Editing Polygraph (section)

==Security clearances==
In 1995, [[Harold James Nicholson]], a [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA) employee later convicted of spying for [[Russia]], had undergone his periodic five-year reinvestigation, in which he showed a strong probability of deception on questions regarding relationships with a foreign intelligence unit. This polygraph test later led to an investigation which resulted in his eventual arrest and conviction. In most cases, however, polygraphs are more of a tool to "scare straight" those who would consider espionage. [[Jonathan Pollard]] was advised by his Israeli handlers that he was to resign his job from American intelligence if he was ever told he was subject to a polygraph test.{{cn|date= September 2023}}  Likewise, [[John Anthony Walker]] was advised by his handlers not to engage in espionage until he had been promoted to the highest position for which a polygraph test was not required, to refuse promotion to higher positions for which polygraph tests were required, and to retire when promotion was mandated.<ref name=NatResearchCouncil/>

In 1983, CIA employee [[Edward Lee Howard]] was dismissed when, during a polygraph screening, he truthfully answered a series of questions admitting to minor crimes such as petty theft and drug abuse. In retaliation for his perceived unjust punishment for minor offenses, he later sold his knowledge of CIA operations to the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://peacecorpsonline.org/messages/messages/2629/1008570.html|title=RPCV and CIA defector Edward Howard dies in Moscow|date=2002-07-22|publisher=Peace Corps Online}}</ref>

Polygraph tests may not deter espionage. From 1945 to the present, at least six Americans have committed espionage while successfully passing polygraph tests. Notable cases of two men who created a false negative result with the polygraphs were [[Larry Wu-Tai Chin]], who spied for China, and [[Aldrich Ames]], who was given two polygraph examinations while with the CIA, the first in 1986 and the second in 1991, while spying for the Soviet Union/Russia. The CIA reported that he passed both examinations after experiencing initial indications of deception.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/hitzrept.html|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20090705120623/http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/hitzrept.html|url-status=dead|title=The Adrich H. Ames Case: An Assessment of CIA's Role, Oct. 21, 1994 Memorandum for Heads of Agency Offices from Director of Central Intelligence|archivedate=July 5, 2009}}</ref> According to a Senate investigation, an FBI review of the first examination concluded that the indications of deception were never resolved.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/irp/congress/1994_rpt/ssci_ames.htm|title=An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implications for U.S. Intelligence – Senate Select Committee on Intelligence – 01 November 1994 – Part One|work=fas.org}}</ref>

[[Ana Belen Montes]], a Cuban spy, passed a counterintelligence scope polygraph test administered by the US [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] (DIA) in 1994.<ref>{{cite news| url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/feature/wp/2013/04/18/ana-montes-did-much-harm-spying-for-cuba-chances-are-you-havent-heard-of-her/ | newspaper=The Washington Post | title=Magazine}}</ref>

Despite these errors, in August 2008, the DIA announced that it would subject each of its 5,700 prospective and current employees to polygraph testing at least once annually.<ref name="Hess, Pamela 2008">Hess, Pamela, "Pentagon's Intelligence Arm Steps Up Lie-Detector Efforts", ''[[Arizona Daily Star]]'', August 24, 2008. Also in Fox News via AP [http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,409502,00.html]</ref>  This expansion of polygraph screening at DIA occurred while DIA polygraph managers ignored documented technical problems discovered in the Lafayette computerized polygraph system.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/20/191542/glitch-in-widely-used-polygraph.html|title=Glitch in widely used polygraph can skew results|work=McClatchy DC|access-date=2013-05-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130527014932/http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/20/191542/glitch-in-widely-used-polygraph.html|archive-date=2013-05-27|url-status=dead}}</ref> The DIA uses computerized Lafayette polygraph systems for routine counterintelligence testing. The impact of the technical flaws within the Lafayette system on the analysis of recorded physiology and on the final polygraph test evaluation is currently unknown.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mcclatchydc.com/polygraph/|title=McClatchy – The Polygraph Files|work=mcclatchydc.com|access-date=2013-05-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130527013422/http://www.mcclatchydc.com/polygraph/|archive-date=2013-05-27|url-status=dead}}</ref>

In 2012, a [[The McClatchy Company|McClatchy]] investigation found that the [[National Reconnaissance Office]] was possibly breaching ethical and legal boundaries by encouraging its polygraph examiners to extract personal and private information from [[United States Department of Defense|US Department of Defense]] personnel during polygraph tests that purported to be limited in scope to counterintelligence matters.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/07/10/155644/the-ig-complaint-of-mark-phillips.html|title=The IG complaint of Mark Phillips concerning the NRO|work=McClatchy DC}}</ref>  Allegations of abusive polygraph practices were brought forward by former NRO polygraph examiners.<ref>Taylor, Marisa, "[http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/07/27/158078/sen-charles-grassley-seeks-probe.html Sen. Charles Grassley Seeks Probe Of Polygraph Techniques At National Reconnaissance Office]", ''[[The McClatchy Company]]'', 27 July 2012</ref>