Editing Deterrence theory (section)

==Nuclear deterrence theory==
{{Main|Nuclear strategy|Massive retaliation|Mutual assured destruction|Flexible response}}
{{Nuclear weapons}}
In 1966, Schelling<ref name="Schelling_1966" /> is prescriptive in outlining the impact of the development of nuclear weapons in the analysis of military power and deterrence. In his analysis, before the widespread use of assured second strike capability, or immediate reprisal, in the form of [[SSBN]] submarines, Schelling argues that [[nuclear weapons]] give nations the potential to destroy their enemies but also the rest of humanity without drawing immediate reprisal because of the lack of a conceivable defense system and the speed with which nuclear weapons can be deployed. A nation's credible threat of such severe damage empowers their deterrence policies and fuels political coercion and military deadlock, which can produce proxy warfare.

According to [[Kenneth Waltz]], there are three requirements for successful nuclear deterrence:<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Sagan|first1=Scott|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MyysQgAACAAJ|title=The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate|last2=Waltz|first2=Kenneth|date=1995|publisher=W.W. Norton|isbn=978-0-393-03810-1|pages=20|language=en|access-date=2022-02-15|archive-date=2023-04-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230410172259/https://books.google.com/books?id=MyysQgAACAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref>

# Part of a state's nuclear arsenal must appear to be able to survive an attack by the adversary and be used for a retaliatory [[second strike]]
# The state must not respond to false alarms of a strike by the adversary
# The state must maintain [[command and control]]

The [[stability–instability paradox]] is a key concept in rational deterrence theory. It states that when two countries each have nuclear weapons, the probability of a direct war between them greatly decreases, but the probability of minor or indirect conflicts between them increases.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Snyder|first=Glenn Herald|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=io4AcgAACAAJ|title=The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror|date=1965|language=en|access-date=2022-01-28|archive-date=2023-04-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230405182342/https://books.google.com/books?id=io4AcgAACAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Jervis|first=Robert|date=1979|title=Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2149629|journal=Political Science Quarterly|volume=94|issue=4|pages=617–633|doi=10.2307/2149629|jstor=2149629|issn=0032-3195|access-date=2022-01-28|archive-date=2022-01-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220128221819/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2149629|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Jervis|first=Robert|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WDeZHrS9r2EC|title=The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon|date=1989|publisher=Cornell University Press|isbn=978-0-8014-9565-6|language=en|access-date=2022-01-28|archive-date=2022-10-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221026215132/https://books.google.com/books?id=WDeZHrS9r2EC|url-status=live}}</ref> This occurs because rational actors want to avoid nuclear wars, and thus they neither start major conflicts nor allow minor conflicts to escalate into major conflicts—thus making it safe to engage in minor conflicts. For instance, during the [[Cold War]] the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] never engaged each other in warfare, but fought [[proxy wars]] in [[Korean War|Korea]], [[Vietnam War|Vietnam]], [[Angolan Civil War|Angola]], the [[Arab–Israeli conflict|Middle East]], [[Nicaraguan Revolution|Nicaragua]] and [[Soviet–Afghan War|Afghanistan]] and spent substantial amounts of money and manpower on gaining relative influence over the [[third world]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Krepon|first=Michael|title=The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia (essay)|url=https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/stability-instability-paradox-south-asia.pdf|publisher=The Henry Stimson Center|accessdate=12 August 2017|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20170812115507/https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/stability-instability-paradox-south-asia.pdf|archivedate=12 August 2017}}</ref>

[[Bernard Brodie (military strategist)|Bernard Brodie]] wrote in 1959 that a credible nuclear deterrent must be always ready.<ref name="Brodie_1959">
{{Citation|last=Brodie|first=Bernard|title="The Anatomy of Deterrence" as found in Strategy in the Missile Age|pages=264–304|year=1959|chapter=8|place=Princeton|publisher=Princeton University Press}}</ref>{{efn|Definition of deterrence from the Dictionary of Modern Strategy and Tactics by Michael Keane: "The prevention or inhibition of action brought about by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. It assumes and requires rational decision makers."}} An extended nuclear deterrence guarantee is also called a [[nuclear umbrella]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2011-12-19 |title=Australia {{!}} Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability |url=https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/a-j-disarm/aust-japan-coop/extended-nuclear-deterrence-contemporary-theory-and-policy/extended-nuclear-deterrence-australia/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210429015052/https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/a-j-disarm/aust-japan-coop/extended-nuclear-deterrence-contemporary-theory-and-policy/extended-nuclear-deterrence-australia/ |archive-date=2021-04-29 |access-date=2021-04-29 |website=nautilus.org |language=en-US}}</ref>

