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Unification of Germany
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==== The aborted 1848–1849 German Empire in retrospective analysis ==== {{further|German Empire (1848–1849)}} Scholars of German history have engaged in decades of debate over how the successes and failures of the Frankfurt Parliament contribute to the historiographical explanations of German nation building. One school of thought, which emerged after [[World War I|The Great War]] and gained momentum in the aftermath of [[World War II]], maintains that the failure of German liberals in the Frankfurt Parliament led to [[bourgeoisie]] compromise with conservatives (especially the conservative [[Junker]] landholders), which subsequently led to the so-called ''[[Sonderweg]]'' (distinctive path) of 20th-century German history.<ref>See, e.g.: [[Ralf Dahrendorf]], ''German History''{{Nonspecific|date=April 2023}}, (1968), pp. 25–32; {{Cite book |last=Wehler |first=Hans-Ulrich |title=Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871–1918 |date=1973 |publisher=Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht |isbn=3-5253-3340-4 |location=Göttingen |pages=10–14 |oclc=873428 |ol=23130743M |author-link=Hans-Ulrich Wehler |language=de}}; {{Harvnb|Krieger|1973}}; {{Harvnb|Grew|Bien|1978|pp=312–345}}; {{Cite book |last1=Kocka |first1=Jürgen |title=Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth Century Europe |last2=Mitchell |first2=Allan |author-link=Jürgen Kocka |date=1993 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-8549-6414-7 |ol=8300088M}}; {{Cite journal |last=Kocka |first=Jürgen |author-link=Jürgen Kocka |date=January 1988 |title=German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg |journal=Journal of Contemporary History |volume=23 |issue=1 |jstor=260865 |pages=3–16|doi=10.1177/002200948802300101 |s2cid=159651458 }}; {{Cite book |last=Berghahn |first=Volker |title=Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century |date=1982 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-5213-4748-8 |ol=2382839M |author-link=Volker Berghahn}}</ref> Failure to achieve unification in 1848, this argument holds, resulted in the late formation of the nation-state in 1871, which in turn delayed the development of positive national values. [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] often called on the German public to sacrifice all for the cause of their great nation, but his regime did not create German nationalism: it merely capitalized on an intrinsic cultural value of German society that still remains prevalent even to this day.<ref>World Encyclopedia V.3 p. 542.</ref> Furthermore, this argument maintains, the "failure" of 1848 reaffirmed latent aristocratic longings among the German middle class; consequently, this group never developed a self-conscious program of modernization.<ref>For a summary of this argument, see {{Harvnb|Blackbourn|Eley|1984|loc=Part 1}}.</ref> More recent scholarship has rejected this idea, claiming that Germany did not have an actual "distinctive path" any more than any other nation, a historiographic idea known as [[exceptionalism]].{{Sfn|Blackbourn|Eley|1984|loc=Part 1}} Instead, modern historians claim 1848 saw specific achievements by the liberal politicians. Many of their ideas and programs were later incorporated into Bismarck's social programs (e.g., social insurance, education programs, and wider definitions of suffrage). In addition, the notion of a distinctive path relies upon the underlying assumption that some other nation's path (in this case, the United Kingdom's) is the accepted norm.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|Eley|1984|loc=Chapter 2}} This new argument further challenges the norms of the British-centric model of development: studies of national development in Britain and other "normal" states (e.g., France or the United States) have suggested that even in these cases, the modern nation-state did not develop evenly. Nor did it develop particularly early, being rather a largely mid-to-late-19th-century phenomenon.{{Sfn|Blackbourn|Eley|1984|pp=286–293}} Since the end of the 1990s, this view has become widely accepted, although some historians still find the ''Sonderweg'' analysis helpful in understanding the period of [[National Socialism]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kocka |first=Jürgen |author-link=Jürgen Kocka |date=February 2003 |title=Comparison and Beyond |journal=History and Theory |volume=42 |issue=1 |doi=10.1111/1468-2303.00228 |pages=39–44}}; {{Cite journal |last=Kocka |first=Jürgen |date=February 1999 |title=Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German ''Sonderweg'' |journal=History and Theory |volume=38 |issue=1 |doi=10.1111/0018-2656.751999075 |author-link=Jürgen Kocka |pages=40–50}}.</ref><ref>For a representative analysis of this perspective, see {{Harvnb|Evans|1987}}.</ref>
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