Editing Cosmological argument (section)

== Criticism and discourse ==
=== "What caused the first cause?" ===
Objections to the cosmological argument may question why a first cause is unique in that it does not require any causes. Critics contend that the concept of a first cause qualifies as [[special pleading]], or that arguing for the first cause's exemption raises the question of why there should be a first cause at all.<ref>{{harvnb|Reichenbach|2022}} 4.5</ref> Defenders maintain that this question is addressed by various formulations of the cosmological argument, emphasizing that none of its major iterations rests on the premise that everything requires a cause.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=07bHgxbG6A4C&q=curious+blind+spot+in+the+anglo+cause+everything&pg=PA49|title=The Creative Retrieval of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Essays in Thomistic Philosophy, New and Old|first=W. Norris|last=Clarke|date=August 25, 2009|publisher=Fordham Univ Press|isbn=9780823229307}}</ref>

Andrew Loke refers to the [[Kalam cosmological argument]], in which the causal premise ("whatever begins to exist has a cause") stipulates that only things which ''begin to exist'' require a cause.<ref name=Loke1>{{cite book|last= Loke|first= Andrew Ter Ern|title= God and Ultimate Origins|year= 2017|publisher= Springer International|isbn= 9783319575476|page= 189}}</ref> [[William Lane Craig]] asserts that—even if one posits a plurality of causes for the existence of the universe—a first uncaused cause is necessary, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise, which he argues is impossible.<ref name="craig-sinclair"/><ref name=Reichenbach/> Similarly, [[Edward Feser]] proposes, in accordance with Aquinas's discourses on the [[Five Ways (Aquinas)#Second way: The Argument of the First Cause|Second Way]], that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot regress to infinity, even if it may be theoretically possible for accidentally ordered causes to do so.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Feser |first1=Edward |author1-link=Edward Feser |title=Five Proofs of the Existence of God |date=2017 |publisher=Ignatius Press |isbn=978-1621641339}}</ref>

Various arguments have been presented to demonstrate the metaphysical impossibility of an actually infinite regress occurring in the [[reality|real world]], referring to [[thought experiments]] such as [[Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel|Hilbert's Hotel]], the [[The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman#References to Tristram Shandy|tale of Tristram Shandy]], and variations.<ref>{{harvnb|Loke|2017|loc=Chapters 2-3}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | author = Waters BV |title=Methuselah's Diary and the Finitude of the Past |journal=Philosophia Christi|volume=15 |issue=2 |pages=463–469 |date=2013|url=http://philpapers.org/archive/WATMDA-2.pdf |doi=10.5840/pc201315240|access-date=}}</ref>

=== "Does the universe need a cause?" ===

Craig maintains that the [[causality|causal principle]] is predicated in the [[metaphysical]] [[Rationalism#Intuition/deduction thesis|intuition]] that ''[[nothing comes from nothing]].'' If such intuitions are false, he argues it would be inexplicable why anything and everything does not randomly come into existence without a cause.<ref name="craig-sinclair"/> Yet, not all philosophers subscribe to the view of causality as ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' in [[Justification (epistemology)|justification]]. [[David Hume]] contends that the principle is rooted in [[experience]], therefore within the category of ''[[Empirical evidence|a posteriori]]'' knowledge and subject to the [[problem of induction]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|url=https://iep.utm.edu/hume-causation/ |title=David Hume: Causation |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2025-01-14}}</ref>

Whereas [[J. L. Mackie]] argues that cause and effect cannot be extrapolated to the origins of the universe based upon our inductive experiences and intellectual preferences,<ref>{{cite book|last= Mackie|first= J. L.|title= The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God|page=85|year= 1982|publisher= Oxford University Press|isbn= 978-0-19-824682-4}}</ref> Craig proposes that causal laws are unrestricted metaphysical truths that are "not contingent upon the properties, causal powers, and dispositions of the natural kinds of substances which happen to exist".<ref name=CraigPC>{{cite web | url=https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/the-existence-of-god/must-the-beginning-of-the-universe-have-a-personal-cause-a-rejoinder | title=Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?: A Rejoinder | author=William Lane Craig | website=Reasonable Faith }}</ref>

=== Identifying the first cause ===
Secular philosophers such as [[Michael Lou Martin|Michael Martin]] argue that a cosmological argument may establish the existence of a first cause, but falls short of identifying that cause as [[personhood|personal]], or as God as defined within [[classical theism|classical]] or other specific conceptions of [[theism]].<ref>{{cite book|last= Martin|first= Michael|title= Atheism: A Philosophical Justification|year= 1990|publisher= Temple University Press|page= 103|isbn= 978-0-87722-943-8}}</ref><ref name=Reichenbach />

Defenders of the argument note that most formulations, such as by Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Craig, employ conceptual analysis to establish the identity of the cause. In Aquinas's ''[[Summa Theologica]]'', the ''Prima Pars'' (First Part) is devoted predominantly to establishing the attributes of the cause, such as uniqueness, perfection and intelligence.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Aquinas |first1=Thomas |title=Summa Theologica: Prima Pars |url=https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1.htm |website=New Advent}}</ref> In Scotus's ''Ordinatio'', his metaphysical argument is the first component of the 'triple primacy' through which he characterises the first cause as a being with the attributes of maximal excellence.<ref name=SEPScot/>

