Editing Experience (section)

== In various disciplines ==
=== Phenomenology ===
[[Phenomenology (philosophy)|Phenomenology]] is the science of the structure and contents of experience. It studies [[phenomena]], i.e. the appearances of things from the first-person perspective.<ref name="Smith"/><ref name="JoelSmith">{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=Joel |title=Phenomenology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/phenom/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=10 October 2021}}</ref> A great variety of experiences is investigated this way, including perception, memory, imagination, thought, desire, emotion and agency.<ref name="Smith2">{{cite web |last1=Smith |first1=David Woodruff |title=Phenomenology: 2. The Discipline of Phenomenology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology/#DiscPhen |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 October 2021 |date=2018}}</ref> According to traditional phenomenology, one important structure found in all the different types of experience is [[intentionality]], meaning that all experience is ''experience of something''.<ref name="Smith"/><ref name="JoelSmith"/> In this sense, experience is always directed at certain objects by means of its representational contents. Experiences are in an important sense different from the objects of experience since experiences are not just presented but one lives through them.<ref name="Smith2"/> Phenomenology is also concerned with the study of the [[conditions of possibility]] of phenomena that may shape experience differently for different people. These conditions include embodiment, culture, language and social background.<ref name="Smith"/><ref name="JoelSmith"/>

There are various different forms of phenomenology, which employ different methods.<ref name="Smith2"/><ref name="JoelSmith"/> Central to traditional phenomenology associated with [[Edmund Husserl]] is the so-called [[epoché]], also referred to as [[Bracketing (phenomenology)#Husserl and Epoché|bracketing]]. In it, the researcher suspends their judgment about the external existence of the experienced objects in order to focus exclusively on the structure of the experience itself, i.e. on how these objects are presented.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Beyer |first1=Christian |title=Edmund Husserl: 5. The phenomenological epoché |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/#PheEpo |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref><ref name="JoelSmith"/> An important method for studying the contents of experience is called [[eidetic variation]]. It aims at discerning their [[essence]] by imagining the object in question, varying its features and assessing whether the object can survive this imaginary change. Only features that cannot be changed this way belong to the object's essence.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Drummond |first1=John J. |title=Historical Dictionary of Husserl's Philosophy |date=2009 |publisher=Scarecrow Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/DRUHDO |chapter=Eidetic variation}}</ref> [[Hermeneutic phenomenology]], by contrast, gives more importance to our pre-existing familiarity with experience.<ref name="Smith2"/> It tries to comprehend how this pre-understanding brings with it various forms of interpretation that shape experience and may introduce distortions into it.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Laverty |first1=Susann M. |title=Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Phenomenology: A Comparison of Historical and Methodological Considerations |journal=International Journal of Qualitative Methods |date=1 September 2003 |volume=2 |issue=3 |pages=21–35 |doi=10.1177/160940690300200303 |s2cid=145728698 |language=en |issn=1609-4069|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=George |first1=Theodore |title=Hermeneutics: 1. Interpretive Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermeneutics/#InteExpe |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=10 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sammel |first1=Ali |title=An Invitation to Dialogue: Gadamer, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, and Critical Environmental Education |journal=Canadian Journal of Environmental Education |date=1 January 2003 |volume=8 |issue=1 |pages=155–168 |url=https://cjee.lakeheadu.ca/article/view/244 |issn=1205-5352}}</ref> [[Neurophenomenology]], on the other hand, aims at bridging the gap between the first-person perspective of traditional phenomenology and the third-person approach favored by the natural sciences. This happens by looking for connections between subjective experience and objective brain processes, for example, with the help of brain scans.<ref name="Smith2"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Bockelman |first1=Patricia |last2=Reinerman-Jones |first2=Lauren |last3=Gallagher |first3=Shaun |title=Methodological lessons in neurophenomenology: Review of a baseline study and recommendations for research approaches |journal=Frontiers in Human Neuroscience |date=2013 |volume=7 |pages=608 |doi=10.3389/fnhum.2013.00608 |pmid=24133430 |pmc=3794193 |issn=1662-5161|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Berkovich-Ohana |first1=Aviva |last2=Dor-Ziderman |first2=Yair |last3=Trautwein |first3=Fynn-Mathis |last4=Schweitzer |first4=Yoav |last5=Nave |first5=Ohad |last6=Fulder |first6=Stephen |last7=Ataria |first7=Yochai |title=The Hitchhiker's Guide to Neurophenomenology – The Case of Studying Self Boundaries With Meditators |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=2020 |volume=11 |pages=1680 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01680 |pmid=32793056 |pmc=7385412 |issn=1664-1078|doi-access=free }}</ref>

