Editing Semantics (section)

== Theories of meaning ==
Theories of meaning explain what meaning is, what meaning an expression has, and how the relation between expression and meaning is established.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Glock|2012|pp=51–52}} | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|pp=20–21}} | {{harvnb|Bagha|2011|pp=1414–1415}} }}</ref>

=== Referential ===
[[File:Referential theory of meaning.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram of referential theories|Referential theories identify meaning with the entities to which expressions point.]]

Referential theories state that the meaning of an expression is the entity to which it points.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Glock|2012|p=51}} | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|pp=21–22}} }}</ref> The meaning of [[singular term]]s like [[name]]s is the individual to which they refer. For example, the meaning of the name ''[[George Washington]]'' is the person with this name.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.1.1 The Theory of Reference}} | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|pp=21–22}} | {{harvnb|Davis|2005|pp=209–210}} | {{harvnb|Gibbs|1994|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4kVJAMghNmUC&pg=PA29 29–30]}} }}</ref> General terms refer not to a single entity but to the set of objects to which this term applies. In this regard, the meaning of the term ''cat'' is the set of all cats.<ref>{{harvnb|Davis|2005|pp=209–210}}</ref> Similarly, verbs usually refer to classes of actions or events and adjectives refer to properties of individuals and events.<ref>{{harvnb|Gibbs|1994|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4kVJAMghNmUC&pg=PA29 29–30]}}</ref>

[[Simple referential theories]] face problems for meaningful expressions that have no clear referent. Names like ''[[Pegasus]]'' and ''[[Santa Claus]]'' have meaning even though they do not point to existing entities.<ref>{{harvnb|Davis|2005|p=211}}</ref> Other difficulties concern cases in which different expressions are about the same entity. For instance, the expressions ''[[Roger Bannister]]'' and ''the first man to run a four-minute mile'' refer to the same person but do not mean exactly the same thing.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|pp=21–22}} | {{harvnb|Gibbs|1994|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4kVJAMghNmUC&pg=PA29 29–30]}} }}</ref> This is particularly relevant when talking about beliefs since a person may understand both expressions without knowing that they point to the same entity.<ref>{{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.1.2 Theories of Reference Vs. Semantic Theories}}</ref> A further problem is given by expressions whose meaning depends on the context, like the deictic terms ''here'' and ''I''.<ref>{{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.1.4 Character and Content, Context and Circumstance}}</ref>

To avoid these problems, referential theories often introduce additional devices. Some identify meaning not directly with objects but with functions that point to objects. This additional level has the advantage of taking the context of an expression into account since the same expression may point to one object in one context and to another object in a different context. For example, the reference of the word ''here'' depends on the location in which it is used.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Davis|2005|pp=209–210}} | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|pp=21–22}} | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.1.4 Character and Content, Context and Circumstance}} }}</ref> A closely related approach is [[possible world]] semantics, which allows expressions to refer not only to entities in the actual world but also to entities in other possible worlds.{{efn|A possible world is a complete way of how things could have been.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Berto|Jago|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Pavel|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OF7ZA54UpYYC&pg=PA50 50]}} }}</ref>}} According to this view, expressions like ''the first man to run a four-minute mile'' refer to different persons in different worlds. This view can also be used to analyze sentences that talk about what is possible or what is necessary: possibility is what is true in some possible worlds while necessity is what is true in all possible worlds.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.1.5 Possible Worlds Semantics}} | {{harvnb|Rooij|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KlPwvH6ICqIC&pg=PA198 198–199]}} | {{harvnb|Davis|2005|pp=209–210}} }}</ref>

=== Ideational ===
[[File:Ideational theory of meaning.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram of ideational theories|Ideational theories identify meaning with the [[mental states]] of language users.]]

Ideational theories, also called mentalist theories, are not primarily interested in the reference of expressions and instead explain meaning in terms of the mental states of language users.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chapman|Routledge|2009}} | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 3.1 Mentalist Theories}} }}</ref> One historically influential approach articulated by [[John Locke]] holds that expressions stand for [[idea]]s in the speaker's mind. According to this view, the meaning of the word ''dog'' is the idea that people have of dogs. Language is seen as a medium used to transfer ideas from the speaker to the audience. After having learned the same meaning of signs, the speaker can produce a sign that corresponds to the idea in their mind and the perception of this sign evokes the same idea in the mind of the audience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chapman|Routledge|2009}} | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|p=22}} | {{harvnb|Appiah|Gutmann|1998|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ylp_omhIPssC&pg=PA34 34]}} | {{harvnb|Pearce|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=inhXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA194 194–195]}} }}</ref>

A closely related theory focuses not directly on ideas but on [[intention]]s.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chapman|Routledge|2009}} | {{harvnb|Pearce|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=inhXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA194 194–195]}} | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 3.1.1 The Gricean Program}} }}</ref> This view is particularly associated with [[Paul Grice]], who observed that people usually communicate to cause some reaction in their audience. He held that the meaning of an expression is given by the intended reaction. This means that communication is not just about decoding what the speaker literally said but requires an understanding of their intention or why they said it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chapman|Routledge|2009}} | {{harvnb|Glock|2012|p=52}} | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 3.1.1 The Gricean Program}} | {{harvnb|Feng|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_AgDSh5c1QcC&pg=PA11 11–12]}} }}</ref> For example, telling someone looking for petrol that "there is a garage around the corner" has the meaning that petrol can be obtained there because of the speaker's intention to help. This goes beyond the literal meaning, which has no explicit connection to petrol.<ref>{{harvnb|Feng|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_AgDSh5c1QcC&pg=PA19 19]}}</ref>