Scholars have debated whether having a superior nuclear arsenal provides a deterrent against other nuclear-armed states with smaller arsenals. Matthew Kroenig has argued that states with nuclear superiority are more likely to win nuclear crises,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kroenig |first=Matthew |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kr9EDwAAQBAJ |title=The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters |date=2018 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-084918-4 |language=en |access-date=2022-05-07 |archive-date=2023-04-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230410172301/https://books.google.com/books?id=kr9EDwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kroenig |first=Matthew |date=2013 |title=Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43282155 |journal=International Organization |volume=67 |issue=1 |pages=141–171 |doi=10.1017/S0020818312000367 |jstor=43282155 |s2cid=155075459 |issn=0020-8183 |access-date=2022-05-07 |archive-date=2022-01-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220126185703/https://www.jstor.org/stable/43282155 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref> whereas Todd Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann and David C. Logan have challenged this assertion.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sechser |first1=Todd S. |last2=Fuhrmann |first2=Matthew |date=2013 |title=Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43282156 |journal=International Organization |volume=67 |issue=1 |pages=173–195 |doi=10.1017/S0020818312000392 |jstor=43282156 |s2cid=154642193 |issn=0020-8183 |access-date=2022-05-07 |archive-date=2022-05-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220507162746/https://www.jstor.org/stable/43282156 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Sechser |first1=Todd S. |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nuclear-weapons-and-coercive-diplomacy/479C1445D90F1225D9D60B3C7C075B3E |title=Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy |last2=Fuhrmann |first2=Matthew |date=2017 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-10694-9 |location=Cambridge |doi=10.1017/9781316227305 |s2cid=157599829 |access-date=2022-05-07 |archive-date=2022-03-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220320230008/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/nuclear-weapons-and-coercive-diplomacy/479C1445D90F1225D9D60B3C7C075B3E |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Logan |first=David C. |date=2022 |title=The Nuclear Balance Is What States Make of It |journal=International Security |volume=46 |issue=4 |pages=172–215 |doi=10.1162/isec_a_00434 |s2cid=248723655 |issn=0162-2889 |quote=the findings reinforce a key theoretical tenet of the nuclear revolution: Once states have achieved a secure second-strike capability, nuclear superiority does not confer additional political benefits.|doi-access=free }}</ref> A 2023 study found that a state with nuclear weapons is less likely to be targeted by non-nuclear states, but that a state with nuclear weapons is not less likely to target other nuclear states in low-level conflict.<ref>{{Cite journal |date=2023 |title=Nuclear Weapons and Low-Level Military Conflict |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqac067 |journal=International Studies Quarterly|doi=10.1093/isq/sqac067 |last1=Lee |first1=Kyung Suk |last2=Kim |first2=James D. |last3=Jin |first3=Hwalmin |last4=Fuhrmann |first4=Matthew |volume=66 |issue=5 |url-access=subscription }}</ref> A 2022 study by Kyungwon Suh suggests that nuclear superiority may not reduce the likelihood that nuclear opponents will initiate nuclear crises.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Suh |first=Kyungwon |date=2022 |title=Nuclear balance and the initiation of nuclear crises: Does superiority matter? |url=https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211067899 |journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=60 |issue=2 |pages=337–351 |doi=10.1177/00223433211067899 |s2cid=248609130 |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Proponents of nuclear deterrence theory argue that newly nuclear-armed states may pose a short- or medium-term risk, but that "nuclear learning" occurs over time as states learn to live with new nuclear-armed states.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Horowitz |first=Michael |date=2009 |title=The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter? |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20684583 |journal=The Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=53 |issue=2 |pages=234–257 |doi=10.1177/0022002708330388 |jstor=20684583 |s2cid=55200649 |issn=0022-0027 |access-date=2023-08-31 |archive-date=2023-08-31 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230831153811/https://www.jstor.org/stable/20684583 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Cohen |first=Michael D. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8s5FDwAAQBAJ |title=When Proliferation Causes Peace: The Psychology of Nuclear Crises |date=2017 |publisher=Georgetown University Press |isbn=978-1-62616-495-6 |language=en |access-date=2023-08-31 |archive-date=2023-12-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231201143821/https://books.google.com/books?id=8s5FDwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref> Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller have however argued that there is a weak theoretical and empirical basis for notions of "nuclear learning."<ref>{{Citation |last1=Bell |first1=Mark S. |title=The Limits of Nuclear Learning in the New Nuclear Age |date=2022 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv310vm0j.11 |work=The Fragile Balance of Terror |pages=209–229 |editor-last=Narang |editor-first=Vipin |series=Deterrence in the New Nuclear Age |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-6701-2 |last2=Miller |first2=Nicholas L. |jstor=10.7591/j.ctv310vm0j.11 |editor2-last=Sagan |editor2-first=Scott D. |access-date=2023-08-31 |archive-date=2023-08-31 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230831153813/https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv310vm0j.11 |url-status=live }}</ref>

