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==Government and politics== {{Main|Government of the Republic of China|Politics of the Republic of China}} {{See also|Elections in Taiwan|Human rights in Taiwan|North–South divide in Taiwan}} === Government === [[File:世界最美總統府.jpg|thumb|Taiwan's popularly elected president resides in the [[Presidential Office Building (Republic of China)|Presidential Office Building, Taipei]], originally built in the Japanese era for colonial governors.]] The government of the Republic of China was founded on the 1947 [[Constitution of the Republic of China|Constitution of the ROC]] and its [[Three Principles of the People]], which states that the ROC "shall be a democratic republic of the people, to be governed by the people and for the people".<ref name="yb:government">{{cite book |title=The Republic of China Yearbook |url=http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/ |chapter=Chapter 4: Government |chapter-url=http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/docs/ch04.pdf |pages=55–65 |publisher=Government Information Office, Republic of China (Taiwan) |year=2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080512091917/http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/ |archive-date=12 May 2008}}</ref> It underwent significant revisions in the 1990s, known collectively as the Additional Articles. The government is divided into five branches (''Yuan''): the Executive Yuan (cabinet), the [[Legislative Yuan]] (Congress or Parliament), the [[Judicial Yuan]], the [[Control Yuan]] (audit agency), and the [[Examination Yuan]] (civil service examination agency). [[File:賴清德總統 (cropped).jpg|left|thumb|upright|[[Lai Ching-te]], [[President of the Republic of China]]]] The [[head of state]] and [[commander-in-chief]] of the armed forces is the [[President of the Republic of China|president]], who is elected by popular vote for a maximum of 2 four-year terms on the same ticket as the vice-president. The president appoints the members of the Executive Yuan as their cabinet, including a [[Premier of the Republic of China|premier]], who is officially the President of the Executive Yuan; members are responsible for policy and administration.<ref name="yb:government" /> The main [[Legislature|legislative body]] is the [[Unicameralism|unicameral]] Legislative Yuan with 113 seats. Seventy-three are elected by popular vote from single-member constituencies; thirty-four are elected based on the proportion of nationwide votes received by participating political parties in a separate party list ballot; and six are elected from two three-member aboriginal constituencies. Members serve four-year terms. Originally the unicameral National Assembly, as a standing [[Constitutional convention (political meeting)|constitutional convention]] and [[electoral college]], held some parliamentary functions, but the [[National Assembly (Republic of China)|National Assembly]] was abolished in 2005 with the power of constitutional amendments handed over to the Legislative Yuan and all eligible voters of the Republic via referendums.<ref name="yb:government" /><ref>{{cite news |title=Taiwan assembly passes changes |date=7 June 2005 |work=BBC News |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4616043.stm |access-date=9 June 2005 |archive-date=23 February 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190223024224/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4616043.stm |url-status=live }}</ref> [[File:Premier Cho Jung-tai 20240820.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Cho Jung-tai]], [[Premier of the Republic of China]]]] The premier is selected by the president without the need for approval from the legislature, and neither the president nor the premier wields veto power.<ref name="yb:government" /> Historically, the ROC has been dominated by strongman single party politics. This legacy has resulted in executive powers currently being concentrated in the office of the president rather than the premier.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Jayasuriya|first=Kanishka|title=Law, capitalism and power in Asia|publisher=Routledge|year=1999|page=217|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OqGSrD9QhXcC&pg=PA217|isbn=978-0-415-19743-4|access-date=25 July 2023|archive-date=2 October 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241002211833/https://books.google.com/books?id=OqGSrD9QhXcC&pg=PA217|url-status=live}}</ref> The Judicial Yuan is the highest [[judiciary|judicial]] organ. It interprets the constitution and other laws and decrees, judges administrative suits, and disciplines public functionaries. The president and vice-president of the Judicial Yuan and additional thirteen justices form the Constitutional Court, which was established in 1993 to resolve constitutional disputes, regulate the activities of political parties and accelerate the democratization process. The Constitutional Court was formerly called the Council of Grand Justices.<ref>{{cite wikisource |title=Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China (2005) |at=Article 5}}</ref> They are nominated and appointed by the president, with the consent of the Legislative Yuan. The highest court, the [[Supreme Court of the Republic of China|Supreme Court]], consists of a number of civil and criminal divisions, each of which is formed by a presiding judge and four associate judges, all appointed for life. The right to a fair public trial is protected by law and respected in practice. There is no [[jury trial|trial by jury]], however many cases are presided over by multiple judges.<ref name="yb:government" /> The Control Yuan is a watchdog agency that monitors the actions of the executive. It can be considered a standing [[Government agency|commission]] for administrative inquiry, like the [[Court of Auditors]] of the [[European Union]] or the [[Government Accountability Office]] of the United States.<ref name="yb:government" /> It is also responsible for the [[National Human Rights Commission (Taiwan)|National Human Rights Commission]]. The Examination Yuan is in charge of validating the qualification of civil servants. It is based on the [[imperial examination]] system used in dynastic China. It can be compared to the [[European Personnel Selection Office]] of the European Union or the [[Office of Personnel Management]] of the United States.<ref name="yb:government" /> It was downsized in 2019, and there have been calls for its abolition.<ref name="2020amend">{{cite news|url=https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201912100011|last1=Wang|first1=Yang-yu|last2=Kao|first2=Evelyn|title=Legislature passes revised law to shrink Examination Yuan|work=[[Central News Agency (Taiwan)|Central News Agency]]|date=10 December 2019|access-date=19 February 2020|archive-date=19 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200219060648/https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201912100011|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Yang |first1=Mien-chieh |last2=Chung |first2=Jake |title=Examination Yuan at odds with self |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/08/07/2003741273 |access-date=10 March 2021 |work=[[Taipei Times]] |archive-date=17 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210417210058/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/08/07/2003741273 |url-status=live }}</ref> === Constitution === The constitution was drafted by the KMT while the ROC still governed the Chinese mainland.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Ginsburg|first=Tom|title=Judicial review in new democracies|publisher=Cambridge University Press|page=111|year=2003|isbn=978-0-521-52039-3|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qJrsouEjOZEC&pg=PA111|access-date=25 July 2023|archive-date=2 October 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241002211835/https://books.google.com/books?id=qJrsouEjOZEC&pg=PA111#v=onepage&q&f=false|url-status=live}}</ref> Political reforms beginning in the late 1970s resulted in the end of martial law in 1987, and Taiwan transformed into a multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. The constitutional basis for this transition to democracy was gradually laid in the [[Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China|Additional Articles of the Constitution]]. These articles suspended portions of the Constitution designed for the governance of mainland China and replacing them with articles adapted for the governance of and guaranteeing the political rights of residents of the Taiwan Area, as defined in the [[Cross-Strait Act]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Yeh |first1=Jiunn-rong |title=The Constitution of Taiwan |date=2016 |publisher=Bloomsbury |isbn=978-1-84946-512-0 |pages=3–4}}</ref> National boundaries were not explicitly prescribed by the 1947 Constitution, and the Constitutional Court declined to define these boundaries in a 1993 interpretation, viewing the question as a political question to be resolved by the Executive and Legislative Yuans.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Chang |first1=Ming-hsuan |last2=Mazzetta |first2=Matthew |title=DPP lawmakers seek removal of 'national unification' from Constitution |url=https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202009300019 |access-date=8 March 2021 |work=[[Central News Agency (Taiwan)]] |issue=3 September 2020 |archive-date=28 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210328162929/https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202009300019 |url-status=live }}</ref> The 1947 Constitution included articles regarding representatives from former Qing dynasty territories including [[Tibet]] and [[Banners of Inner Mongolia|Mongol banner]]s.<ref>{{cite web |title=蒙古不是中華民國固有之疆域 |url=https://features.ltn.com.tw/spring/article/2017/breakingnews/2228191 |website=自由時報 [[Liberty Times]] |access-date=6 February 2021 |archive-date=3 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210203153813/https://features.ltn.com.tw/spring/article/2017/breakingnews/2228191}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Constitution of the Republic of China (Taiwan) |url=https://english.president.gov.tw/page/94 |access-date=14 February 2021 |archive-date=23 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201023000233/https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/94 }}</ref><ref name="I Mongol">{{cite book|author=Yin-t'ang Chang|title=The Economic Development and Prospects of Inner Mongolia (Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ningsia)|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zlklAAAAMAAJ&q=chahars+1919|year=1933|publisher=Commercial Press, Limited|page=62}}</ref> The ROC recognized [[Mongolia]] as an independent country in 1946 after signing the 1945 [[Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance]], but after retreating to Taiwan in 1949 it reneged to preserve its claim over mainland China.