Editing Expected utility hypothesis (section)

===Preference reversals over uncertain outcomes===
Starting with studies such as Lichtenstein & Slovic (1971), it was discovered that subjects sometimes exhibit signs of preference reversals about their certainty equivalents of different lotteries. Specifically, when eliciting [[certainty equivalent]]s, subjects tend to value "p bets" (lotteries with a high chance of winning a low prize) lower than "$ bets" (lotteries with a small chance of winning a large prize). When subjects are asked which lotteries they prefer in direct comparison, however, they frequently prefer the "p bets" over "$ bets".<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Lichtenstein S, Slovic P |year=1971|title=Reversals of preference between bids and choices in gambling decisions|journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology|volume=89|issue=1|pages=46–55|doi=10.1037/h0031207|hdl=1794/22312 |hdl-access=free}}</ref> Many studies have examined this "preference reversal", from both an experimental (e.g., Plott & Grether, 1979)<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Grether DM, Plott CR |year=1979|title=Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon|journal=[[American Economic Review]]|volume=69|issue=4|pages=623–638|jstor=1808708}}</ref> and theoretical (e.g., Holt, 1986)<ref>{{cite journal| vauthors = Holt C |year=1986|title=Preference Reversals and the Independence Axiom |journal=[[American Economic Review]]|volume=76|issue=3|pages=508–515|jstor=1813367}}</ref> standpoint, indicating that this behavior can be brought into accordance with neoclassical economic theory under specific assumptions.