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=== Theory-theory === {{Main|Theory-theory}} Theory-theory is a reaction to the previous two theories and develops them further.<ref name="Big Book"/> This theory postulates that categorization by concepts is something like scientific theorizing.<ref name="Stanford Encycl"/> Concepts are not learned in isolation, but rather are learned as a part of our experiences with the world around us.<ref name="Big Book"/> In this sense, concepts' structure relies on their relationships to other concepts as mandated by a particular mental theory about the state of the world.<ref name="concepts core readings"/> How this is supposed to work is a little less clear than in the previous two theories, but is still a prominent and notable theory.<ref name="concepts core readings"/> This is supposed to explain some of the issues of ignorance and error that come up in prototype and classical theories as concepts that are structured around each other seem to account for errors such as whale as a fish (this misconception came from an incorrect theory about what a whale is like, combining with our theory of what a fish is).<ref name="concepts core readings"/> When we learn that a whale is not a fish, we are recognizing that whales don't in fact fit the theory we had about what makes something a fish. Theory-theory also postulates that people's theories about the world are what inform their conceptual knowledge of the world. Therefore, analysing people's theories can offer insights into their concepts. In this sense, "theory" means an individual's mental explanation rather than scientific fact. This theory criticizes classical and prototype theory as relying too much on similarities and using them as a sufficient constraint. It suggests that theories or mental understandings contribute more to what has membership to a group rather than weighted similarities, and a cohesive category is formed more by what makes sense to the perceiver. Weights assigned to features have shown to fluctuate and vary depending on context and experimental task demonstrated by Tversky. For this reason, similarities between members may be collateral rather than causal.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Murphy|first1=Gregory L.|last2=Medin|first2=Douglas L.|date=1985|title=The role of theories in conceptual coherence.|journal=Psychological Review|volume=92|issue=3|pages=289β316|doi=10.1037/0033-295x.92.3.289|pmid=4023146|issn=0033-295X}}</ref>
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