Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Resource curse
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
=== Foreign aid === There is an argument in political economy that [[foreign aid]] can have the same negative effects in the long run towards development as in the case of the resource curse. The so-called "aid curse" results from giving perverse political incentives to a weak body of civil servants, lowering politicians' accountability towards citizens and decreasing economic pressure thanks to the income of an unearned resource to mitigate economic crisis.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Moss|first1=Todd|last2=Pettersson|first2=Gunilla|date=2006|title=An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on aid dependency and state building in sub-Saharan Africa|url=https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/5646_file_WP_74.pdf|journal=Center for Global Development|volume=Working paper 74|pages=5}}</ref> When foreign aid represents a major source of revenue to governments, especially in low-income countries, state-building capacity is hindered by undermining responsiveness toward taxpayers or by decreasing the incentive for governments to look for different sources of income or the increase in taxation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bräutigam|first=Deborah|date=2002|title=Building Leviathan: Revenue, State Capacity, and Governance|url=https://deborahbrautigam.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/2002-building-leviathan.pdf|journal=IDS Bulletin |volume=33|issue=3|pages=1–17|doi=10.1111/j.1759-5436.2002.tb00034.x}}</ref>
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)