Editing Smith set (section)

== Further reading ==
* {{cite journal |author=Ward, Benjamin |year=1961 |title=Majority Rule and Allocation |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=5 |issue=4 |pages=379–389 |doi=10.1177/002200276100500405 |s2cid=145231466}} In an analysis of serial decision making based on majority rule, describes the Smith set and the Schwartz set.
* {{cite journal |author=Smith, J.H. |year=1973 |title=Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorates |journal=Econometrica |publisher=The Econometric Society |volume=41 |issue=6 |pages=1027–1041 |doi=10.2307/1914033 |jstor=1914033 |authorlink=John H. Smith (mathematician)}} Introduces a version of a generalized Condorcet Criterion that is satisfied when pairwise elections are based on simple majority choice, and for any dominating set, any candidate in the set is collectively preferred to any candidate not in the set. But Smith does not discuss the idea of a smallest dominating set.
* {{cite journal |author=Fishburn, Peter C. |year=1977 |title=Condorcet Social Choice Functions |journal=SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics |volume=33 |issue=3 |pages=469–489 |doi=10.1137/0133030}} Narrows Smith's generalized Condorcet Criterion to the smallest dominating set and calls it Smith's Condorcet Principle.
* {{cite book |last=Schwartz |first=Thomas |title=The Logic of Collective Choice |publisher=Columbia University Press |year=1986 |location=New York}} Discusses the Smith set (named GETCHA) and the Schwartz set (named GOTCHA) as possible standards for optimal collective choice.
* {{cite journal |author=Schwartz, Thomas |year=1970 |title=On the Possibility of Rational Policy Evaluation |journal=Theory and Decision |volume=1 |pages=89–106 |doi=10.1007/BF00132454 |s2cid=154326683}}  Introduces the notion of the Schwartz set at the end of the paper as a possible alternative to maximization, in the presence of cyclic preferences, as a standard of rational choice.
* {{cite journal |author=Schwartz, Thomas |year=1972 |title=Rationality and the Myth of the Maximum |journal=Noûs |publisher=Noûs, Vol. 6, No. 2 |volume=6 |issue=2 |pages=97–117 |doi=10.2307/2216143 |jstor=2216143}}  Gives an axiomatic characterization and justification of the Schwartz set as a possible standard for optimal, rational collective choice.
* {{cite journal |author=Deb, Rajat |year=1977 |title=On Schwart's Rule |journal=Journal of Economic Theory |volume=16 |pages=103–110 |doi=10.1016/0022-0531(77)90125-9}}  Proves that the Schwartz set is the set of undominated elements of the transitive closure of the pairwise preference relation.
* Green-Armytage, James. [http://www.votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE29/I29P1.pdf Four Condorcet-Hare Hybrid Methods for Single-Winner Elections].
* Somdeb Lahiri (nd), "Group and multi-criteria decision making". Outlines some properties of choice sets.

[[Category:Electoral system criteria]]