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Clark |first1=Keith Allan II |title=Imagined Territory: The Republic of China's 1955 Veto of Mongolian Membership in the United Nations |journal=Journal of American-East Asian Relations |date=3 September 2018 |volume=25 |issue=3 |pages=263–295 |doi=10.1163/18765610-02503003 |s2cid=240274376 }}</ref> The Additional Articles of the 1990s did not alter national boundaries, but suspended articles regarding Mongolian and Tibetan representatives. The ROC began to accept the Mongolian passport and removed clauses referring to Outer Mongolia from the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area in 2002.<ref>{{cite news |url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1842387.stm |title = Taiwan 'embassy' changes anger China |publisher = BBC News |date = 26 February 2002 |access-date = 14 February 2021 |archive-date = 26 May 2004 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20040526084615/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1842387.stm |url-status = live }}</ref> In 2012 the Mainland Affairs Council issued a statement clarifying that Outer Mongolia was not part of the ROC's national territory in 1947.<ref>{{cite news |title=Mongolia not within national boundary under ROC Constitution: MAC |url=https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201205210043 |access-date=8 March 2021 |work=[[Central News Agency (Taiwan)]] |date=21 May 2012 |archive-date=17 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210417204401/https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/201205210043 |url-status=live }}</ref> The [[Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission]] in the Executive Yuan was abolished in 2017. ===Administrative divisions=== {{Main|Administrative divisions of Taiwan}} {{See also|Administrative divisions of the Republic of China (1912–1949)}} According to the 1947 constitution, the territory of the ROC is according to its "existing national boundaries".<ref name=constitution>[http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0000001 Article 4 of the constitution]</ref> The ROC is, ''de jure'' constitutionally, divided into {{Ill|#History|lt=provinces|zh|省 (中華民國)}}, [[special municipality (Taiwan)|special municipalities]] (which are further divided into districts for local administration), and the province-level [[Tibet Area (administrative division)|Tibet Area]]. Each province is subdivided into [[provincial city (Taiwan)|cities]] and [[county (Taiwan)|counties]], which are further divided into townships and county-administered cities. Some divisions are indigenous divisions which have different degrees of autonomy to standard ones. In addition, districts, cities and townships are further divided into villages and neighborhoods. Since its retreat, the ROC has controlled only [[Taiwan Province]] and some islands of [[Fujian Province, Republic of China|Fujian Province]], with the provincial governments now "streamlined" and no longer functional.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.taiwan-panorama.com/Articles/Details?Guid=2b597bb2-6ee2-482d-999a-601e09469db2&langId=3&CatId=10|title=The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan Provincial Government|website=Taiwan Panorama|date=January 1999|access-date=9 March 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Cheung|first=Han|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2020/07/19/2003740165|title=Taiwan in Time: A provincial government that ruled no land|work=Taipei Times|date=19 July 2020|access-date=9 March 2025}}</ref> The ROC also controls the [[Pratas Islands]] and [[Taiping Island]] in the [[Spratly Islands]], which are part of the disputed [[South China Sea Islands]], and has placed them under the administration of [[Kaohsiung]].<ref>{{Cite news|title=Taiwan rejects South China Sea claims of the Philippines, China|date=12 November 2024|work=Focus Taiwan|url=https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202411120009|access-date=9 March 2025}}</ref> With provinces non-functional, Taiwan is in practice divided into 22 subnational divisions, each with a self-governing body led by an elected leader and a legislative body with elected members. Duties of local governments include social services, education, urban planning, public construction, water management, environmental protection, transport, public safety, and more. {{Administrative divisions of Taiwan|map=show}} ===Major camps=== {{multiple image | width = 100 | footer = | image1 = | alt1 = A circular logo representing the island of Taiwan surrounded by the text "DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY" and "民主進步黨" | caption1 = The [[Democratic Progressive Party]], the main [[Pan-Green Coalition]] party | image2 = Emblem of the Kuomintang.svg | alt2 = A circular logo representing a white sun on a blue background. The sun is a circle surrounded by twelve triangles. | caption2 = Emblem of the [[Kuomintang]], the main [[Pan-Blue Coalition]] party }} Taiwan's political scene is divided into two major camps in terms of cross-strait relations, i.e. how Taiwan should relate to China or the PRC. The [[Pan-Green Coalition]] (e.g. the [[Democratic Progressive Party]]) leans pro-independence, and the [[Pan-Blue Coalition]] (e.g. the [[Kuomintang]]) leans pro-unification.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Lin|first1=Gang|last2=Wu|first2=Weixu|year=2017|title=The Transition of Party System in Taiwan: Divergence or Convergence?|journal=China Review|volume=17|issue=3|pages=141–166|jstor=44371801}}</ref> Moderates in both camps regard the Republic of China as a sovereign independent state, but the Pan-Green Coalition regard the ROC as [[Four-Stage Theory of the Republic of China|synonymous with Taiwan]],<ref>{{cite news |last1=Mo |first1=Yan-chih |last2=Chung |first2=Jake |title=Tsai affirms recognition of the ROC |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/10/10/2003515353 |work=Taipei Times |date=10 October 2011 |quotation=...{{nbsp}}Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen{{nbsp}}... said the ROC was Taiwan and Taiwan was the ROC{{nbsp}}...}}</ref> while moderates in the Pan-Blue Coalition view it as [[1992 Consensus|synonymous with China]].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Shih |first1=Hsiao-kuang |last2=Xie |first2=Dennis |title=KMT task force unveils four pillars for stable, peaceful cross-strait relations |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2020/06/20/2003738531 |access-date=20 June 2020 |work=Taipei Times |date=20 June 2020 |quotation=...{{nbsp}}the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP){{nbsp}}... acknowledge that there is 'one China,' with each side having its own interpretation of what 'China' means.}}</ref> These positions formed against the backdrop of the PRC's [[Anti-Secession Law]], which threatens the use of "non-peaceful means" to respond to formal Taiwanese independence.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Shi |first1=Jiangtao |title=Beijing may use Anti-Secession Law to seek Taiwan reunification, Wang says |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3193182/beijing-may-use-anti-secession-law-seek-taiwan-reunification |work=South China Morning Post |date=20 September 2022 |language=en |quotation=The 2005 Anti-Secession Law provides a legal framework for Beijing to use non-peaceful means to guard against pro-independence forces in Taiwan. |access-date=7 June 2023 |archive-date=14 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314095520/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3193182/beijing-may-use-anti-secession-law-seek-taiwan-reunification |url-status=live }}</ref> The ROC government has understood this to mean a military invasion of Taiwan.<ref>{{cite web |title=The Official Position of the Republic of China (Taiwan) on the People's Republic of China's Anti-Secession (Anti-Separation) Law | work=Mainland Affairs Council |url=https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=8A319E37A32E01EA&sms=2413CFE1BCE87E0E&s=D1B0D66D5788F2DE |publisher=[[Mainland Affairs Council]] |date=29 March 2005 |quotation=[The intention of the 'Anti-Secession Law' is] to establish a legal basis for the military invasion of Taiwan: Through the 'Anti-Secession Law', China has changed its Taiwan policy from a mere political statement to a legal basis, paving the way for an invasion of Taiwan. |access-date=7 June 2023 |archive-date=8 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230608211551/https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=8A319E37A32E01EA&sms=2413CFE1BCE87E0E&s=D1B0D66D5788F2DE |url-status=live }}</ref> [[File:2012年臺灣519民進黨嗆馬踹共晚會 Democratic Progressive Party's Anti-Ma Ying-jeou Event in Taipei, TAIWAN.jpg|thumb|[[Democratic Progressive Party]]'s event in Taipei]] The [[Pan-Green Coalition]] is mainly led by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). They oppose the idea that Taiwan is part of China, and seek wide diplomatic recognition and an eventual declaration of formal [[Taiwan independence movement|Taiwan independence]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/04/taiwan_flashpoint/html/independence_debate.stm |title=Taiwan Flashpoint: Independence Debate |author=<!--Not stated--> |website=BBC News |publisher=BBC |access-date=6 March 2021 |archive-date=2 April 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190402150151/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/04/taiwan_flashpoint/html/independence_debate.stm |url-status=live }}</ref> In September 2007, the ruling DPP approved a resolution asserting separate identity from China and called for the enactment of a new constitution for a "normal country". It called also for general use of "Taiwan" as the country's name, without abolishing its formal name, the "Republic of China".<ref name="AP2007">{{cite news|url=https://www.ctvnews.ca/taiwan-party-asserts-separate-identity-1.258300|title=Taiwan party asserts separate identity from China|website=The Associated Press|date=30 September 2007|access-date=18 January 2023|archive-date=11 February 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230211122716/https://www.ctvnews.ca/taiwan-party-asserts-separate-identity-1.258300|url-status=live}}</ref> Some members of the DPP, such as former President Chen Shui-bian and President Lai Ching-te, argue that it is unnecessary to proclaim independence because Taiwan is already an independent sovereign country called the Republic of China.<ref>{{cite web|author=Crisis Group |url=http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1653&l=1 |title=Taiwan Strait I: What's Left of 'One China'?