=== Epistemology ===
Experience, when understood in terms of sensation, is of special interest to epistemology. Knowledge based on this form of experience is termed "empirical knowledge" or "knowledge a posteriori".<ref name="Honderich"/> [[Empiricism]] is the thesis that all knowledge is empirical knowledge, i.e. that there is no knowledge that does not ultimately rest on sensory experience. Traditionally, this view is opposed by [[rationalists]], who accept that sensory experience can ground knowledge but also allow other sources of knowledge. For example, some rationalists claim that humans either have innate or intuitive knowledge of mathematics that does not rest on generalizations based on sensory experiences.<ref name="Markie">{{cite web |last1=Markie |first1=Peter |last2=Folescu |first2=M. |title=Rationalism vs. Empiricism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/#Intr |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=21 September 2021 |date=2021}}</ref>

Another problem is to understand how it is possible for sensory experiences to justify beliefs. According to one view, sensory experiences are themselves belief-like in the sense that they involve the affirmation of propositional contents.<ref name="Honderich"/> On this view, seeing white snow involves, among other things, the affirmation of the proposition "snow is white".<ref>{{cite web |last1=Oppy |first1=Graham |title=Propositional attitudes |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/propositional-attitudes/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=21 September 2021 |language=en}}</ref> Given this assumption, experiences can justify beliefs in the same way as beliefs can justify other beliefs: because their propositional contents stand in the appropriate logical and explanatory relations to each other.<ref name="Honderich"/> But this assumption has many opponents who argue that sensations are non-conceptual and therefore non-propositional. On such a view, the affirmation that snow is white is already something added to the sensory experience, which in itself may not amount to much more than the presentation of a patch of whiteness.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Balog |first1=Katalin |title=Jerry Fodor on Non-Conceptual Content |journal=Synthese |date=2009 |volume=167 |issue=3 |pages=311–320 |doi=10.1007/s11229-009-9585-x |s2cid=18583257 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BALJFO}}</ref> One problem for this [[#Conceptuality and myth of the given|non-conceptualist approach]] to perceptual experience is that it faces difficulties in explaining how sensory experiences can justify beliefs, as they apparently do.<ref name="Honderich"/> One way to avoid this problem is to deny this appearance by holding that they do not justify beliefs but only cause beliefs.<ref name="DiFate"/> On the [[coherence theory of justification]], these beliefs may still be justified, not because of the experiences responsible for them, but because of the way they cohere with the rest of the person's beliefs.<ref name="Honderich"/>

Because of its relation to justification and knowledge, experience plays a central role for empirical rationality.<ref name="Gupta2012"/> Whether it is rational for someone to believe a certain claim depends, among other things, on the experiences this person has made.<ref name="Audi"/><ref name="Rescher"/> For example, a teacher may be justified in believing that a certain student will pass an exam based on the teacher's experience with the student in the classroom. But the same belief would not be justified for a stranger lacking these experiences. Rationality is relative to experience in this sense. This implies that it may be rational for one person to accept a certain claim while another person may rationally reject the same claim.<ref name="Audi">{{cite journal |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=Précis of the Architecture of Reason |journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |date=2003 |volume=67 |issue=1 |pages=177–180 |doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00031.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDPOT|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name="Rescher">{{cite book |last1=Rescher |first1=Nicholas |title=Rationality: A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason |date=1988 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/RESRAP |chapter=10. The Universality of the Rational}}</ref><ref name="Gupta2012"/>