===Timeless origin of the universe===

In the topic of [[cosmogony|cosmic origins]] and the standard model of [[cosmology]], the [[initial singularity]] of the [[Big Bang]] is postulated to be the point at which [[space]] and [[time]], as well as all [[matter]] and [[energy]], came into existence.<ref name="sciam">{{cite magazine |last1=Gott III |first1=J. Richard |author1-link=J. Richard Gott |last2=Gunn |first2=James E. |author2-link=James Gunn (astronomer) |last3=Schramm |first3=David N. |author3-link=David Schramm (astrophysicist) |last4=Tinsley |first4=Beatrice M. |author4-link=Beatrice Tinsley |title=Will the Universe Expand Forever? |magazine=[[Scientific American]] |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/24950306 |jstor=24950306 |access-date=December 10, 2023 |page=65 |date=March 1976}}</ref> [[J. Richard Gott]] and [[James Gunn (astronomer)|James E. Gunn]] assert that the question of "What was there before the Universe?" makes no sense and that the concept of ''before'' becomes meaningless when considering a timeless state. They add that questioning what occurred before the Big Bang is akin to questioning what is north of the [[North Pole]].<ref name="sciam"/>

Craig refers to [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]]'s postulate that a cause can be simultaneous with its effect, denoting that this is true of the moment of creation when time itself came into being.<ref>{{cite web |title=Creation and Simultaneous Causation |url=https://www.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/P650/creation-and-simultaneous-causation |last1=Craig |first1=William Lane |website=Reasonable Faith}}</ref> He affirms that the history of 20th century cosmology belies the proposition that researchers have no strong intuition to pursue a causal explanation of the origin of time and the universe.<ref name=CraigPC /> Accordingly, physicists have sought to examine the causal origins of the Big Bang by  conjecturing such scenarios as the collision of [[Membrane (M-Theory)|membrane]]s.<ref>{{cite web|last=Britt |first=Robert R. |title=Brane-Storm {{pipe}} Challenges Part of Big Bang Theory |publisher=Space.com |date=April 18, 2001 |access-date=June 21, 2008 |url=http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/astronomy/bigbang_alternative_010413-3.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080511144628/http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/astronomy/bigbang_alternative_010413-3.html |archive-date=11 May 2008 }}</ref> Feser also notes that versions of the cosmological argument presented by classical philosophers do not require a commitment to the Big Bang, or even to a cosmic origin.<ref>{{cite book |first=Edward |last=Feser |author-link=Edward Feser |title=The Last Superstition |publisher=St. Augustine Press |year=2008 |page=103|isbn=978-1587314520 }}</ref>

=== The Hume-Edwards principle ===
[[William L. Rowe]] characterises the Hume-Edwards principle, referring to arguments presented by [[David Hume]], and later [[Paul Edwards (philosopher)|Paul Edwards]], in their criticisms of the cosmological argument:<ref name=Pruss>Alexander R. Pruss, [https://archive.today/20130202224654/http://www.springerlink.com/content/q134n458307w0125 The Hume-Edwards Principle and the Cosmological Argument], ''International Journal for Philosophy of Religion''</ref>

{{Blockquote|"If the existence of every member of a set is explained, the existence of that set is thereby explained."}}

The principle stipulates that a causal series—even one that regresses to infinity—requires no explanatory causes beyond those that are members within that series. If every member of a series has a causal explanation within the sequence, the series in itself is explanatorily complete.<ref name=Pruss /> Thus, it rejects arguments, such as by Duns Scotus, for the existence of higher-order, efficient causes that govern the basic principles of material causation.<ref name=SEPScot /> Notably, it contradicts Hume's own ''[[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]]'', in which the character Demea reflects that, even if a succession of causes is infinite, the very existence of the chain still requires a cause.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hume |first=David|year=1779 |title= Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion |publisher=Penguin Books |place=London }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Calvert |first=Brian |title=Another problem about Part IX of Hume's Dialogues |journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=65–70 |doi=10.1007/BF00131845 |year=1983 |s2cid=189828318}}</ref>

=== Causal loop arguments ===

Some objections to the cosmological argument refer to the possibility of loops in the structure of [[causality|cause and effect]] that would avoid the need for a first cause. Gott and Li refer to the curvature of [[spacetime]] and [[closed timelike curve]]s as possible mechanisms by which the universe may bring about its own existence.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Can the Universe Create Itself? |first1=John Richard |last1=Gott III |first2=Li-Xin |last2=Li |journal=Physical Review D |volume=58 |issue=2 |date=1997 |page=023501 |doi=10.1103/PhysRevD.58.023501 |arxiv=astro-ph/9712344}}</ref> [[Richard Hanley]] contends that causal loops are neither logically nor physically impossible, remarking: "[In timed systems] the only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidence is required to explain them."<ref>{{cite journal |title=No End in Sight: Causal Loops in Philosophy, Physics and Fiction |first=Richard |last=Hanley |journal=Synthese |volume=141 |date=2004 |pages=123–152 |doi=10.1023/B:SYNT.0000035847.28833.4f}}</ref>

Andrew Loke argues that there is insufficient evidence to postulate a causal loop of the type that would avoid a first cause. He proposes that such a mechanism would suffer from the problem of [[temporal paradox#Bootstrap paradox|vicious circularity]], rendering it [[metaphysics|metaphysically]] impossible.<ref>{{cite book |last=Loke |first=Andrew |chapter=Is There a Causal Loop Which Avoids a First Cause? |title=God and Ultimate Origins |date=2017a |publisher=Springer International Publishing AG |location=Switzerland |isbn=9783319861890 |pages=109–123}}</ref>