=== Causal ===
Causal theories hold that the meaning of an expression depends on the causes and effects it has.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Glock|2012|pp=51–52}} | {{harvnb|Blackburn|2008a}} | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 3.2.1 Causal Origin}} }}</ref> According to [[behaviorist]] semantics, also referred to as stimulus-response theory, the meaning of an expression is given by the situation that prompts the speaker to use it and the response it provokes in the audience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|p=23}} | {{harvnb|Lyons|1996|pp=120, 123–125}} | {{harvnb|Lepore|2009|p=1026}} }}</ref> For instance, the meaning of yelling "Fire!" is given by the presence of an uncontrolled fire and attempts to control it or seek safety.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Duignan|2023|loc=§ Behaviourist Semantics}} | {{harvnb|Lepore|2009|p=1026}} }}</ref> Behaviorist semantics relies on the idea that learning a language consists in adopting behavioral patterns in the form of [[Classical conditioning|stimulus-response pairs]].<ref>{{harvnb|Lyons|1996|pp=123–125}}</ref> One of its key motivations is to avoid private mental entities and define meaning instead in terms of publicly observable language behavior.<ref>{{harvnb|Lyons|1996|pp=120–121}}</ref>

Another causal theory focuses on the meaning of names and holds that a naming event is required to establish the link between name and named entity. This naming event acts as a form of baptism that establishes the first link of a causal chain in which all subsequent uses of the name participate.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Blackburn|2008a}} | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 3.2.1 Causal Origin}} }}</ref> According to this view, the name ''[[Plato]]'' refers to an ancient Greek philosopher because, at some point, he was originally named this way and people kept using this name to refer to him.<ref>{{harvnb|Blackburn|2008a}}</ref> This view was originally formulated by [[Saul Kripke]] to apply to names only but has been extended to cover other types of speech as well.<ref>{{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 3.2.1 Causal Origin}}</ref>

=== Others ===
[[Truth-conditional semantics]] analyzes the meaning of sentences in terms of their truth conditions. According to this view, to understand a sentence means to know what the world needs to be like for the sentence to be true.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dummett|2008|pp=45–46}} | {{harvnb|Kearns|2011|pp=8–11}} }}</ref> Truth conditions can themselves be expressed through [[possible worlds]]. For example, the sentence "[[Hillary Clinton]] won the [[2016 American presidential election]]" is false in the actual world but there are some possible worlds in which it is true.<ref>{{harvnb|Berto|Jago|2023|loc=§ 1. Reasons for Introducing Impossible Worlds}}</ref> The extension of a sentence can be interpreted as its truth value while its intension is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true.<ref>{{harvnb|Kearns|2011|pp=8–11}}</ref> Truth-conditional semantics is closely related to [[Verificationism|verificationist theories]], which introduce the additional idea that there should be some kind of verification procedure to assess whether a sentence is true. They state that the meaning of a sentence consists in the method to verify it or in the circumstances that justify it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Glock|2012|p=51}} | {{harvnb|Morris|Preti|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=p_3LEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA369 369–370]}} | {{harvnb|Boyd|Gasper|Trout|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pEzcsK1wlVYC&pg=PA5 5]}} | {{harvnb|Lepore|2009|p=1027}} }}</ref> For instance, scientific claims often make predictions, which can be used to confirm or disconfirm them using [[observation]].<ref>{{harvnb|Boyd|Gasper|Trout|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pEzcsK1wlVYC&pg=PA5 5]}}</ref> According to verificationism, sentences that can neither be verified nor falsified are meaningless.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Morris|Preti|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=p_3LEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA369 369–370]}} | {{harvnb|Boyd|Gasper|Trout|1991|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pEzcsK1wlVYC&pg=PA5 5]}} }}</ref>

The [[Philosophical Investigations#Meaning as use|use theory]] states that the meaning of an expression is given by the way it is utilized. This view was first introduced by [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], who understood language as a collection of [[language game]]s. The meaning of expressions depends on how they are used inside a game and the same expression may have different meanings in different games.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|pp=23–24}} | {{harvnb|Strauven|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=eYdIDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA78 78]}} }}</ref> Some versions of this theory identify meaning directly with patterns of regular use.<ref>{{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 3.2.4 Regularities in Use}}</ref> Others focus on [[social norm]]s and [[Convention (norm)|conventions]] by additionally taking into account whether a certain use is considered appropriate in a given society.<ref>{{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 3.2.5 Social Norms}}</ref>

[[Inferential role semantics|Inferentialist semantics]], also called conceptual role semantics, holds that the meaning of an expression is given by the role it plays in the premises and conclusions of good [[inference]]s.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=§ 2.2.3 Inferentialist Semantics}} | {{harvnb|Whiting|loc=Lead Section, § 1a. A Theory of Linguistic Meaning}} | {{harvnb|Hess|2022|loc=§ Abstract, § 1 Introduction}} }}</ref> For example, one can infer from "x is a male sibling" that "x is a brother" and one can infer from "x is a brother" that "x has parents". According to inferentialist semantics, the meaning of the word ''brother'' is determined by these and all similar inferences that can be drawn.<ref>{{harvnb|Whiting|loc=§ 1a. A Theory of Linguistic Meaning}}</ref>