=== Science ===
Closely related to the role of experience in epistemology is its role in science.<ref name="Masiello">{{cite book |last1=Masiello |first1=R. J. |title=New Catholic Encyclopedia |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/experience |chapter=Experience}}</ref><ref name="Sandkühler"/> It is often argued that observational experience is central to scientific experiments. The evidence obtained in this manner is then used to confirm or disconfirm scientific theories. In this way, experience acts as a neutral arbiter between competing theories.<ref name="Crupi">{{cite web |last1=Crupi |first1=Vincenzo |title=Confirmation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/confirmation/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=13 June 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref name="DiFate">{{cite web |last1=DiFate |first1=Victor |title=Evidence |url=https://iep.utm.edu/evidence/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=11 June 2021}}</ref><ref name="ThomasKelly">{{cite web |last1=Kelly |first1=Thomas |title=Evidence |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evidence/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 June 2021 |date=2016}}</ref> For example, astronomical observations made by [[Galileo Galilei]] concerning the orbits of planets were used as evidence in the [[Copernican Revolution]], in which the traditional [[geocentric model]] was rejected in favor of the [[heliocentric model]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Copernican Revolution |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Copernican-Revolution |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=29 September 2021 |language=en}}</ref> One problem for this view is that it is essential for scientific evidence to be public and uncontroversial. The reason for this is that different scientists should be able to share the same evidence in order to come to an agreement about which hypothesis is correct. But experience is usually understood as a private mental state, not as a publicly observable phenomenon, thereby putting its role as scientific evidence into question.<ref name="DiFate"/><ref name="ThomasKelly"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Gage |first1=Logan Paul |title=Objectivity and Subjectivity in Epistemology: A Defense of the Phenomenal Conception of Evidence |chapter=1. Introduction: Two Rival Conceptions of Evidence|date=2014 |publisher=Baylor University |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GAGOAS|type=PhD Thesis }}</ref><ref name="Borchert"/>

=== Metaphysics ===
A central problem in [[metaphysics]] is the [[mind–body problem]]. It involves the question of how to conceive the relation between body and mind.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Borchert |first1=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Mind–Body Problem}}</ref><ref name="RobinsonHoward"/> Understood in its widest sense, it concerns not only experience but any form of [[mind]], including unconscious mental states.<ref name="RobinsonHoward"/> But it has been argued that experience has special relevance here since experience is often seen as the paradigmatic form of mind.<ref name="Pernu"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Bourget |first1=David |last2=Mendelovici |first2=Angela |title=Phenomenal Intentionality: 2. The phenomenal intentionality theory |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenal-intentionality/#PhenInteTheo |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 October 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> The idea that there is a "problem" to begin with is often traced back to how different matter and experience seem to be.<ref name="Pernu">{{cite journal |last1=Pernu |first1=Tuomas K. |title=The Five Marks of the Mental |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |date=2017 |volume=8 |page=1084 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01084 |pmid=28736537 |language=English |issn=1664-1078|pmc=5500963 |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Kim">{{cite book |last1=Kim |first1=Jaegwon |title=Philosophy of Mind |date=2006 |publisher=Boulder: Westview Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMPOM-3 |chapter=1. Introduction|edition=Second }}</ref> Physical properties, like size, shape and weight, are public and are ascribed to objects. Experiences, on the other hand, are private and are ascribed to subjects.<ref name="RobinsonHoward">{{cite web |last1=Robinson |first1=Howard |title=Dualism: 1.1 The Mind–Body Problem |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/#MinBod |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 October 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> Another important distinctive feature is that experiences are intentional, i.e. that they are directed at objects different from themselves.<ref name="Smith"/><ref name="Representation in Mind"/> But despite these differences, body and mind seem to causally interact with each other, referred to as psycho-physical causation.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lowe |first1=E. J. |title=The Problem of Psychophysical Causation |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |date=1992 |volume=70 |issue=3 |pages=263–76 |doi=10.1080/00048409212345161 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LOWTPO|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name="Robb">{{cite web |last1=Robb |first1=David |last2=Heil |first2=John |title=Mental Causation |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-causation/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=11 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref> This concerns both the way how physical events, like a rock falling on someone's foot, cause experiences, like a sharp pain, and how experiences, like the intention to make the pain stop, cause physical events, like pulling the foot from under the rock.<ref name="Robb"/>

