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===Deontic logic=== {{Main|Deontic logic}} Likewise talk of morality, or of [[obligation]] and [[norm (philosophy)|norms]] generally, seems to have a modal structure. The difference between "You must do this" and "You may do this" looks a lot like the difference between "This is necessary" and "This is possible". Such logics are called ''[[deontic logic|deontic]]'', from the Greek for "duty". Deontic logics commonly lack the axiom '''T''' semantically corresponding to the reflexivity of the accessibility relation in [[Kripke semantics]]: in symbols, <math>\Box\phi\to\phi</math>. Interpreting □ as "it is obligatory that", '''T''' informally says that every obligation is true. For example, if it is obligatory not to kill others (i.e. killing is morally forbidden), then '''T''' implies that people actually do not kill others. The consequent is obviously false. Instead, using [[Kripke semantics]], we say that though our own world does not realize all obligations, the worlds accessible to it do (i.e., '''T''' holds at these worlds). These worlds are called ''idealized'' worlds. ''P'' is obligatory with respect to our own world if at all idealized worlds accessible to our world, ''P'' holds. Though this was one of the first interpretations of the formal semantics, it has recently come under criticism.<ref>See, e.g., {{cite journal |first=Sven |last=Hansson |title=Ideal Worlds—Wishful Thinking in Deontic Logic |journal=Studia Logica |volume=82 |issue=3 |pages=329–336 |year=2006 |doi=10.1007/s11225-006-8100-3 |s2cid=40132498 }}</ref> One other principle that is often (at least traditionally) accepted as a deontic principle is ''D'', <math>\Box\phi\to\Diamond\phi</math>, which corresponds to the seriality (or extendability or unboundedness) of the accessibility relation. It is an embodiment of the Kantian idea that "ought implies can". (Clearly the "can" can be interpreted in various senses, e.g. in a moral or alethic sense.) ====Intuitive problems with deontic logic==== When we try to formalize ethics with standard modal logic, we run into some problems. Suppose that we have a proposition ''K'': you have stolen some money, and another, ''Q'': you have stolen a small amount of money. Now suppose we want to express the thought that "if you have stolen some money, it ought to be a small amount of money". There are two likely candidates, : (1) <math>(K \to \Box Q)</math> : (2) <math>\Box (K \to Q)</math> But (1) and ''K'' together entail □''Q'', which says that it ought to be the case that you have stolen a small amount of money. This surely is not right, because you ought not to have stolen anything at all. And (2) does not work either: If the right representation of "if you have stolen some money it ought to be a small amount" is (2), then the right representation of (3) "if you have stolen some money then it ought to be a large amount" is <math>\Box (K \to (K \land \lnot Q))</math>. Now suppose (as seems reasonable) that you ought not to steal anything, or <math>\Box \lnot K</math>. But then we can deduce <math>\Box (K \to (K \land \lnot Q))</math> via <math>\Box (\lnot K) \to \Box (K \to K \land \lnot K)</math> and <math>\Box (K \land \lnot K \to (K \land \lnot Q)) </math> (the [[contrapositive]] of <math>Q \to K</math>); so sentence (3) follows from our hypothesis (of course the same logic shows sentence (2)). But that cannot be right, and is not right when we use natural language. Telling someone they should not steal certainly does not imply that they should steal large amounts of money if they do engage in theft.<ref>Ted Sider's ''Logic for Philosophy'', unknown page. http://tedsider.org/books/lfp.html</ref>
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