===Stages of US policy of deterrence===
The US policy of deterrence during the [[Cold War]] underwent significant variations.

==== Containment ====
The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by the [[containment]] of communism, an aggressive stance on behalf of the US especially on [[developing nations]] under its [[sphere of influence]]. The period was characterized by numerous [[proxy wars]] throughout most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. One notable conflict was the [[Korean War]]. [[George F. Kennan]], who is taken to be the founder of this policy in his [[Long Telegram]], asserted that he never advocated military intervention, merely economic support, and that his ideas were misinterpreted as espoused by the general public.

==== Détente ====
With the [[Vietnam War#U.S. exit and final campaigns, 1973–1975|US drawdown]] from Vietnam, the normalization of US relations with China, and the [[Sino-Soviet Split]], the policy of containment was abandoned and a new policy of [[détente]] was established, with peaceful co-existence was sought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although all of those factors contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of [[mutual assured destruction]] (MAD). Therefore, the period of détente was characterized by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, which lasted from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence then characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and relations with Russia until the onset of the [[Cold War II#Russo-Western tensions|New Cold War]] in the early 2010s. Since then, relations have been less clear.

==== Reagan era ====
A third shift occurred with US President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s arms build-up during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify the policy by concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the post-1979 [[Iranian Revolution|revolutionary]] government of [[Iran]]. Similar to the old policy of containment, the US funded several proxy wars, including support for [[Saddam Hussein]] of [[Iraq]] during the [[Iran–Iraq War]],<ref>{{Cite web |date=2013-05-22 |title=Lessons from America’s First War with Iran |url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/lessons-from-americas-first-war-with-iran/ |access-date=2025-04-21 |website=Brookings |language=en-US}}</ref> support for the [[mujahideen]] in [[Afghanistan]], who were fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, and several anticommunist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow of the [[Sandinista]] government in [[Nicaragua]]. The funding of the [[Contras]] in Nicaragua led to the [[Iran-Contra Affair]], while overt support led to a ruling from the [[International Court of Justice]] against the United States in ''[[Nicaragua v. United States]]''.

The final expression of the full impact of deterrence during the cold war can be seen in the agreement between Reagan and [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] in 1985. They "agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.".

While the army was dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took on a broader multinational dimension. The US policy on deterrence after the Cold War was outlined in 1995 in the document called "[[Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence]]".<ref name="Nautilus">
{{Cite web
 |url         = http://www.nautilus.org/archives/nukestrat/USA/Advisory/essentials95.html
 |title       = The Nautilus Institute Nuclear Strategy Project: US FOIA Documents
 |url-status     = dead
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20081208035653/http://www.nautilus.org/archives/nukestrat/USA/Advisory/essentials95.html
 |archive-date = December 8, 2008
}}</ref> It explains that while relations with Russia continue to follow the traditional characteristics of MAD, but the US policy of deterrence towards nations with minor nuclear capabilities should ensure by threats of immense retaliation (or even [[pre-emptive war|pre-emptive action]]) not to threaten the United States, its interests, or allies. The document explains that such threats must also be used to ensure that nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining [[chemical]] or [[biological weapons]]. The current tensions with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs are caused partly by the continuation of the policy of deterrence.