|publisher=International Crisis Group |date=6 June 2003 |access-date=29 May 2009 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080709035143/http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1653&l=1 |archive-date = 9 July 2008}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.todayonline.com/chinaindia/china/taiwanese-premiers-independence-stance-incurs-beijings-wrath |title=Taiwanese premier's independence stance incurs Beijing's wrath |publisher=TODAYonline |date=28 September 2017 |access-date=6 October 2017 |archive-date=6 October 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171006112007/http://www.todayonline.com/chinaindia/china/taiwanese-premiers-independence-stance-incurs-beijings-wrath |url-status=live }}</ref> Despite being a member of KMT prior to and during his presidency, Lee Teng-hui also held a similar view and was a supporter of the [[Taiwanization]] movement.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Shirk|first=Susan L.|title=China: Fragile Superpower|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2007|isbn=978-0-19-530609-5|url=https://archive.org/details/chinafragilesupe00shir}}</ref> [[Taiwan Statebuilding Party]] (TSP) and [[Green Party (Taiwan)|Green Party]] (GPT)<ref>{{Cite news|title=讓全球綠黨的願景在台灣實現,守護公平正義的最佳第三勢力|newspaper=The News Lens|date=27 December 2019|url=https://www.thenewslens.com/article/129238|quote=台灣綠黨是最早表態支持蔡總統連任的小黨,護台抗中、反紅禦韓的立場鮮明,頻頻出戰,讓綠黨被對手批評是小綠、側翼,甚至還被柯文哲羞辱是比皇帝還著急的太監。|access-date=19 January 2023|archive-date=27 June 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230627020930/https://www.thenewslens.com/article/129238|url-status=live}}</ref> have adopted a line that aggressive route more than the DPP, in order to win over pro-independence voters who are dissatisfied with the DPP's conservative stance. The [[Pan-Blue Coalition]], composed of the pro-unification Kuomintang (KMT), [[People First Party (Republic of China)|People First Party]] (PFP) and [[New Party (Republic of China)|New Party]] generally support the spirit of the [[1992 Consensus]], where the KMT claimed that there is one China, but that the ROC and PRC have different interpretations of what "China" means. They favor eventual unification with China.<ref name="panblue-reunif-chineseid">{{Cite book|last=Pares|first=Susan |title=A political and economic dictionary of East Asia|publisher=Routledge|date=24 February 2005|page=267|isbn=978-1-85743-258-9|url={{GBurl|id=xJKePP5ATKUC}}|quote=The Pan-Blue coalition on the whole favours a Chinese nationalist identity and policies supporting reunification and increased economic links with the People's Republic of China.}}</ref> The mainstream Pan-Blue position is to maintain the status quo, while refusing immediate unification.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Huang|first1=Chin-Hao|last2=James|first2=Patrick|date=2014|title=Blue, Green or Aquamarine? Taiwan and the Status Quo Preference in Cross-Strait Relations|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=219|issue=219 |pages=670–692|doi=10.1017/S0305741014000745|jstor=24740633|s2cid=40724777 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Cho|first1=Young Chul|last2=Ahn|first2=Mun Suk|year=2017|title=Taiwan's international visibility in the twenty-first century: A suggestive note|journal=International Journal|volume=72|issue=1|pages=79–90|doi=10.1177/0020702017692608|jstor=26414076|s2cid=151892075 }}</ref> Former President Ma Ying-jeou defined cross-strait relations as special relations, not one between two Chinas or two states.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.oem.com.mx/oem/notas/n836891.htm|title=Impulsa Taiwan la reconciliación|date=2 September 2008|newspaper=El Sol de México|language=es|access-date=9 June 2009|quote=Esencialmente, no definiríamos la relación a través del estrecho de Taiwan como una relación de dos países o dos Chinas, porque nuestra Constitución no lo permite. Nosotros definiríamos está relación como una relación muy especial, ya que la Constitución nuestra, igual que la Constitución de China continental, no permite la existencia de otro país dentro del territorio.|archive-date=4 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304092648/http://www.oem.com.mx/oem/notas/n836891.htm}}</ref><ref name="chinapost.com.tw">{{Cite news|title=Taiwan and China in 'special relations': Ma|newspaper=China Post|date=4 September 2008|url=http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm|access-date=11 September 2008|archive-date=6 September 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080906092524/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/09/04/173082/Taiwan-and.htm}}</ref><ref name="MasClaimtoMainland">{{Cite news|last=Ko|first=Shu-Ling|title=Ma refers to China as ROC territory in magazine interview|newspaper=Taipei Times|date=8 October 2008|url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/08/2003425320|access-date=8 October 2008|archive-date=3 June 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090603213128/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/10/08/2003425320|url-status=live}}</ref> Ma also noted that unification is unlikely within our lifetimes, as the Taiwanese people oppose the mainland's authoritarian rule.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national%20news/2008/05/16/156644/Unification-with.htm|title=Unification with China unlikely 'in our lifetimes': president-elect|last=Enav|first=Peter|date=16 May 2008|newspaper=China Post|access-date=13 June 2009|quote='It is very difficult for us to see any unification talks even in our lifetimes,' Ma said. 'Taiwanese people would like to have economic interactions with the mainland, but obviously they don't believe their political system is suitable for Taiwan.'|archive-date=16 June 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090616151325/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national%20news/2008/05/16/156644/Unification-with.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> Some Pan-Blue members seek to improve relationships with the PRC, with a focus on improving economic ties.<ref>{{cite news|last=Smith|first=Courtney Donovan|date=21 June 2022|title=How pro-China is the KMT now?|url=https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4576006|work=Taiwan News|access-date=29 January 2023|archive-date=29 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230129014003/https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4576006|url-status=live}}</ref> ===National identity=== {{Main|Taiwanese people#The current state of Taiwanese identity}} {{See also|Taiwan independence movement|Chinese unification}} Roughly 84 percent of Taiwan's population are descendants of Han Chinese immigrants between 1683 and 1895. Another significant fraction descends from Han Chinese who immigrated from mainland China in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The shared cultural origin as well as hostility between the rival ROC and PRC have resulted in national identity being a contentious issue with political overtones. Since democratic reforms and the lifting of martial law, a distinct Taiwanese identity is often at the heart of political debates. Its acceptance makes the island distinct from mainland China, and therefore may be seen as a step towards forming a consensus for ''de jure'' Taiwan independence.<ref name="power-shift">{{Cite book|last=Shambaugh|first=David L.|title=Power shift|publisher=University of California Press|year=2006|pages=179–183 |isbn=978-0-520-24570-9}}</ref> The Pan-Green camp supports a predominantly Taiwanese identity (although "Chinese" may be viewed as cultural heritage), while the Pan-Blue camp supports a predominantly Chinese identity (with "Taiwanese" as a regional/diasporic Chinese identity).<ref name="panblue-reunif-chineseid" /> The KMT has downplayed this stance in the recent years and now supports a Taiwanese identity as part of a Chinese identity.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20081230ho.html|title=No sign of a 'peace agreement'|last=Okazaki|first=Hisahiko|date=30 December 2008|newspaper=Japan Times|access-date=15 July 2009|quote=For one thing, I believe there is recognition that the awareness of Taiwanese identity is now irreversible. The KMT government did things like rename the "Taiwan Post" to "Chunghwa Post" as soon as it came in. But it did not take much time to perceive that it would cause a backlash among the Taiwan populace. The cross-strait exchanges have also brought about opposition demonstrations from time to time. This appears to be one of the reasons for the abrupt decline in the approval rating of the Ma administration.|archive-date=14 July 2012|archive-url=https://archive.today/20120714162422/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20081230ho.html%23.UAGdJqgo9Rw|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1211639,00.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071024135148/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1211639,00.html|archive-date=24 October 2007|title=10 Questions: Ma Ying-jeou|date=10 July 2006|newspaper=Time|access-date=15 July 2009|quote=I am Taiwanese as well as Chinese.}}</ref> ====Public opinion==== {{See also|Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity}} [[File:National Chengchi University identity survey.svg|thumb|right|upright=1.5|Results from an identity survey conducted each year from 1992 to 2020 by the Election Study Center, [[National Chengchi University]].<ref name="nccu"/> Responses are Taiwanese (green), Chinese (red) or Both Taiwanese and Chinese (hatched). No response is shown as gray.]] Taiwanese identification has increased substantially since the early 1990s, while Chinese identification has fallen to a low level, and identification as both has also seen a reduction. In 1992, 17.6 percent of respondents identified as Taiwanese, 25.5 percent as Chinese, 46.4 percent as both, and 10.5 percent non-response. In June 2021, 63.3 percent identified as Taiwanese, 2.6 percent as Chinese, 31.4 percent as both, and 2.7 percent non-response.<ref name="nccu">{{cite web |title=Taiwanese / Chinese Identity(1992/06~2021/06) |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961 |website=Election Study Center |publisher=[[National Chengchi University]] |access-date=27 October 2021 |archive-date=6 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210306094327/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961 |url-status=live }}</ref> A survey conducted in Taiwan by Global Views Survey Research Center in July 2009 showed that 82.8 percent of respondents consider the ROC and the PRC two separate countries with each developing on its own but 80.2 percent think they are members of the Chinese.