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Argumentation theory
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==Theories== ===Argument fields=== [[Stephen Toulmin]] and [[Charles Arthur Willard]] have championed the idea of argument fields, the former drawing upon [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Ludwig Wittgenstein's]] notion of [[language-game|language games]], (Sprachspiel) the latter drawing from communication and argumentation theory, sociology, political science, and social epistemology. For Toulmin, the term "field" designates discourses within which arguments and factual claims are grounded.<ref>{{cite book|first = Stephen E.|last = Toulmin|title = The Uses of Argument|date = 1958|publisher = Cambridge University Press|isbn = 978-0521092302|url-access = registration|url = https://archive.org/details/usesofargument0000toul}}</ref> For Willard, the term "field" is interchangeable with "community", "audience", or "readership".<ref>Charles Arthur Willard. "Some Questions About Toulmin's View of Argument Fields." Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, eds. ''Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation''. 1980. "Field Theory: A Cartesian Meditation." George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds. ''Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation.''</ref> Similarly, G. Thomas Goodnight has studied "spheres" of argument and sparked a large literature created by younger scholars responding to or using his ideas.<ref>G. T. Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument." ''Journal of the American Forensics Association.'' (1982) 18:214β227.</ref> The general tenor of these field theories is that the premises of arguments take their meaning from social communities.<ref>Bruce E. Gronbeck. "Sociocultural Notions of Argument Fields: A Primer." George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds. ''Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation.'' (1981) 1β20.</ref> ===Stephen E. Toulmin's contributions=== One of the most influential theorists of argumentation was the philosopher and educator, [[Stephen Toulmin]], who is known for creating the [[Toulmin model of argument]]. His book ''[[The Uses of Argument]]'' is regarded as a seminal contribution to argumentation theory.<ref>{{cite book |last=Loui|first=Ronald P. |editor1-first=David| editor1-last=Hitchcock |editor2-first=Bart| editor2-last=Verheij |title=Arguing on the Toulmin Model: New Essays in Argument Analysis and Evaluation |year=2006 |publisher=Springer Netherlands|pages=31β38|chapter=A Citation-Based Reflection on Toulmin and Argument |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3xE5ichwr5MC&q=A+Citation-Based+Reflection+on+Toulmin+and+Argument&pg=PA31 |isbn=978-1-4020-4937-8 |quote=Toulmin's 1958 work is essential in the field of argumentation. |doi=10.1007/978-1-4020-4938-5_3 |access-date=2010-06-25}}</ref> ====Alternative to absolutism and relativism==== {{transcluded section|source=Stephen Toulmin}} {{trim|{{#section-h:Stephen Toulmin|Objection to absolutism and relativism}}}} ====Toulmin model of argument==== {{transcluded section|source=Stephen Toulmin}} {{trim|{{#section-h:Stephen Toulmin|Toulmin model of argument}}}} ==== Evolution of knowledge ==== {{transcluded section|source=Stephen Toulmin}} {{trim|{{#section-h:Stephen Toulmin|Evolutionary model}}}} ===Pragma-dialectics=== {{Main article|Pragma-dialectics}} Scholars at the [[University of Amsterdam]] in the Netherlands have pioneered a rigorous modern version of [[dialectic]] under the name ''pragma-dialectics''. The intuitive idea is to formulate clear-cut rules that, if followed, will yield reasonable discussion and sound conclusions. [[Frans H. van Eemeren]], the late [[Rob Grootendorst]], and many of their students and co-authors have produced a large body of work expounding this idea. The dialectical conception of reasonableness is given by ten rules for critical discussion, all being instrumental for achieving a resolution of the difference of opinion (from Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p. 182β183). The theory postulates this as an ideal model, and not something one expects to find as an empirical fact. The model can however serve as an important [[heuristic]] and critical tool for testing how reality approximates this ideal and point to where discourse goes wrong, that is, when the rules are violated. Any such violation will constitute a [[fallacy]]. Albeit not primarily focused on fallacies, pragma-dialectics provides a systematic approach to deal with them in a coherent way. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst identified four stages of argumentative dialogue. These stages can be regarded as an argument protocol. In a somewhat loose interpretation, the stages are as follows:{{Citation needed|date=April 2020}} * Confrontation stage: Presentation of the difference of opinion, such as a debate question or a political disagreement. * Opening stage: Agreement on material and procedural starting points, the mutually acceptable common ground of facts and beliefs, and the rules to be followed during the discussion (such as, how evidence is to be presented, and determination of closing conditions). * Argumentation stage: Presentation of reasons for and against the standpoint(s) at issue, through application of logical and common-sense principles according to the agreed-upon rules * Concluding stage: Determining whether the standpoint has withstood reasonable criticism, and accepting it is justified. This occurs when the termination conditions are met (Among these could be, for example, a time limitation or the determination of an arbiter.) Van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide a detailed list of rules that must be applied at each stage of the protocol.{{Citation needed|date=April 2020}} Moreover, in the account of argumentation given by these authors, there are specified roles of protagonist and antagonist in the protocol which are determined by the conditions which set up the need for argument. ===Walton's logical argumentation method=== [[Douglas N. Walton]] developed a distinctive philosophical theory of logical argumentation built around a set of practical methods to help a user identify, analyze and evaluate arguments in everyday conversational discourse and in more structured areas such as debate, law and scientific fields.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Walton|first1=Douglas|title=Methods of Argumentation|date=2013|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge}}</ref> There are four main components: [[argumentation scheme]]s,<ref>{{cite book|last1=Walton|first1=Douglas|last2=Reed|first2=Chris|last3=Macagno|first3=Fabrizio|title=Argumentation Schemes|date=2008|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=New York}}</ref> dialogue structures, [[argument map]]ping tools, and formal argumentation systems. The method uses the notion of commitment in dialogue as the fundamental tool for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation rather than the notion of belief.<ref name="WaltonKrabbe1995">{{cite book|last1=Walton|first1=Douglas|last2=Krabbe|first2=E. C. W.|title=Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning|date=1995|publisher=SUNY Press|location=Albany}}</ref> Commitments are statements that the agent has expressed or formulated, and has pledged to carry out, or has publicly asserted. According to the commitment model, agents interact with each other in a dialogue in which each takes its turn to contribute speech acts. The dialogue framework uses critical questioning as a way of testing plausible explanations and finding weak points in an argument that raise doubt concerning the acceptability of the argument. Walton's logical argumentation model took a view of proof and justification different from [[analytic philosophy]]'s dominant [[epistemology]], which was based on a [[justified true belief]] framework.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Walton|first1=Douglas|last2=Zhang|first2=Nanning|title=The Epistemology of Scientific Evidence|journal=Artificial Intelligence and Law|date=2 October 2013|volume=21|issue=2|page=1|publisher=Social Science Research Network|doi=10.1007/s10506-012-9132-9|language=en|quote=In place of the traditional epistemological view of knowledge as justified true belief we argue that artificial intelligence and law needs an evidence -based epistemology|ssrn=2335090|s2cid=16536938}}</ref> In the logical argumentation approach, knowledge is seen as form of belief commitment firmly fixed by an argumentation procedure that tests the evidence on both sides, and uses standards of proof to determine whether a proposition qualifies as knowledge. In this evidence-based approach, knowledge must be seen as [[Defeasible reasoning|defeasible]].
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