Editing Vote counting (section)

===Direct-recording electronic counting===
{{main|DRE voting machine}}
{{further|Voting machine#Direct-recording electronic (DRE)|Electronic voting#Direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting system|Electronic voting in the United States#Direct-recording electronic counting}}
[[File:Paper roll with votes from numerous voters, on iVotronic election computer.png|thumb|Roll of paper from direct-recording machine, with votes from numerous voters, Martinsburg, West Virginia, 2018]]

A touch screen displays choices to the voter, who selects choices, and can change their mind as often as needed, before casting the vote. Staff initialize each voter once on the machine, to avoid repeat voting. Voting data and ballot images are recorded in memory components, and can be copied out at the end of the election.

The system may also provide a means for communicating with a central location for reporting results and receiving updates,<ref>[http://www.eac.gov/VVSG%20Volume_I.pdf 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060208184233/http://www.eac.gov/VVSG%20Volume_I.pdf |date=2006-02-08 }} from the US [[Election Assistance Commission]]</ref>
which is an access point for hacks and bugs to arrive.

Some of these machines also print names of chosen candidates on paper for the voter to verify. These names on paper can be used for [[election audit]]s and [[recount]]s if needed. The tally of the voting data is stored in a removable memory component and in bar codes on the paper tape. The paper tape is called a [[Voter-verified paper audit trail]] (VVPAT). The VVPATs can be counted at 20–43 seconds of staff time per vote (not per ballot).<ref name="votersunite">{{Cite web |url=http://www.votersunite.org/info/CostEstimateforHandCounting.pdf |title=Cost Estimate for Hand Counting 2% of the Precincts in the U.S. |last=Theisen |first=Ellen |date=2005-06-14 |website=VotersUnite.org |access-date=2020-02-14}}</ref><ref name="ga"/>

For machines without VVPAT, there is no record of individual votes to check.

====Errors in direct-recording electronic voting====
This approach can have software errors. It does not include scanners, so there are no scanner errors. When there is no paper record, it is hard to notice or research most errors.
*The only forensic examination which has been done of direct-recording software files was in Georgia in 2020, and found that one or more unauthorized intruders had entered the files and erased records of what it did to them. In 2014-2017 an intruder had control of the state computer in Georgia which programmed vote-counting machines for all counties. The same computer also held voter registration records. The intrusion exposed all election files in Georgia since then to compromise and malware. Public disclosure came in 2020 from a court case.<ref name="lamb">{{Cite web |url=https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.699.10.pdf |title=SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF LOGAN LAMB |last=Lamb |first=Logan |date=2020-01-14 |website=CourtListener |access-date=2020-02-03}}</ref><ref name="cgg">{{Cite web |url=https://coaltionforgoodgovernance.sharefile.com/d-s0dce50c25084f0da |title=Coalition Plaintiffs' Status Report, pages 237-244 |date=2020-01-16 |website=Coalition for Good Governance |access-date=2020-02-03}}</ref><ref name="bajak">{{Cite news |url=https://apnews.com/39dad9d39a7533efe06e0774615a6d05 |title=Expert: Georgia election server showed signs of tampering |last=Bajak |first=Frank |date=2020-01-16 |work=Associated Press |access-date=2020-02-03}}</ref> Georgia did not have paper ballots to measure the amount of error in electronic tallies. The [[FBI]] studied that computer in 2017, and did not report the intrusion.<ref name="zetter-ga">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |url=http://politi.co/2heBRW2 |title=Will the Georgia Special Election Get Hacked?|work=Politico |access-date=2020-02-16 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="lamb"/>
*A 2018 study of direct-recording voting machines (iVotronic) without VVPAT in South Carolina found that every election from 2010 to 2018 had some memory cards fail. The investigator also found that lists of candidates were different in the central and precinct machines, so 420 votes which were properly cast in the precinct were erroneously added to a different contest in the central official tally, and unknown numbers were added to other contests in the central official tallies. The investigator found the same had happened in 2010. There were also votes lost by garbled transmissions, which the state election commission saw but did not report as an issue. 49 machines reported that their three internal memory counts disagreed, an average of 240 errors per machine, but the machines stayed in use, and the state evaluation did not report the issue, and there were other error codes and time stamp errors.<ref name="buell"/><ref name="freed">{{Cite news |url=https://statescoop.com/south-carolina-voting-machines-miscounted-hundreds-of-ballots-report-finds/ |title=South Carolina voting machines miscounted hundreds of ballots, report finds |last=Freed |first=Benjamin |date=2019-01-07|work=Scoop News Group |access-date=2020-02-05 |language=en}}</ref>
*In a 2017 York County, Pennsylvania, election, a programming error in a county's machines without VVPAT let voters vote more than once for the same candidate. Some candidates had filed as both Democrat and Republican, so they were listed twice in races where voters could select up to three candidates, so voters could select both instances of the same name.<ref name="ydr7">{{Cite news |last1=Kessler |first1=Brandie |last2=Boeckel |first2=Teresa |last3=Segelbaum |first3=Dylan |url=https://www.ydr.com/story/news/2017/11/07/problem-york-county-voting-machines-could-allow-extra-votes-some-candidates/841010001/ |title='Redo' of some York County races - including judge - possible after voting problems |date=2017-11-07 |work=York Daily Record |access-date=2020-03-11 |language=en}}</ref> They recounted the DRE machines' electronic records of votes and found 2,904 pairs of double votes.<ref name="ydr20">{{Cite news |last=Lee |first=Rick |url=https://www.ydr.com/story/news/2017/11/20/no-change-after-election-recount/869905001/ |title=UPDATE: York Co. election judicial winners: Kathleen Prendergast, Clyde Vedder, Amber Anstine Kraft |date=2017-11-20 |work=York Daily Record |access-date=2020-03-11 |language=en}}</ref>
*In a 2011 Fairfield Township, New Jersey, election a programming error in a machine without a VVPAT gave two candidates low counts. They collected more affidavits by voters who voted for them than the computer tally gave them, so a judge ordered a new election which they won.<ref name="nj-cw">{{Cite news |last=Thibodeau |first=Patrick |url=https://www.computerworld.com/article/3126820/if-the-election-is-hacked-we-may-never-know.html |title=If the election is hacked, we may never know |date=2016-10-05|work=ComputerWorld |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en}}</ref>
*A 2007 study for the Ohio Secretary of State reported on election software from ES&S, Premier and Hart. Besides the problems it found, it noted that all "election systems rely heavily on third party software that implement interfaces to the operating systems, local databases, and devices such as optical scanners... the construction and features of this software is unknown, and may contain undisclosed vulnerabilities such trojan horses or other malware."<ref name="everest">{{Cite report |url=https://nordicinnovationlabs.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/everest.pdf |title=EVEREST: Evaluation and Validation of Election-Related Equipment, Standards and Testing |last=McDaniel |display-authors=etal |date=2007-12-07 |issue=Ohio Secretary of State |access-date=2020-02-05}}</ref>