<ref>{{cite web|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110429190528/http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/200907_GVSRC_others_E.pdf|url=http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/200907_GVSRC_others_E.pdf|archive-date=29 April 2011|title=Survey on President Ma's Approval Rating and Cross-Strait Relations After First Year of Direct Flights|date=24 July 2009|publisher=Global Views Survey Research Center|access-date=3 December 2014}}</ref> Domestic public opinion has preferred maintaining the status quo, though pro-independence sentiment has steadily risen since 1994. In June 2021, an annual poll found that 28.2 percent supported the status quo and postponing a decision, 27.5 percent supported maintaining the status quo indefinitely, 25.8 percent supported the status quo with a move toward independence, 5.9 percent supported the status quo with a move toward unification, 5.7 percent gave no response, 5.6 percent supported independence as soon as possible, and 1.5 percent supported unification as soon as possible.<ref name="chengchiIndepUnif">{{cite web |title=Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |publisher=Election Study Center, [[National Chengchi University]] |access-date=27 October 2021 |archive-date=26 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211026231952/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |url-status=live }}</ref> A [[2018 Taiwanese referendum|referendum question in 2018]] asked if Taiwan's athletes should compete under "Taiwan" in the [[2020 Summer Olympics]] but did not pass; the ''New York Times'' attributed the failure to a campaign cautioning that a name change might lead to Taiwan being banned "under Chinese pressure".<ref name="HortonNYT2018">{{Cite news|last=Horton|first=Chris|date=26 November 2018|title=Taiwan Asked Voters 10 Questions. It Got Some Unexpected Answers. (Published 2018)|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/26/world/asia/taiwan-election.html}}</ref> ==={{anchor|status}}Foreign relations and international status=== {{Main|Foreign relations of Taiwan|Political status of Taiwan}} {{See also|List of states with limited recognition|Foreign relations of China#International territorial disputes|Taiwan, China}} [[File:Countries recognizing the Republic of China (Taiwan).svg|thumb|upright=1.2| {{Legend|black|Republic of China (Taiwan)}} {{Legend|#007f00|Countries that have formal relations with Taiwan}} {{Legend|#8fbc8f|Countries that have formal relations with the PRC and informal relations with Taiwan}}]] The political and legal statuses of Taiwan are contentious issues. The People's Republic of China (PRC) claims that Taiwan is Chinese territory and that the PRC replaced the ROC government in 1949, becoming the sole legal government of China.<ref name="PRCNorway">{{cite web |url=https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceno/eng/ztxw/twwt/t110655.htm |title=White Paper—The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue |author=<!--Not stated--> |date=21 February 2000 |website=Embassy of the PRC in the Kingdom of Norway |publisher=The Taiwan Affairs Office and The Information Office of the State Council |access-date=27 November 2021 |quote=As we have already said, Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and, after replacing the government of the Republic of China in 1949, the government of the PRC has become the sole legal government of China, enjoying and exercising sovereignty over the whole of China, including Taiwan. |archive-date=28 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211128012529/https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceno/eng/ztxw/twwt/t110655.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> The ROC, however, has its [[New Taiwan dollar|own currency]], [[Taiwan passport|widely accepted passport]], [[Postage stamps and postal history of Taiwan|postage stamps]], internet [[Top-level domain|TLD]], armed forces, constitution, and institutions.<ref name="tfp09">{{cite web |date=2009 |title=Taiwan flashpoint: Introduction – Present status |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/04/taiwan_flashpoint/html/present_status.stm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201205164959/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/asia_pac/04/taiwan_flashpoint/html/present_status.stm |archive-date=5 December 2020 |access-date=6 December 2020 |website=[[BBC]] |quote=But Taiwan's leaders say it is clearly much more than a province, arguing that it is a sovereign state. It has its own constitution, democratically-elected leaders, and 400,000 troops in its armed forces.}}</ref> It has not formally renounced its claim to the mainland, but ROC government publications have increasingly downplayed this historical claim.<ref>{{cite book |last=Chang |first=Bi-yu |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hgaUBwAAQBAJ&q=9781317658122&pg=PA58 |title=Place, Identity, and National Imagination in Post-war Taiwan |date=2015 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-317-65812-2 |location=University of London |pages=35–40, 46–60 |language=en |access-date=25 July 2023 |archive-date=2 October 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241002210440/https://books.google.com/books?id=hgaUBwAAQBAJ&q=9781317658122&pg=PA58#v=onepage&q=9781317658122&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref> Until 1928, the [[foreign policy]] of Republican China was complicated by a lack of internal unity—competing centers of power all claimed legitimacy. This situation changed after the defeat of the [[Beiyang Government|Peiyang Government]] by the Kuomintang (KMT), which led to widespread diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://history.state.gov/countries/china|title=Countries – China|publisher=US Department of State, Office of the Historian|access-date=28 May 2009|archive-date=15 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210415013135/https://history.state.gov/countries/china|url-status=live}}</ref> After the KMT retreated to Taiwan, most countries, especially those of the [[Western Bloc]] – save the United Kingdom, which recognized the PRC in 1950<ref>Wolf, David C. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/260389 'To Secure a Convenience': Britain Recognizes China – 1950] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231215163208/https://www.jstor.org/stable/260389 |date=15 December 2023 }}. Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 18, no. 2, 1983, pp. 299–326. JSTOR.</ref> – continued to maintain formal relations with the ROC; but recognition gradually eroded and many countries switched recognition to the People's Republic of China in the 1970s. On 25 October 1971, UN Resolution 2758 was adopted by 76 votes to 35 with 17 abstentions, recognizing the PRC as China's sole representative in the United Nations.<ref>Eyal Propper. [https://web.archive.org/web/20120325191248/http://israelcfr.com/documents/issue5_china.pdf "How China Views its National Security,"] [[Israel Council on Foreign Relations|The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs]], May 2008.</ref><ref>{{cite web|publisher=United Nations Digital Library|url=https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/735611?ln=en|page=41|title=General Assembly, 26th session: 1976th plenary meeting, Monday, 25 October 1971, New York (A/PV.1976)|year=1974|access-date=28 October 2021|archive-date=15 February 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200215090149/https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/735611?ln=en|url-status=live}}</ref> [[File:Taiwanese Embassy in Mbabane.JPG|thumb|[[Embassy of the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the Kingdom of Eswatini|ROC embassy]] in [[Eswatini]]]] The PRC refuses to have [[diplomacy|diplomatic relations]] with any nation that has diplomatic relations with the ROC, and requires all nations with which it has diplomatic relations to make a statement on its claims to Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Henckaerts |first=Jean-Marie |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_9kuVIayxDoC&pg=PA96 |title=The international status of Taiwan in the new world order |publisher=[[Martinus Nijhoff Publishers]] |year=1996 |isbn=978-90-411-0929-3 |pages=96–97 |language=en |access-date=28 September 2020 |archive-date=2 October 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241002213726/https://books.google.com/books?id=_9kuVIayxDoC&pg=PA96#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Lee|first=Tzu-wen|year=1996|title=The International Legal Status of the Republic of China on Taiwan|journal=UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs|volume=1|issue=2|pages=351–392|jstor=45302055}}</ref> As a result, only {{Numrec|ROC||UN member states}} and the [[Holy See]] maintain official diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.<ref name="ap2024"/> The ROC maintains unofficial relations with other countries via ''de facto'' [[embassy|embassies]] and [[consul (representative)|consulates]] mostly called [[Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office]]s (TECRO), with branch offices called "Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices" (TECO). Both TECRO and TECO are "unofficial commercial entities" of the ROC in charge of maintaining diplomatic relations, providing consular services, and serving the national interests of the ROC.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Pajtinka |first=Erik |year=2017 |title=Between Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy: Taiwan's Foreign Relations in Current Practice |journal=Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics |publication-place=[[Matej Bel University]] |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=39–57 |doi=10.1515/jnmlp-2017-0003 |s2cid=158957023 |doi-access=free}}</ref> From 1954 to 1979, the United States was a partner with Taiwan in a mutual defense treaty. The United States remains one of the [[Republic of China-United States relations|main supporters]] of Taiwan and, through the [[Taiwan Relations Act]] passed in 1979, has continued selling arms and providing military training to the [[Republic of China Armed Forces]].<ref name="TRA-review">{{cite web|url=http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg1272.cfm|title=The Taiwan Relations Act After 20 Years: Keys to Past and Future Success|first=Stephen J.|last=Yates|author-link=Stephen J. Yates|date=16 April 1999|publisher=The Heritage Foundation|access-date=19 July 2009|url-status=unfit|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090722095740/http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/bg1272.cfm|archive-date=22 July 2009}}</ref> The PRC considers US involvement disruptive to the stability of the region.