us, it is necessary to attack them bravely, quickly, not to become engaged in shooting matches; artillery must fire precisely, irregular armies must try to surround their flanks and rear. ... The regular cavalry attacks quickly, but as a part of concerted action, without dividing into small bodies. Squadrons must support each other in the attack, not forgetting to provide for reserves and flanks. The cavalry should be located under the chess order.<ref name=mika13/>}}

Attacks were to be conducted with troops formed in columns:

{{blockquote|Commanders of Corps must try to turn all attention to attacking the enemy with bayonets, using columns, and to attack until the enemy retreats. The horse artillery should operate energetically, as should cavalry, but harmoniously and without the slightest confusion. It is especially necessary when the enemy has strong reserves and may frustrate our attacking forces; for that we must try to have our forces in columns and in readiness, and as soon as everyone is driven into flight, then the Cossacks must prick and harass them, with the regular forces in close and harmonious support.{{sfnp|Mikaberidze|2009}}}}

Bagration recommended deployment of the forces in a battle array that was not too closely packed, but sufficiently so as to permit soldiers to feel each other's presence with their elbows. In case of counter-attacks by enemy cavalry, Bagration advised the use of battalion masses and squares, or ''carrés''. "When the enemy cavalry attacks infantry, it takes only a minute to form either a column closed on all sides, or a battalion in a ''carré''."

With the purpose of increasing the enthusiasm of armies, all attacks were to be made with a shout, and during the approach the drums were to be beaten and music to be played.

Similar insights are reflected in a number of Bagration's other orders, instructions, and letters. In particular, as  characteristic of his tactical perspective, the "Manual for Infantry Officers on the Day of Battle" may serve as an example. This document was prepared on the basis of the "Manual to Officers of the Narva infantry Regiment," authored by M.S. Vorontsov in 1812. According to military historian P. Simansky, Vorontsov's manual "was strongly influenced by Suvorov's precepts, and was appraised by the most favorite disciple of Suvorov, Prince Bagration; it was slightly corrected by him, as in some places it concerned only Narva infantry Regiment, and then in July 1812 it was dispatched to all units of the 2nd Army." The "Manual to Infantry Officers on the Day of Battle" recognized the offensive as the fundamental form of combat. The principal manifestation of offensive combat was the bayonet attack, concluded with a vigorous pursuit of the defeated enemy. This manual considered in detail the question of action in separate lines and in columns and about conducting aimed fire. The necessity of maintaining close communication of skirmishers with their columns was specified; movement forward was to be determined only by an order of the chief of division or battalion. If it was necessary to operate on separate lines in forests, it was suggested to hold a reserve behind one of the flanks in order to have an opportunity to suddenly envelope the flank of a counter-attacking enemy.

Attacks by enemy cavalry acting in separate lines were to be met by fire, after allowing the enemy to advance to within approximately 150 paces; after that it would be necessary to divide into small groups of ten and repulse the enemy by fire and bayonets until the approach of reinforcements. Upon approaching, reinforcements were to be redeployed from a column into square, firing on enemy cavalry from a distance of 150 paces. The "Manual" demanded that officers demonstrate constant care for their soldiers, to remind them of their duties and their oath, to explain what was required of them during military action. Special attention was given to the maintenance of trust in the virtue of "Russian bayonets", a spirit of boldness, courage and persistence in the fight. "Persistence and courage," declared the "Manual", "have won more battles than all other military talents taken altogether."

Dissemination of all rumors of disaster and panic, such as "We are cut off!", were categorically forbidden, under the threat of severe punishment. It was specified in the "Manual" that: "Brave people are never cut off; wherever the enemy goes, turn your breast to follow and defeat him." Thus, in the field of tactics, as well as in the field of strategy, Bagration acted as an innovator, a convinced supporter of decisive offensive action. He doggedly introduced advanced tactics; he dispensed with obsolete positional tactics and applied tactics of columns in a combination with separate lines. Paying great attention to the value of offensive combat, Bagration at the same time did not reject the opportunity to conduct defensive operations. He creatively approached planning for his assigned tasks, applying such forms of combat as provided exactly the right answers to particular circumstances. His practical legacy offers experience rich in the conduct of offensive battles as well as the development and practice of waging both advance and rear guard fights.

Bagration was the unsurpassed master of organization of these extremely complex kinds of action. It was not by chance that, at the most crucial moments of the wars of 1799–1807, it was Bagration who was appointed to command the rear guards and advance guards of the Russian Army. The engagements conducted by Russian armies under Bagration's leadership during the Italian campaign of 1799, and also the advance and rear guard combats during the Swiss Campaign of 1799 and war between of Russia and France in 1805–1807, belong among the finest accomplishments in Russian military art. Bagration built a process of education and training of soldiers on the basis of the system developed by A.V. Suvorov. He paid great attention to the training and education of troops to develop soldiers with courage and initiative, capable of carrying out orders quickly and skillfully.

Bagration constantly worried about his soldiers' health, taking measures so that they'd be well clothed and timely fed. S.G. Volkonsky, who during the Franco-Russian conflict of 1806–1807 was frequently in Bagration's group, wrote:

{{blockquote|... I visited several times an avant garde where many of my friends were serving at Prince Bagration's headquarters. The hospitable manner of the Prince with subordinates, amicable relations between themselves, harmony, cleanliness in tents, the fresh and pleased appearance of the lower grades, proved the Prince's good treatment and attitude toward them, and in all hearts the pledge of general trust in him.]{{sfnp|Mikaberidze|2009}}}}

While showing concern for the soldiers, Bagration at the same time demanded the maintenance of the strictest military discipline, considering it to be the foundation of military ability. "In military service," he wrote, "the first objective is order, subordination, discipline, unanimity and friendship". Above all, Bagration was extremely demanding of himself. "...To execute the will of the sovereign, of the emperor and my commanders is the most sacred obligation which I follow and obey at every step of my service... I love soldiers, I respect their bravery, and equally I demand order and discipline." Armies under Bagration's command were always distinguished for their high discipline, and, in some sense, this was one of the main reasons for their brilliant victories over their enemies.