Editing Mirror neuron (section)

===Theory of mind===
In [[Philosophy of mind]], mirror neurons have become the primary rallying call of [[Simulation theory of empathy|simulation theorists]] concerning our "[[theory of mind]]."  "Theory of mind" refers to our ability to infer another person's mental state (i.e., beliefs and desires) from experiences or their behaviour.

There are several competing models which attempt to account for our theory of mind; the most notable in relation to mirror neurons is simulation theory. According to simulation theory, theory of mind is available because we [[subconscious]]ly empathize with the person we're observing and, accounting for relevant differences, imagine what we would desire and believe in that scenario.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Gordon R |year=1986 |title=Folk psychology as simulation |journal=Mind and Language |volume=1 |issue=2 |pages=158–171 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-0017.1986.tb00324.x}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Goldman A |year=1989 |title=Interpretation psychologized |journal=Mind and Language |volume=4 |issue=3 |pages=161–185 |doi=10.1111/j.1468-0017.1989.tb00249.x}}</ref> Mirror neurons have been interpreted as the mechanism by which we simulate others in order to better understand them, and therefore their discovery has been taken by some as a validation of simulation theory (which appeared a decade before the discovery of mirror neurons).<ref name="pmid21227300"/> More recently, Theory of Mind and Simulation have been seen as complementary systems, with different developmental time courses.<ref name="pmid12689375">{{cite journal | vauthors = Meltzoff AN, Decety J | title = What imitation tells us about social cognition: a rapprochement between developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience | journal = Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences | volume = 358 | issue = 1431 | pages = 491–500 | date = March 2003 | pmid = 12689375 | pmc = 1351349 | doi = 10.1098/rstb.2002.1261 }}</ref><ref name="pmid16892982">{{cite journal | vauthors = Sommerville JA, Decety J | title = Weaving the fabric of social interaction: articulating developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience in the domain of motor cognition | journal = Psychonomic Bulletin & Review | volume = 13 | issue = 2 | pages = 179–200 | date = April 2006 | pmid = 16892982 | doi = 10.3758/BF03193831 | s2cid = 14689479 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Keysers C, Gazzola V | title = Integrating simulation and theory of mind: from self to social cognition | journal = Trends in Cognitive Sciences | volume = 11 | issue = 5 | pages = 194–196 | date = May 2007 | pmid = 17344090 | doi = 10.1016/j.tics.2007.02.002 | s2cid = 18930071 }}</ref>

At the neuronal-level, in a 2015 study by Keren Haroush and Ziv Williams using jointly interacting primates performing an iterated prisoner's dilemma game, the authors identified neurons in the [[anterior cingulate cortex]] that selectively predicted an opponent's yet unknown decisions or covert state of mind. These "other-predictive neurons" differentiated between self and other decisions and were uniquely sensitive to social context, but they did not encode the opponent's observed actions or receipt of reward. These cingulate cells may therefore importantly complement the function of mirror neurons by providing additional information about other social agents that is not immediately observable or known.<ref name="pmid25728667">{{cite journal | vauthors = Haroush K, Williams ZM | title = Neuronal prediction of opponent's behavior during cooperative social interchange in primates | journal = Cell | volume = 160 | issue = 6 | pages = 1233–1245 | date = March 2015 | pmid = 25728667 | pmc = 4364450 | doi = 10.1016/j.cell.2015.01.045 }}</ref>