<ref name="SanctionsAFP">{{cite news|title=China: US spat over Taiwan could hit co-operation |date=2 February 2010 |agency=[[Agence France-Presse]] |url=https://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jDzKLVZ7X2dz8yrsshklcJZh38Cg |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100206214100/https://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jDzKLVZ7X2dz8yrsshklcJZh38Cg |archive-date=6 February 2010 |access-date=17 July 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Obama to push ahead on Taiwan frigate sales despite Chinese anger|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/14/obama-to-push-ahead-on-taiwan-frigate-sales-despite-chinese-anger.html|publisher=[[CNBC]]|agency=[[Reuters]]|date=14 December 2015|access-date=15 September 2017|archive-date=29 May 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170529195323/http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/14/obama-to-push-ahead-on-taiwan-frigate-sales-despite-chinese-anger.html|url-status=live}}</ref> The official position of the United States is that the PRC is expected to "use no force or threat[en] to use force against Taiwan" and the ROC is to "exercise prudence in managing all aspects of [[cross-strait relations]]." Both are to refrain from performing actions or espousing statements "that would unilaterally alter Taiwan's status".<ref name="UsPolicyToTaiwan">{{cite press release |publisher=[[United States Department of State]] |date=21 April 2004 |title=Overview of US Policy Towards Taiwan |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649.htm |access-date=17 July 2014 |last=Kelly |first=James A. |archive-date=14 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191014064318/https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> While not officially classified as a [[major non-NATO ally]], it has been ''de facto'' treated this way by the [[United States]] since at least 2003.<ref name="Kan20092">{{cite book |last=Kan |first=Shirley |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fJSHhOZo_j8C&pg=PA52 |title=Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990 |date=December 2009 |publisher=DIANE Publishing |isbn=978-1-4379-2041-3 |pages=52 |access-date=22 November 2023 |archive-date=16 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240816172305/https://books.google.com/books?id=fJSHhOZo_j8C&pg=PA52#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref> Taiwan, since 2016 under the Tsai administration's [[New Southbound Policy]], has pursued closer economic relations with South and [[Southeast Asia]]n countries, increasing cooperation on investments and people-to-people exchanges despite the region's general lack of official diplomatic ties with Taipei.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Sana Hashmi |date=5 February 2021 |title=Perfecting Taiwan's New Southbound Policy |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/perfecting-taiwans-new-southbound-policy/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20230125053859/https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/perfecting-taiwans-new-southbound-policy/ |archive-date=25 January 2023 |website=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=30 August 2021 |title=Southbound Policy options discussed |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2021/08/30/2003763471 |access-date=25 January 2023 |website=[[Taipei Times]] |archive-date=25 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230125092725/https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2021/08/30/2003763471 |url-status=live }}</ref> The policy has led to Taiwan receiving an increased number of migrants and students from the region.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Ralph Jennings |date=28 February 2019 |title=Illegal immigration disrupt Taiwan's economic shift away from China and towards Southeast Asia |url=https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2187922/illegal-immigration-disrupts-taiwans-economic-shift-away-china |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20210504063103/https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/2187922/illegal-immigration-disrupts-taiwans-economic-shift-away-china |archive-date=4 May 2021 |access-date=25 January 2023 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en}}</ref> However, a few scandals of Southeast Asians, particularly Indonesians, experiencing exploitation in scholarship programs<ref>{{Cite web |last=Mimi Leung |date=7 January 2019 |title=Indonesia suspends student internships to Taiwan |url=https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190107175952304 |access-date=25 January 2023 |website=[[University World News]] |archive-date=25 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230125092734/https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190107175952304 |url-status=live }}</ref> and in some labor industries have emerged as setbacks for the policy<ref>{{Cite web |last=[[Kyodo]] |date=2019-08-29 |title=Migrant worker's death at hands of Taiwan police highlights failings in labour system |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3024913/migrant-workers-death-hands-taiwan-police-highlights-failings |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231021002443/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3024913/migrant-workers-death-hands-taiwan-police-highlights-failings |archive-date=2023-10-21 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |quote=A combination of factors – rules of employment, limited education, poor Chinese-language skills and corruption – have long made such workers targets of abuse, leading foreign governments to express concern about their citizens employed in Taiwan.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Ja Ian Chong |date=10 April 2019 |title=Taiwan's New Southbound Policy: Accomplishments and Perceptions |url=https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/taiwan%E2%80%99s-new-southbound-policy-accomplishments-and-perceptions |website=[[East-West Center]] |place=[[National University of Singapore]] |language=en |access-date=25 January 2023 |archive-date=25 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230125092726/https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/taiwan%E2%80%99s-new-southbound-policy-accomplishments-and-perceptions |url-status=live }}</ref> as well as for [[Indonesia-Taiwan relations]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Chou |first=Bryan |date=5 November 2020 |title=Taiwan, Indonesia Spar Over Migrant Worker Fees |url=https://international.thenewslens.com/article/142835 |access-date=25 January 2023 |website=[[The News Lens]] |language=en |archive-date=25 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230125092727/https://international.thenewslens.com/article/142835 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=7 February 2017 |title=Perbudakan ABK di Taiwan Mendapat Perhatian Khusus Dewan |trans-title=ABK slavery in Taiwan Receives Special Attention from the Council |url=http://www.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/15447 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230125092729/https://www.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/15447 |archive-date=25 January 2023 |access-date=25 January 2023 |website=[[People's Representative Council]] |language=id}}</ref> ====Relations with the PRC==== {{Main|Cross-strait relations}} [[File:2015 Ma–Xi Meeting 08.jpg|thumb|The [[Ma–Xi meeting]] was the only meeting between the leaders of both sides of the Taiwan Strait since 1949.]] The [[Mainland Affairs Council]] (MAC) of Taiwan is responsible for relations with the PRC, while the [[Taiwan Affairs Office]] (TAO) of the PRC is responsible for relations with Taiwan. Exchanges are conducted through private organizations both founded in 1991: the [[Straits Exchange Foundation]] (SEF) of Taiwan and the [[Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits]] (ARATS) of the PRC. In November 1992, the ARATS and SEF held a meeting which would later become known as the [[1992 Consensus]]. The SEF announced that both sides agreed that there was only [[one China]], but disagreed on the definition of China (i.e. the ROC vs. PRC), while the ARATS announced that the two agreed on the One China principle, but did not mention differences regarding its definition made in the SEF statement.<ref name="autogenerated1">{{Cite web|url=https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30341.html|title=China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei|website=www.everycrsreport.com|access-date=7 January 2022|archive-date=16 August 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240816172156/https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30341.html|url-status=live}}</ref> In Taiwan, the ruling [[Democratic Progressive Party]] has rejected the 1992 Consensus since early 2019.<ref>{{cite web|title=President Tsai issues statement on China's President Xi's "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan"|url=https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5621|website=Office of the President, ROC (Taiwan)|date=2 January 2019|access-date=4 July 2023|archive-date=22 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230522173943/https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5621|url-status=live}}</ref> President [[Lai Ching-te]] has stated that the ROC and the PRC are not subordinate to each other.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://thediplomat.com/2024/11/lai-ching-te-and-the-republic-of-china-and-motherland-theories/|title=Lai Ching-te and the 'Republic of China' and 'Motherland' Theories|website=The Diplomat|last=Kawashima|first=Shin|date=29 November 2024|access-date=27 February 2025}}</ref> The PRC's One China principle states that Taiwan and mainland China are both part of China, and that the PRC is the only legitimate government of China.<ref name="woo21" /> It seeks to prevent or reduce any formal recognition of the ROC as an independent sovereign state,<ref>{{cite book |last1=Huang |first1=Jing |title=Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace |publisher=[[University of California Press]] |year=2017 |editor-last1=Dittmer |editor-first1=Lowell |edition=1st |pages=239–248 |chapter=Xi Jinping's Taiwan Policy: Boxing Taiwan In with the One-China Framework |jstor=10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm |chapter-url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.16}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Shattuck |first=Thomas J. |year=2020 |title=The Race to Zero?: China's Poaching of Taiwan's Diplomatic Allies |journal=[[Orbis (journal)|Orbis]] |volume=64 |issue=2 |pages=334–352 |doi=10.1016/j.orbis.2020.02.003 |pmc=7102519 |pmid=32292214}}</ref> meaning that Taiwan participates in many international forums as a non-state member under names such as "Chinese Taipei". The PRC suggested the "[[one country, two systems]]" employed in [[Hong Kong]] as a model for peaceful unification with Taiwan.