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Condorcet method
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==Related terms== Other terms related to the Condorcet method are: ;Condorcet loser:{{citation needed|date=October 2020}} the candidate who is less preferred than every other candidate in a pairwise matchup (preferred by fewer voters than any other candidate). ;Weak Condorcet winner:{{citation needed|date=October 2020}} a candidate who beats or ties with every other candidate in a pairwise matchup (preferred by at least as many voters as any other candidate). There can be more than one weak Condorcet winner.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1007/s11127-014-0180-4 |quote=A weak Condorcet winner (WCW) is an alternative, y, that no majority of voters rank below any other alternative, z, but is not a SCW [Condorcet winner].|title=Weak Condorcet winner(s) revisited|year=2014|last1=Felsenthal|first1=Dan S.|last2=Tideman|first2=Nicolaus|journal=Public Choice|volume=160|issue=3β4|pages=313β326|s2cid=154447142}}</ref> ;Weak Condorcet loser:{{citation needed|date=October 2020}} a candidate who is defeated by or ties with every other candidate in a pairwise matchup. Similarly, there can be more than one weak Condorcet loser. ;Improved Condorcet winner:{{citation needed|date=October 2020}} in improved condorcet methods, additional rules for pairwise comparisons are introduced to handle ballots where candidates are tied, so that pairwise wins can not be changed by those tied ballots switching to a specific preference order. A strong improved condorcet winner in an improved condorcet method must also be a strong condorcet winner, but the converse need not hold. In tied at the top methods, the number of ballots where the candidates are tied at the top of the ballot is subtracted from the victory margin between the two candidates. This has the effect of introducing more ties in the pairwise comparison graph, but allows the method to satisfy the favourite betrayal criterion.
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