=== <span lang="Kannada">Post</span>-Cold War period ===
By the beginning of the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], many western hawks expressed the view that deterrence worked in that war but  only in one way – in favor of Russia. Former US security advisor, [[John Bolton]], said: Deterrence is working in the Ukraine crisis, just not for the right side. The United States and its allies failed to deter Russia from invading. The purpose of deterrence strategy is to prevent the conflict entirely, and there Washington failed badly. On the other hand, Russian deterrence is enjoying spectacular success. Russia has convinced the West that even a whisper of NATO military action in Ukraine would bring disastrous consequences. Putin threatens, blusters, uses the word “nuclear,” and the West wilts.<ref>{{Cite magazine |date=2022-03-09 |title=How Russia Is Beating the West at Deterrence |url=https://time.com/6155990/russia-ukraine-invasion-deterrence/ |access-date=2023-08-11 |magazine=Time |language=en |archive-date=2023-06-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230605115035/https://time.com/6155990/russia-ukraine-invasion-deterrence/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

When [[Elon Musk]] prevented Ukraine from carrying [[Drone warfare|drone attacks]] on the Russian [[Black Sea Fleet|Black Sea fleet]] by denying to enable needed [[Starlink in the Russo-Ukrainian War#Crimea|Starlink communications in Crimea]],<ref>{{Cite web |last=Darcy |first=Oliver |date=2023-09-12 |title=An explosive Elon Musk biography is just hitting shelves. But the book's acclaimed author is already walking back a major claim {{!}} CNN Business |url=https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/11/media/walter-isaacson-elon-musk-reliable-sources/index.html |access-date=2023-09-15 |website=CNN |language=en |archive-date=2023-09-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230922122628/https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/11/media/walter-isaacson-elon-musk-reliable-sources/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Anne Applebaum]] argued Musk had been deterred by Russia after the country's ambassador warned him an [[Crimea attacks (2022–present)|attack on Crimea]] would be met with a nuclear response.<ref name="Elon Musk">{{Cite web |last=Applebaum |first=Anne |date=2023-09-11 |title=What Russia Got by Scaring Elon Musk |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/09/elon-musk-let-russia-scare-him/675282/ |access-date=2023-09-12 |website=The Atlantic |language=en |archive-date=2023-09-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230916102808/https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/09/elon-musk-let-russia-scare-him/675282/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Later Ukrainian attacks on the same fleet using a different communications system also caused deterrence, this time to the Russian Navy.<ref name="Elon Musk" />

Timo S. Koster who served at NATO as Director of Defence Policy & Capabilities similarly argued: A massacre is taking place in Europe and the strongest military alliance in the world is staying out of it. We are deterred and Russia is not.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Koster |first=Ben Hodges, Timo S. |date=2022-05-05 |title=NATO Must Re-Learn Deterrence |url=https://cepa.org/article/nato-must-re-learn-deterrence/ |access-date=2023-08-11 |website=CEPA |language=en-US |archive-date=2023-07-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230716025857/https://cepa.org/article/nato-must-re-learn-deterrence/ |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Philip Breedlove]], a retired four-star U.S. Air Force general and a former [[SACEUR]], said that Western fears about nuclear weapons and World War III have left it "fully deterred" and Putin "completely undeterred." The West have "ceded the initiative to the enemy."<ref>Tavberidze, Vazha, (2022).  "Former NATO Commander Says Western Fears Of Nuclear War Are Preventing A Proper Response To Putin," ''Radio Free Europe'', April 07.</ref> No attempt was made by NATO to deter Moscow with the threat of military force, wondered another expert. To the contrary, it was Russia’s deterrence that proved to be successful.<ref>Bar, Shmuel, (2022). "Deterrence after Ukraine—a critical analysis," ''Quillette'', March 24.</ref>