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Chao|first=Chien-Min|year=1987|title="One Country, Two Systems": A Theoretical Analysis|journal=Asian Affairs: An American Review|volume=14|issue=2|pages=107–124|doi=10.1080/00927678.1987.10553643|jstor=30172037}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Lin|first=Gang|year=2016|title=Beijing's New Strategies toward a Changing Taiwan|journal=Journal of Contemporary China|volume=25|issue=99|pages=321–335|doi=10.1080/10670564.2015.1104863|s2cid=155357074|url=https://taiwan.sjtu.edu.cn/Beijing%E2%80%99s%20New%20Strategies%20toward%20a%20Changing%20Taiwan.pdf|access-date=17 December 2022|archive-date=17 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221217053049/https://taiwan.sjtu.edu.cn/Beijing%E2%80%99s%20New%20Strategies%20toward%20a%20Changing%20Taiwan.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref> While it aims for peaceful reunification, the PRC does not rule out the use of force.<ref name="scmp2014sep27">{{cite news|last1=Chung|first1=Lawrence|title='One country, two systems' right formula for Taiwan, Xi Jinping reiterates|url=http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1601307/one-country-two-systems-right-formula-taiwan-xi-jinping-reiterates?page=all|access-date=14 April 2015|work=South China Morning Post|date=27 September 2014|archive-date=12 April 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150412121848/http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1601307/one-country-two-systems-right-formula-taiwan-xi-jinping-reiterates?page=all|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="bbc21">{{cite news |title=China-Taiwan tensions: We will not bow to Beijing pressure, says leader |date=10 October 2021 |work=BBC News |publisher=BBC |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58860365 |access-date=10 October 2021 |archive-date=10 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211010044827/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58860365 |url-status=live }}</ref> The political environment is complicated by the potential for military conflict<ref name="mol21">{{cite news |last=Molloy |first=Shannon |date=13 October 2021 |title=Proof China has been practising for years for a war that would spark mass global conflict |url=https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/proof-china-has-been-practising-for-years-for-a-war-that-would-spark-mass-global-conflict/news-story/efe55679a42171268224ba89b084e386 |access-date=13 October 2021 |work=[[News.com.au]] |archive-date=13 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211013023546/https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/proof-china-has-been-practising-for-years-for-a-war-that-would-spark-mass-global-conflict/news-story/efe55679a42171268224ba89b084e386 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="mar21">{{cite news |title=U.S. Lawmakers' Visit to Taiwan Tests Detente With China |first=Peter |last=Martin |date=10 November 2021 |work=Bloomberg |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-09/u-s-lawmakers-visit-to-taiwan-inflames-tensions-with-china |url-access=limited |access-date=13 November 2021 |archive-date=12 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211112142048/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-09/u-s-lawmakers-visit-to-taiwan-inflames-tensions-with-china |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="yn21">{{cite news |title='Inconceivable': Peter Dutton warns of major China move |author=Yahoo News Staff |date=13 November 2021 |work=Yahoo News |publisher=Yahoo |url=https://au.news.yahoo.com/inconceivable-australia-must-prepare-major-china-move-002430696.html |access-date=13 November 2021 |archive-date=13 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211113012155/https://au.news.yahoo.com/inconceivable-australia-must-prepare-major-china-move-002430696.html |url-status=live }}</ref> should events outlined in the PRC's [[Anti-Secession Law]] occur, such as Taiwan declaring ''[[de jure]]'' independence. There is a substantial military presence on the Fujian coast as well as PRC sorties into Taiwan's [[air defense identification zone]] (ADIZ).<ref>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/liancheng.htm|title=Liancheng / Lianfeng Airbase – Chinese Military Forces|publisher=Federation of American Scientists|access-date=7 June 2009|quote=In March 2000 it was reported that the PLA Air Force was deploying new air-defense missiles [possibly batteries of Russian-made S-300 missiles] opposite Taiwan at the coastal cities of Xiamen and Shantou, and at Longtian, near Fuzhou.|archive-date=23 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210823122033/https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/liancheng.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name=2004NatDefRpt>{{cite web |year=2004 |title=2004 National Defense Report |work=ROC Ministry of National Defense |url=https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/taiwan-2004-national-defense-report.pdf |access-date=27 November 2021 |archive-date=28 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211128012530/https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/taiwan-2004-national-defense-report.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="srf21">{{cite news |date=5 October 2021 |title=Luftraumverletzungen in Taiwan: Es geht um Einschüchterung |trans-title=Airspace intrusion in Taiwan: It's about intimidation |url=https://www.srf.ch/news/international/militaerjets-aus-china-luftraumverletzungen-in-taiwan-es-geht-um-einschuechterung |access-date=10 October 2021 |work=[[Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen]] |language=DE-ch |archive-date=16 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240816172146/https://www.srf.ch/news/international/strategie-der-einschuechterung-chinesische-militaerjets-in-taiwans-luftraumueberwachungszone |url-status=live }}</ref> ====Participation in international events and organizations==== {{See also|Foreign relations of Taiwan#Relation with International organizations|Chinese Taipei}} The ROC was a [[Member states of the United Nations#Original members|founding member of United Nations]], and held the [[China and the United Nations|seat of China]] on the [[United Nations Security Council|Security Council]] and other UN bodies until 1971, when it was expelled by Resolution 2758 and replaced with the PRC as the ROC now has neither official membership nor observer status in the organization. Since 1993, the ROC has petitioned the UN for entry, but its applications have not made it past committee stage.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Hickey|first1=Dennis V.|date=1997|title=U.S. Policy and Taiwan's Bid to Rejoin the United Nations|journal=Asian Survey|volume=37|issue=11|pages=1031–1043|doi=10.2307/2645739|jstor=2645739 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-un-dilemma-to-be-or-not-to-be/|title=Taiwan's UN Dilemma: To Be or Not To Be|last1=Winkler|first1=Sigrid|website=The Brookings Institution|date=20 June 2012|access-date=16 November 2022|archive-date=31 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200331180632/https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-un-dilemma-to-be-or-not-to-be/|url-status=live}}</ref> Due to the [[One China]] policy, most [[Member states of the United Nations|UN member states]], including the United States, do not wish to discuss the issue of the ROC's political status for fear of souring diplomatic ties with the PRC.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tkacik |first=John |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2009/05/13/2003443455 |title=John Tkacik on Taiwan: Taiwan's 'undetermined' status |newspaper=Taipei Times |date=13 May 2009 |access-date=28 May 2009 |archive-date=2 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190502100149/http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2009/05/13/2003443455 |url-status=live }}</ref> The ROC government shifted its focus to organizations affiliated with the UN, as well as organizations outside the UN system.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Li|first1=Chien-pin|date=2006|title=Taiwan's Participation in Inter-Governmental Organizations: An Overview of Its Initiatives|journal=Asian Survey|volume=46|issue=4|pages=597–614|doi=10.1525/as.2006.46.4.597|jstor=10.1525/as.2006.46.4.597|url=https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/facpubs/34|access-date=19 September 2023|archive-date=24 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230924055555/https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/facpubs/34/|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> The government sought to participate in the [[World Health Organization]] (WHO) since 1997,<ref>{{cite news|title=Minister Chiu leads our WHA delegation to actively hold bilateral talks with delegations from other nations. This event has been the most successful medical-related diplomatic record over the past years.|url=http://www.mohw.gov.tw/EN/CommonPages/DocPrint.aspx?doc_no=45250|access-date=27 January 2015|publisher=Ministry of Health and Welfare|date=18 June 2014|archive-date=10 February 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150210005025/http://www.mohw.gov.tw/EN/CommonPages/DocPrint.aspx?doc_no=45250}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=ROC urges world public to support WHO bid|url=http://taiwaninfo.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=19343&CtNode=103&htx_TRCategory=&mp=4|access-date=27 January 2015|work=Taiwan Info|date=3 May 2002|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150210015656/http://taiwaninfo.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=19343&CtNode=103&htx_TRCategory=&mp=4|archive-date=10 February 2015}}</ref> their efforts were rejected until 2009, when they participated as an observer under the name "Chinese Taipei" after reaching an agreement with Beijing.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLI62888|title=Taiwan hopes WHO assembly will help boost its profile|last=Reid|first=Katie|work=Reuters|date=18 May 2009|access-date=11 June 2013|archive-date=15 October 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131015040228/http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/18/idUSLI62888|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=103148&ctnode=427&mp=9|title=Taiwan delegation to participate in WHA|newspaper=Taiwan Today|date=14 May 2010|access-date=2 January 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120119091612/http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=103148&ctnode=427&mp=9|archive-date=19 January 2012}}</ref> In 2017, Taiwan again began to be excluded from the WHO even in an observer capacity.