Editing Active measures (section)

== Russian Federation active measures, 1991 to present ==
{{See also|Propaganda in the Russian Federation|Second Cold War}}
Active measures have continued in the post-Soviet [[Russia|Russian Federation]] and are in many ways based on Cold War schematics.<ref name="am"/> After the [[annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|annexation of Crimea]], Kremlin-controlled media spread disinformation about Ukraine's government. In July 2014, [[Malaysia Airlines Flight 17|Malaysia Airlines flight MH17]] was shot down by a Russian missile over eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 passengers. Kremlin-controlled media and online agents spread disinformation, claiming Ukraine had shot down the airplane.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/02/22/russian-disinformation-distorts-american-and-european-democracy |title=Russian disinformation distorts American and European democracy |date=22 February 2018 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |access-date=26 November 2018 |archive-date=26 November 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181126181142/https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/02/22/russian-disinformation-distorts-american-and-european-democracy |url-status=live }}</ref>

Russia's alleged disinformation campaign, its involvement in [[Brexit|the UK's withdrawal from the EU]], [[interference in the 2016 United States presidential election]], and its alleged support of far-left and documented support of far-right movements in the West, has been compared to the Soviet Union's active measures in that it aims to "disrupt and discredit Western democracies".<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21711538-1930s-moscow-beacon-international-movement-russian-propaganda |title=The motherlands calls: Russian propaganda is state-of-the-art again |date=10 December 2016 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |access-date=13 December 2016 |archive-date=13 December 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161213022837/http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21711538-1930s-moscow-beacon-international-movement-russian-propaganda |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/russia-is-already-winning-214648 |title=Russia Is Already Winning |first=Molly K. |last=McKew |date=18 January 2017 |website=[[Politico]] |access-date=24 January 2017 |archive-date=21 January 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170121093116/http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/russia-is-already-winning-214648 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In testimony before the [[United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence|United States Senate Intelligence Committee]] hearing on the US policy response to Russian interference in the 2016 elections, [[Victoria Nuland]], former US Ambassador to [[NATO]], referred to herself as "a regular target of Russian active measures."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.c-span.org/video/?447328-1/obama-administration-officials-testify-russia-election-interference#Victoria&start=772 |title=Senate Intelligence Committee on the policy response to Russian interference in the 2016 elections |first=Victoria |last=Nuland |date=June 20, 2018 |website=[[C-SPAN]] |access-date=July 19, 2018 |archive-date=15 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180715064539/https://www.c-span.org/video/?447328-1/obama-administration-officials-testify-russia-election-interference#Victoria&start=772 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/CHRG-115shrg30501.pdf |title=Hearing Before The Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate: Policy Response To The Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections |date=June 20, 2018 |website=U.S. Senate |access-date=23 August 2020 |archive-date=26 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200826024415/https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/CHRG-115shrg30501.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

The introduction of the Internet, specifically social media offered new opportunities for active measures. The Kremlin-affiliated [[Internet Research Agency]], also referred to as the Information Warfare Branch, was established in 2013.<ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271634 |title=Commanding the Trend: Social Media as Information Warfare |last=Prier |first=Jarred |date=2017 |journal=[[Strategic Studies Quarterly]] |publisher=[[Air University Press]] |volume=11 |number=4 |pages=50–85 |jstor=26271634 |access-date=28 October 2021 |archive-date=4 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210204160128/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271634 |url-status=live }}</ref> This agency is devoted to spreading disinformation through the Internet, the most well-known and prominent operation being its part in the interference in the 2016 US presidential election.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Bastos |first1=Marco |last2=Farkas |first2=Johan |date=2019-04-01 |title='Donald Trump Is My President!': The Internet Research Agency Propaganda Machine |journal=Social Media + Society |language=en |volume=5 |issue=3 |doi=10.1177/2056305119865466 |s2cid=181681781 |issn=2056-3051|doi-access=free |hdl=2043/29693 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> According to the [[United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]], by 2018, organic content created by the Russian IRA reached at least 126 million US Facebook users, while its politically divisive ads reached 11.4 million US Facebook users. Tweets by the IRA reached approximately 288 million American users. According to committee chair [[Adam Schiff]], "[The Russian] social media campaign was designed to further a broader Kremlin objective: sowing discord in the U.S. by inflaming passions on a range of divisive issues. The Russians did so by weaving together fake accounts, pages, and communities to push politicized content and videos, and to mobilize real Americans to sign [[online petition]]s and join rallies and protests."<ref>{{Cite web |title=Exposing Russia's Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and Advertisements |url=https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/ |url-status=dead |access-date=2021-11-05 |website=[[Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence]]|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190107222939/https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/ |archive-date=7 January 2019 }}</ref>