Editing Counterintelligence (section)

==Theory of offensive counterintelligence==

The phrase offensive counterintelligence is ordinarily considered as being synonymous in meaning with the term counterespionage. The [[US Department of Defense]] defines it as 'That aspect of counterintelligence designed to detect, destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent espionage activities through identification, penetration, manipulation, deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or organizations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage activities.<ref>{{cite web |title=Counterintelligence |url=https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCWP%202-6%20W%20Erratum%20Counterintelligence.pdf |website=Marines |publisher=US Marine Corps |access-date=22 March 2025}}</ref> At the heart of exploitation operations is the objective to degrade the effectiveness of an adversary's intelligence service or a terrorist organization. Offensive counterespionage (and counterterrorism) is done one of two ways: either by manipulating the adversary (FIS or terrorist) in some manner or by disrupting the adversary's normal operations. 

Defensive counterintelligence operations that succeed in breaking up a clandestine network by arresting the persons involved or by exposing their actions demonstrate that disruption is quite measurable and effective against FIS if the right actions are taken. If defensive counterintelligence stops terrorist attacks, it has succeeded.

Offensive counterintelligence seeks to damage the long-term capability of the adversary. If it can lead a national adversary into putting large resources into protecting from a nonexistent threat, or if it can lead terrorists to assume that all of their "sleeper" agents in a country have become unreliable and must be replaced (and possibly killed as security risks), there is a greater level of success than can be seen from defensive operations alone, To carry out offensive counterintelligence, however, the service must do more than detect; it must manipulate persons associated with the adversary.

The [[Canadian Department of National Defence]] makes some useful logical distinctions in its Directive on its<ref name=DND-8002-2>{{Cite web
 | url = http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/admfincs/subjects/daod/8002/2_e.asp
 | title = Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit
 | access-date = 2007-11-19
 | date = 2003-03-28
 | id = Canada-DND-DAOD 8002-2
 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20071121153316/http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/admfincs/subjects/daod/8002/2_e.asp
 | archive-date = 2007-11-21
 | url-status = dead
 }}</ref>
National Counter-Intelligence Unit. The terminology is not the same as used by other services, but the distinctions are useful:
:#"Counter-intelligence (''contre-ingérence'') means activities concerned with identifying and counteracting threats to the security of DND employees, CF members, and DND and CF property and information, that are posed by hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities." This corresponds to defensive counterintelligence in other services.
:#"Security intelligence  (''renseignement de sécurité'') means intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile intelligence services, organizations or individuals, who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, organized crime or other criminal activities." This does ''not'' (''emphasis added'') correspond directly to offensive counterintelligence, but is the intelligence preparation necessary to conduct offensive counterintelligence.
:#The duties of the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit include "identifying, investigating and countering threats to the security of the DND and the CF from espionage, sabotage, subversion, terrorist activities, and other criminal activity; identifying, investigating and countering the actual or possible compromise of highly classified or special DND or CF material; conducting CI security investigations, operations and security briefings and debriefings to counter threats to, or to preserve, the security of DND and CF interests."  This mandate is a good statement of a mandate to conduct offensive counterintelligence.

DND further makes the useful clarification,<ref name=DND8002-3>{{Cite web
 | url = http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/admfincs/subjects/daod/8002/3_e.asp
 | title = Security Intelligence Liaison Program
 | access-date = 2007-11-19
 | date = 2003-03-28
 | id = Canada-DND-DAOD 8002-3
 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20071130193223/http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/admfincs/subjects/daod/8002/3_e.asp
 | archive-date = 2007-11-30
 | url-status = dead
 }}</ref>
"The security intelligence process ''should not be confused with'' the liaison conducted by members of the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) for the purpose of ''obtaining criminal intelligence,'' as the collection of this type of information is within their mandate."

Manipulating an intelligence professional, himself trained in counterintelligence, is no easy task, unless he is already predisposed toward the opposing side. Any effort that does not start with a sympathetic person will take a long-term commitment, and creative thinking to overcome the defenses of someone who knows he is a counterintelligence target and also knows counterintelligence techniques.

Terrorists on the other hand, although they engage in deception as a function of security appear to be more prone to manipulation or deception by a well-placed adversary than are foreign intelligence services. This is in part due to the fact that many terrorist groups, whose members "often mistrust and fight among each other, disagree, and vary in conviction.", are not as internally cohesive as foreign intelligence services, potentially leaving them more vulnerable to both deception and manipulation.