Various solutions to the mind–body problem have been presented.<ref>{{cite web |title=Philosophy of mind - Traditional metaphysical positions |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/The-soul-and-personal-identity#ref283966 |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=12 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref> Dualism is a traditionally important approach. It states that bodies and minds belong to distinct ontological categories and exist independently of each other.<ref name="RobinsonHoward"/><ref>{{cite web |last1=Calef |first1=Scott |title=Dualism and Mind |url=https://iep.utm.edu/dualism/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=12 October 2021}}</ref> A central problem for dualists is to give a plausible explanation of how their interaction is possible or of why they seem to be interacting. Monists, on the other hand, deny this type of ontological bifurcation.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Schaffer |first1=Jonathan |title=Monism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/monism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 October 2021 |date=2018}}</ref> Instead, they argue that, on the most fundamental level, only one type of entity exists. According to materialism, everything is ultimately material. On this view, minds either do not exist or exist as material aspects of bodies.<ref>{{cite web |title=Materialism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/materialism-philosophy |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=12 October 2021 |language=en}}</ref> According to idealism, everything is ultimately mental. On this view, material objects only exist in the form of ideas and depend thereby on experience and other mental states.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Guyer |first1=Paul |last2=Horstmann |first2=Rolf-Peter |title=Idealism: 1. Introduction |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/#Intr |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref> Monists are faced with the problem of explaining how two types of entities that seem to be so different can belong to the same ontological category.<ref name="Pernu"/><ref name="Kim"/>

The [[hard problem of consciousness]] is a closely related issue. It is concerned with explaining why some physical events, like brain processes, are accompanied by [[conscious]] experience, i.e. that undergoing them feels a certain way to the subject.<ref name="Weisberg">{{cite web |last1=Weisberg |first1=Josh |title=Hard Problem of Consciousness |url=https://iep.utm.edu/hard-con/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=11 October 2021}}</ref><ref name="Vasilyev">{{cite journal |last1=Vasilyev |first1=Vadim V. |title="The Hard Problem of Consciousness" and Two Arguments for Interactionism |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/VASTHP-2 |journal=Faith and Philosophy |pages=514–526 |doi=10.5840/faithphil200926552 |date=2009|volume=26 |issue=5 }}</ref><ref name="McClelland">{{cite journal |last1=McClelland |first1=Tom |title=The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky? |journal=Topoi |date=2017 |volume=36 |issue=1 |pages=17–30 |doi=10.1007/s11245-014-9257-4 |s2cid=145287229 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MCCTPO-36|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This is especially relevant from the perspective of the [[natural science]]s since it seems to be possible, at least in principle, to explain human behavior and cognition without reference to experience. Such an explanation can happen in relation to the processing of information in the form of electrical signals. In this sense, the hard problem of consciousness points to an explanatory gap between the physical world and conscious experience.<ref name="Weisberg"/><ref name="Vasilyev"/><ref name="McClelland"/> There is significant overlap between the solutions proposed to the mind–body problem and the solutions proposed to the hard problem of consciousness.<ref name="Weisberg"/><ref name="RobinsonHoward"/>

=== Psychology ===
Another disagreement between empiricists and rationalists besides their epistemological dispute concerns the role of experience in the formation of concepts.<ref name="Markie"/> Concepts are general notions that constitute the fundamental building blocks of thought.<ref name="Concepts"/> Some empiricists hold that all concepts are learned from experience. This is sometimes explained by claiming that concepts just constitute generalizations, abstractions or copies of the original contents of experience.<ref name="Gupta2012"/> Logical empiricists, for example, have used this idea in an effort to reduce the content of all empirical propositions to protocol sentences recording nothing but the scientists' immediate experiences.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Uebel |first1=Thomas |title=Empiricism at the Crossroads: The Vienna Circle's Protocol-Sentence Debate Revisited |date=2 November 2015 |publisher=Open Court |isbn=978-0-8126-9929-6 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nq-6CgAAQBAJ |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Logical positivism |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/logical-positivism |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=23 September 2021 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Borchert"/> This idea is convincing for some concepts, like the concept of "red" or of "dog", which seem to be acquired through experience with their instances. But it is controversial whether this is true for all concepts.<ref name="Borchert"/> [[Immanuel Kant]], for example, defends a rationalist position by holding that experience requires certain concepts so basic that it would not be possible without them. These concepts, the so-called categories, cannot be acquired through experience since they are the ''conditions of the possibility of experience'', according to Kant.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Piché |first1=Claude |title=Transcendental Inquiry: Its History, Methods and Critiques |date=2016 |publisher=Springer International Publishing |isbn=978-3-319-40715-9 |pages=1–20 |url=https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/21324/picheC-KantOnTheConditions-TranscendentalInquiry-2016.pdf |language=en |chapter=Kant on the “Conditions of the Possibility” of Experience}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Thomasson |first1=Amie |title=Categories |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/categories/#KanCon |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Wardy |first1=Robert |title=Categories |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/categories/v-1/sections/categories-in-kant |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=23 September 2021 |language=en}}</ref>