<ref>{{cite web |last=David Green |date=18 May 2018 |title=WHO Bows to China Pressure, Contravenes Human Rights in Refusing Taiwan Media |url=https://international.thenewslens.com/article/95982 |access-date=31 March 2020 |website=international.thenewslens.com}}</ref> This exclusion caused a number of scandals during the [[COVID-19]] outbreak.<ref>{{cite web |last=Davidson|first=Helen|date=30 March 2020|title=Senior WHO adviser appears to dodge question on Taiwan's Covid-19 response|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/30/senior-who-adviser-appears-to-dodge-question-on-taiwans-covid-19-response |work=The Guardian}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Blanchard |first1=Ben |title=Parties unite over Taiwan's exclusion from WHO anti-virus planning |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-taiwan/parties-unite-over-taiwans-exclusion-from-who-anti-virus-planning-idUSKBN1ZN0QG |work=Reuters |access-date=31 March 2020|date=24 January 2020 }}</ref> [[File:Flag of Chinese Taipei for Olympic games.svg|thumb|The flag used by Taiwan at the Olympic Games, where it competes as "[[Chinese Taipei]]" ({{lang|zh-Hant-TW|中華台北}})|alt=A white symbol in shape of a five petal flower ringed by a blue and a red line. In its center stands a circular symbol depicting a white sun on a blue background. The five Olympic circles (blue, yellow, black, green and red) stand below it.]] The [[Republic of China at the Olympics#Nagoya Resolution|Nagoya Resolution]] in 1979 approved by the [[International Olympic Committee]] (IOC) provided a compromise for the ROC to use the name "Chinese Taipei" in international events where the PRC is also a party, such as the [[Olympic Games]].<ref name="Brownell2007">{{cite web|last=Brownell|first=Susan|url=http://hnn.us/article/51398#sthash.04ZCBpL4.dpuf|title=Could China stop Taiwan from coming to the Olympic Games?|website=History News Network|date=14 June 2008|access-date=26 August 2014}}</ref><ref name="Lin">{{cite news |title=How 'Chinese Taipei' came about |author=Catherine K. Lin |url=http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2008/08/05/2003419446 |newspaper=Taipei Times |date=5 August 2008}}</ref><ref name="chinese-taipei">{{cite news |url=http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/07/25/167036/Taiwan-insists.htm |title=Taiwan insists on 'Chinese Taipei' |newspaper=China Post |date=25 July 2008 |access-date=28 May 2009 |archive-date=29 June 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170629085958/http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan%20relations/2008/07/25/167036/Taiwan-insists.htm }}</ref> Under the IOC charter, [[Flag of the Republic of China|ROC flags]] cannot be flown at any official Olympic venue or gathering.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Taiwan flags in Salt Lake ruffle a few feelings |date=10 February 2002 |newspaper=The Deseret News |url=http://www.deseretnews.com/article/894748/Taiwan-flags-in-SL-ruffle-a-few-feelings.html |access-date=19 January 2012 |archive-date=8 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181008024953/https://www.deseretnews.com/article/894748/Taiwan-flags-in-SL-ruffle-a-few-feelings.html }}</ref> The ROC also participates in the [[Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation]] forum (since 1991) and the [[World Trade Organization]] (since 2002) under the names "Chinese Taipei" and "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu", respectively.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Chu|first=Ming-chin Monique|year=2016|title=No Need to Beg China? Taiwan's Membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation as a Contested State|journal=The China Quarterly|volume=225|issue=225 |pages=169–189|doi=10.1017/S030574101500171X|jstor=24743040 |s2cid=155769358 |url=https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/381497/1/TW%2520membership%2520of%2520APEC%2520as%2520a%2520contested%2520state-Monique%2520Chu-author%2520manuscript.pdf }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm|title=Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei) and the WTO|publisher=World Trade Organization|access-date=7 June 2009}}</ref> It was a founding member of the [[Asian Development Bank]], but since China's ascension in 1986 has participated under the name "Taipei, China". The ROC is able to participate as "China" in organizations in which the PRC does not participate, such as the [[World Organization of the Scout Movement]]. Due to its limited international recognition, the Republic of China has been a member of the [[Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization]] (UNPO) since the foundation of the organization in 1991, represented by a government-funded organization, the [[Taiwan Foundation for Democracy]] (TFD), under the name "Taiwan".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.unpo.org/content/view/7908/146/ |title=Taiwan |publisher=UNPO |access-date=7 May 2009 |archive-date=23 December 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081223022541/http://www.unpo.org/content/view/7908/146/ |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tfd.org.tw/english/about.php|title=About TFD|publisher=TFD|archive-date=18 March 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080318204700/http://www.tfd.org.tw/english/about.php}}</ref> ===Military=== {{Main|Republic of China Armed Forces}} {{See also|Military history of Taiwan|Republic of China Military Academy}} [[File:20200210 F16vsH6K Taiwan.jpg|thumb|A Taiwanese [[General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon|F-16]] fighter jet flies next to a Chinese [[Xian H-6|H-6]] bomber (top) in Taiwan's [[Air defense identification zone|ADIZ]].]] The [[Republic of China Armed Forces]] takes its roots in the [[National Revolutionary Army]], which was established by [[Sun Yat-sen]] in 1924 in [[Guangdong]] with a goal of reunifying China under the Kuomintang. When the [[People's Liberation Army]] won the Chinese Civil War, much of the National Revolutionary Army retreated to Taiwan along with the government. The 1947 Constitution of the ROC reformed it into the Republic of China Armed Forces, making it the national army rather than the army of a political party. Units which surrendered and remained in mainland China were either disbanded or incorporated into the People's Liberation Army. From 1949 to the 1970s, the primary mission of the Taiwanese military was to "retake mainland China" through Project National Glory. As this mission has transitioned away from attack because the relative strength of the PRC has massively increased, the ROC military has begun to shift emphasis from the traditionally dominant Army to the [[Republic of China Air Force|air force]] and [[Republic of China Navy|navy]]. Control of the armed forces has also passed into the hands of the civilian government.<ref name=towards>{{cite journal|last=Fravel|first=M. Taylor|title=Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwans's Democratization|journal=Armed Forces & Society|year=2002|volume=29|issue=1|pages=57–84|doi=10.1177/0095327X0202900104|s2cid=146212666 |url=https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/510e/42aa20fb53c1a69b45b48b0b55b34117b361.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200212081044/https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/510e/42aa20fb53c1a69b45b48b0b55b34117b361.pdf|archive-date=12 February 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB988242686540854310?mod=googlewsj |title=Committed to Taiwan |newspaper=The Wall Street Journal|date= 26 April 2001|access-date=28 May 2009}}</ref> The ROC began a series of force reduction plans since the 1990s to scale down its military from a level of 450,000 in 1997 to 380,000 in 2001.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/2004/P101.htm |title=Taiwan Yearbook 2004 |publisher=Government Information Office, Republic of China |access-date=28 May 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120106230514/http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/2004/P101.htm |archive-date=6 January 2012}}</ref> {{As of|2021}}, the total strength of the Armed Forces is capped at 215,000 with 90 percent manning ratio for volunteer military.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.mnd.gov.tw/NewUpload/%E6%AD%B7%E5%B9%B4%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A%E6%9B%B8%E7%B6%B2%E9%A0%81%E5%B0%88%E5%8D%80/%E6%AD%B7%E5%B9%B4%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A%E6%9B%B8%E5%B0%88%E5%8D%80.files/%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A%E6%9B%B8-110/110%E5%B9%B4%E5%9C%8B%E9%98%B2%E5%A0%B1%E5%91%8A%E6%9B%B8-%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87%E7%89%88.pdf|title=ROC National Defense Report 2021|pages=64, 116|website=Ministry of National Defense, R.O.C.|date=October 2021|access-date=27 August 2022}}</ref> [[Conscription in Taiwan|Conscription]] remains universal for qualified males reaching age eighteen, but as a part of the reduction effort many are given the opportunity to fulfill their draft requirement through alternative service.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/729500.stm |title=Asia-Pacific {{pipe}} Military alternative in Taiwan |work=BBC News |date=1 May 2000 |access-date=28 May 2009}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-extend-compulsory-military-service-official-media-2022-12-27/|title=Taiwan to extend conscription to one year, citing rising China threat|work=Reuters|date=27 December 2022|access-date=28 December 2022}}</ref> The military's reservists is around 2.5 million including first-wave reservists numbered at 300,000 {{As of|2022|lc=y}}.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2022/02/27/2003773863|title=Relax rules to boost reservist numbers: lawmakers|work=Taipei Times|date=27 February 2022|access-date=27 August 2022}}</ref> Taiwan's [[Military budget|defense spending]] as a percentage of its GDP fell below three percent in 1999 and had been trending downwards over the first two decades of the twenty-first century.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://milex.sipri.org/sipri|title=SIPRI Military Expenditure Database|work=SIPRI|access-date=28 December 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite thesis|type=PhD|last=Li|first=Steven X.|date=2020|title=Why So Little? The Curious Case of Taiwan's Defense Spending|publisher=University of Washington|url=https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/46343|access-date=27 August 2022}}</ref> The ROC government pledged to raise the spending as high as proposed three percent of GDP.