Editing Majority rule (section)

==== Other arguments ====
Saunders argued that [[deliberative democracy]] flourishes under majority rule and that under majority rule, participants always have to convince more than half the group, while under [[Supermajority|supermajoritarian]] rules participants might only need to persuade a minority (to prevent a change).<ref name="Saunders" /> 

Where large changes in seats held by a party may arise from only relatively slight change in votes cast (such as under FPTP), and a simple majority is all that is required to wield power (most legislatures in democratic countries), governments may repeatedly fall into and out of power. This may cause polarization and policy lurch, or it may encourage compromise, depending on other aspects of political culture. McGann argued that such cycling encourages participants to compromise, rather than pass resolutions that have the bare minimum required to "win" because of the likelihood that they would soon be reversed.<ref name="Logic" />

Within this atmosphere of compromise, a minority faction may accept proposals that it dislikes in order to build a coalition for a proposal that it deems of greater moment. In that way, majority rule differentiates weak and strong preferences. McGann argued that such situations encourage minorities to participate, because majority rule does not typically create permanent losers, encouraging systemic stability. He pointed to governments that use largely unchecked majority rule, such as is seen under [[proportional representation]] in the [[Netherlands]], [[Austria]], and [[Sweden]], as empirical evidence of majority rule's stability.<ref name="Tyranny" />