Editing Mutual assured destruction (section)

===Post-Cold War===
{{more citations needed section|date=May 2018}}
[[File:EKV prototype launch.jpg|thumb|200px|A payload launch vehicle carrying a prototype [[Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle|exoatmospheric kill vehicle]] is launched from [[Meck Island]] at the [[Kwajalein Missile Range]] on December 3, 2001, for an intercept of a ballistic missile target over the central Pacific Ocean.]]

After the [[fall of the Soviet Union]], the [[Russian Federation]] emerged as a sovereign entity encompassing most of the territory of the former USSR. Relations between the United States and Russia were, at least for a time, less tense than they had been with the Soviet Union.{{citation needed|date=March 2025}}

While MAD has become less applicable for the US and Russia, it has been argued as a factor behind [[Nuclear weapons and Israel|Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons]]. Similarly, diplomats have warned that Japan may be pressured to nuclearize by the presence of North Korean nuclear weapons. The ability to launch a nuclear attack against an enemy city is a relevant deterrent strategy for these powers.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=SOKOLSKI|first=HENRY D.|date=2004|title=PREFACE|journal=Getting Mad|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12035.3|pages=v–viii}}</ref>

The administration of US President [[George W. Bush]] withdrew from the [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty]] in June 2002, claiming that the limited national missile defense system which they proposed to build was designed only to prevent [[nuclear blackmail]] by a state with limited nuclear capability and was not planned to alter the nuclear posture between Russia and the United States.

While relations have improved and an intentional nuclear exchange is more unlikely, the decay in Russian nuclear capability in the [[post–Cold War era]] may have had an effect on the continued viability of the MAD doctrine. A 2006 article by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press stated that the United States could carry out a nuclear first strike on Russia and would "have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM." This was attributed to reductions in Russian nuclear stockpiles and the increasing inefficiency and age of that which remains. Lieber and Press argued that the MAD era is coming to an end and that the United States is on the cusp of global nuclear primacy.<ref>Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'', March/April 2006, pp 42–55.</ref>

However, in a follow-up article in the same publication, others criticized the analysis, including [[Peter C. W. Flory|Peter Flory]], the US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, who began by writing "The essay by Keir Lieber and Daryl Press contains so many errors, on a topic of such gravity, that a Department of Defense response is required to correct the record."<ref name="PCWF">Peter C. W. Flory ''Nuclear Exchange: Does Washington Really Have (or Want) Nuclear Primacy?'' [http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faresponse85514/peter-c-w-flory-keith-payne-pavel-podvig-alexei-arbatov-keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/nuclear-exchange.html Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060925140832/http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faresponse85514/peter-c-w-flory-keith-payne-pavel-podvig-alexei-arbatov-keir-a-lieber-daryl-g-press/nuclear-exchange.html |date=2006-09-25 }}</ref> Regarding reductions in Russian stockpiles, another response stated that "a similarly one-sided examination of [reductions in] U.S. forces would have painted a similarly dire portrait".

A situation in which the United States might actually be expected to carry out a "successful" attack is perceived as a disadvantage for both countries. The strategic balance between the United States and Russia is becoming less stable, and the objective, the technical possibility of a first strike by the United States is increasing. At a time of crisis, this instability could lead to an accidental nuclear war. For example, if Russia feared a US nuclear attack, Moscow might make rash moves (such as putting its forces on alert) that would provoke a US preemptive strike.<ref name="PCWF" />

An outline of current US nuclear strategy toward both Russia and other nations was published as the document "[[Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence]]" in 1995.

In November 2020, the US successfully destroyed a dummy ICBM outside the atmosphere with another missile. [[Bloomberg Opinion]] writes that this defense ability "ends the era of nuclear stability".<ref>{{Cite news|last=Kluth|first=Andreas|date=2020-11-29|title=A Successful U.S. Missile Intercept Ends the Era of Nuclear Stability|language=en|work=Bloomberg.com|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-11-30/a-successful-u-s-missile-intercept-ends-the-era-of-nuclear-stability|access-date=2020-11-30}}</ref>

==== India and Pakistan ====
MAD does not entirely apply to all nuclear-armed rivals. [[Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts|India and Pakistan]] are an example of this; because of the superiority of conventional Indian armed forces to their Pakistani counterparts, Pakistan may be forced to use their nuclear weapons on invading Indian forces out of desperation regardless of an Indian retaliatory strike. As such, any large-scale attack on Pakistan by India could precipitate the use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, thus rendering MAD inapplicable. However, MAD is applicable in that it may deter Pakistan from making a “suicidal” nuclear attack rather than a defensive nuclear strike.<ref name=":1"/>

==== North Korea ====
Since the emergence of [[North Korea and weapons of mass destruction|North Korea as a nuclear state]], military action has not been an option in handling the instability surrounding North Korea because of their option of nuclear retaliation in response to any conventional attack on them, thus rendering non-nuclear neighboring states such as South Korea and Japan incapable of resolving the destabilizing effect of North Korea via military force.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Baranwal|first=Sanjay|title="Nuclear Nihilism of North Korea: Perils and Path Ahead"|date=2011|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/42761440|journal=The Indian Journal of Political Science|volume=72|issue=2|pages=547–554|jstor=42761440|issn=0019-5510}}</ref> MAD may not apply to the situation in North Korea because the theory relies on rational consideration of the use and consequences of nuclear weapons, which may not be the case for potential North Korean deployment.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=2017|title=Time to re-assess mutually assured destruction|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26951722|journal=BMJ: British Medical Journal|volume=359|jstor=26951722|issn=0959-8138}}</ref>