Editing False imprisonment (section)

===== Intentional or reckless =====
An example of reckless imprisonment may be a janitor locking up a school for the night, knowing that someone ''might'' still be inside, but without bothering to check. Whereas, regarding intention, intention to imprison a person is what matters and not necessarily an intention to falsely imprison someone. For example, in ''[[R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex p Evans]]'',<ref name=Brockhill>''R v Governor of Brockhill Prison ex parte Evans'' [1997] QB 443</ref> it did not matter if the decision to imprison the claimant was in good faith, or considered lawful, it still constituted false imprisonment.

False imprisonment does not require a literal prison, but a restriction of the claimant's freedom of movement (''complete restraint''). According to the ''[[Termes de la Ley]]'', 'imprisonment is the restraint of a man's liberty, whether it be in the open field, or in the stocks, or in the cage in the streets or in a man's own house, as well as in the common gaole'. Imprisonment does not have to involve seizure of the claimant; touching and informing him that he is under arrest are sufficient.<ref>{{cite book |first1=Simon F. |last1=Deakin |author-link1=Simon Deakin |last2=Adams |first2=Zoe |first3=Basil |last3=Markesinis |author-link3=Basil Markesinis |title=Markesinis and Deakin's Tort Law |edition=8th |publisher=Oxford University Press |date=2019 |ISBN=9780198747963}}</ref> Tagging and an imposed curfew can be false imprisonment.<ref>''R (Gedi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department'' [2015] EWHC 276 (Admin), [2016] EWCA Civ 409</ref><ref>''R (Jollah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department'' [2018] EWCA Civ 1260</ref> The restriction must also be total, meaning that the claimant is restricted to an area delimited by the defendant. The larger the area, the less likely the claimant will be deemed to be imprisoned. For example, confining a person to a house would constitute the tort of false imprisonment. However, confining someone to the land mass of the USA would not.

Therefore, false imprisonment is not just about locking someone within a room, the following examples have all been found to constitute false imprisonment:

* Where a defendant might position themselves in a doorway to prevent someone leaving a room, as in ''Walker v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis'' [2014].<ref name=Walker>''Walker v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis'' [2014] EWCA Civ 897</ref>
* Where a defendant might threaten violence if the claimant leaves, which could thus be both false imprisonment and assault.<ref>''[[Collins v Wilcock]]'' [1984] 3 All ER 374, 380 (QBD)</ref>
* Where a defendant ensures someone stays in a room simply by asserting their authority, as in ''Harnett v Bond'' and ''Meering v Grahame-White Aviation.''<ref>''Harnett v Bond'' [1925] AC 669 (HL)</ref><ref>''Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd'' (1920) 122 LT 44</ref>

Finally, where a claimant accedes to authority that does not necessarily mean they consent to being detained, as in ''Warner v Riddiford'' (1858).<ref>''Warner v Riddiford'' (1858) 4 CBNS 180, 140 ER 1052</ref>