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://international.thenewslens.com/article/84504|title=Opinion: Taiwan Must Come to its Own Defense|website=The News Lens|date=1 December 2017|access-date=27 August 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/07/16/2003696762|title=Defense budget fails to meet Tsai campaign pledge|work=Taipei Times|date=16 July 2018|access-date=27 August 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202502140007|title=Lai pledges to raise Taiwan's defense spending to over 3% of GDP|work=Focus Taiwan|date=24 February 2025|access-date=27 February 2025}}</ref> In 2024, Taiwan proposed 2.45 percent of projected GDP in defense spending for the following year.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2024/08/23/2003822636|title=Defense spending to top NT$640 billion|work=Taipei Times|date=23 August 2024|access-date=27 February 2025}}</ref> [[File:05.25 總統視導漢光33號演習 (34750802021).jpg|thumb|The [[Han Kuang Exercise]] is an annual military exercise by the [[Republic of China Armed Forces|ROC Armed Forces]] in preparation for a possible attack from the PRC.]] The ROC and the United States signed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, and established the [[United States Taiwan Defense Command]]. About 30,000 US troops were stationed in Taiwan, until the United States established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Shortall|first1=Dominick|last2=Johnson|first2=Jesse|date=28 October 2020|title=Once unimaginable, some now debating return of U.S. forces to Taiwan|url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/10/28/asia-pacific/us-forces-taiwan-china/|access-date=6 January 2021|website=The Japan Times|language=en-US}}</ref> A significant amount of military hardware has been bought from the United States, and continues to be legally guaranteed by the [[Taiwan Relations Act]].<ref name="TRA-review" /> France and the Netherlands have also sold military weapons and hardware to the ROC, but they almost entirely stopped in the 1990s under pressure of the PRC.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/july01/jpcabest.pdf|title=France's Taiwan Policy: A Case of Shopkeeper Diplomacy|last=Cabestan|first=Jean-Pierre|year=2001|publisher=CERI|access-date=5 June 2009|quote=By excluding the French companies from the bidding lists of many contract, Peking wanted above all to stop a growing trend{{nbsp}}... to disregard its objections and interests in the Taiwan issue.{{nbsp}}... In spite of the ban of arms sales to Taiwan approved by the French government in January 1994, discreet and small-sized deals have continued to be concluded since then. }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-09-24-taiwan_x.htm |title=Taiwan trying to shore up weapons support |newspaper=USA Today |date=24 September 2004 |access-date=28 May 2009}}</ref> There is no guarantee in the Taiwan Relations Act or any other treaty that the United States will defend Taiwan, even in the event of invasion.<ref>{{Cite news|title=China Threat to Attack Taiwan Alarms Asia |date=14 March 2005 |agency=Associated Press |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050411032736/http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=%2Fn%2Fa%2F2005%2F03%2F14%2Finternational%2Fi003051S91.DTL |url=http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2005/03/14/international/i003051S91.DTL |archive-date=11 April 2005 }}</ref> The joint declaration on security between the US and Japan signed in 1996 may imply that Japan would be involved in any response. However, Japan has refused to stipulate whether the "area surrounding Japan" mentioned in the pact includes Taiwan.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kapstein|first=Ethan B. |author2=Michael Mastanduno |title=Unipolar politics|publisher=Columbia University Press|page=194|isbn=978-0-231-11309-0|url={{GBurl|id=68s2k0ztkCMC|p=194}}|year=1999|quote=The Japanese leadership openly split on whether a crisis in Taiwan was included in the geographic expression "area surrounding Japan." In the event, Japan refused to stipulate the contingencies under which it would provide rear area support for U.S. forces or even the geographic scope of the "area surrounding Japan".{{nbsp}}... The two sides have not articulated clearly what the alliance stands ''for'', nor who it is defined to protect ''against''.}}</ref> The [[Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty]] (ANZUS Treaty) may mean that other US allies, such as Australia, could be involved.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Tow |first=William |year=2005 |title=ANZUS: Regional versus Global Security in Asia? |journal=International Relations of the Asia-Pacific |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=197–216 |doi= 10.1093/irap/lci113 }}</ref><ref name="sei21">{{cite news |title=China reacts to Peter Duttons 'jaw-dropping' promise to defend Taiwan |first=Jamie |last=Seidel |date=31 October 2021 |work=news.com.au |publisher=Nationwide News |url=https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/china-reacts-to-peter-duttons-jawdropping-promise-to-defend-taiwan/news-story/3644a042edd36c1b141a38017acf61e3 |access-date=13 November 2021 |quote=The Republic of China autocracy-turned-democracy didn't surrender to the Communist Party uprising during the 1949 civil war. It has no intention of doing so now. Now Taipei's own defence minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, says his country is prepared to defend itself alone, if necessary. "The country must rely on itself," he told media Thursday. "If any friends or other groups can help us, then we're happy to have it. But we cannot completely depend on it." }}</ref> While this would risk damaging economic ties with China,<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/07/13/1089694360063.html|title=China and Taiwan: flashpoint for a war|date=14 July 2004|newspaper=The Sydney Morning Herald|access-date=13 June 2009}}</ref> a conflict over Taiwan could lead to an economic blockade of China by a greater coalition.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Mirski |first1=Sean |title=Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2013/02/stranglehold-the-context-conduct-and-consequences-of-an-american-naval-blockade-of-china?lang=en |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |publisher=Journal Of Strategic Studies |access-date=15 January 2021}}</ref><ref name="chinas_fear_2019_04_30_reuters">{{cite news |last1=Lague |first1=David |last2=Kang Lim |first2=Benjamin |date=30 April 2019 |title=China's fear of an American blockade |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-army-blockade/chinas-fear-of-an-american-blockade-idUSKCN1S6140 |access-date=15 January 2021 |website=[[Reuters]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Axe |first1=David |title=To Defeat China In War, Strangle Its Economy: Expert |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/08/24/to-defeat-china-in-war-strangle-its-economy/ |website=Forbes |access-date=15 January 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Williams |title=After "the War that Never Was"—The Real Beginning |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/september/after-war-never-was-real-beginning |website=U.S. Naval Institute |access-date=15 January 2021 |language=en |date=29 September 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Mehra |first1=Jyotsna |title=The Australia-India-Japan-US Quadrilateral: Dissecting the China Factor |url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-australia-india-japan-us-quadrilateral/ |access-date=15 January 2021 |website=[[Observer Research Foundation]]}}</ref> ===LGBT rights=== {{Main|LGBT rights in Taiwan|Same-sex marriage in Taiwan}} On 24 May 2017, the [[Judicial Yuan#Constitutional Court|Constitutional Court]] ruled that then-current marriage laws had been violating the Constitution by denying same-sex couples the right to marry. The Court ruled that if the Legislative Yuan did not pass adequate amendments to Taiwanese marriage laws within two years, same-sex marriages would automatically become lawful in Taiwan.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Wu|first1=J. R.|title=Taiwan court rules in favor of same-sex marriage, first in Asia|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-lgbt-marriage/taiwan-court-rules-in-favor-of-same-sex-marriage-first-in-asia-idUSKBN18K0UN|work=[[Reuters]]|date=24 May 2017}}</ref> In a [[2018 Taiwanese referendum|referendum question in 2018]], however, voters expressed overwhelming opposition to same-sex marriage and supported the removal of content about homosexuality from primary school textbooks. According to the ''New York Times'', the referendum questions were subject to a "well-funded and highly organized campaign led by conservative Christians and other groups" involving the use of misinformation.<ref name="HortonNYT2018" /> Nevertheless, the vote against same-sex marriage does not affect the court ruling, and on 17 May 2019, Taiwan's parliament approved a bill legalizing same-sex marriage, making it the first country in Asia to do so.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48305708|title=Taiwan gay marriage: Parliament legalises same-sex unions|date=17 May 2019|publisher=BBC|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190517061353/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48305708|archive-date=17 May 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/17/asia/taiwan-same-sex-marriage-intl/index.html|title=Taiwan legalizes same-sex marriage in historic first for Asia|date=17 May 2019|work=[[CNN]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Steger |first=Isabella |title=In a first for Asia, Taiwan legalized same-sex marriage—with caveats |work=Quartz |date=17 May 2019 |url=https://qz.com/1621783/taiwan-becomes-first-country-in-asia-to-legalize-same-sex-marriage/ }}</ref> Taiwan has an annual pride event, [[Taiwan Pride]]. It currently holds the record for the largest [[LGBT]] gathering in [[East Asia]], rivaling [[Tel Aviv Pride]] in [[Israel]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Taiwan hosts biggest in-person LGBTQ Pride event of post-Covid 2020 |first=Louise |last=Watt |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/taiwan-hosts-biggest-person-lgbtq-pride-event-post-covid-2020-n1245610 |access-date=24 May 2022 |work=[[NBC News]] |date=31 October 2020 |language=en}}</ref> The event draws more than 200,000 people.<ref>{{Cite web |date=27 October 2019 |access-date=15 January 2024|title=Thousands join Taiwan's 17th LGBT Pride parade |first=Sean |last=Lin |work=[[Taipei Times]]|url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2019/10/27/2003724735}}</ref>
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