Editing Sino-Soviet split (section)

== Conflict ==
=== Cultural Revolution ===
[[File:1966-11 1966年毛泽东林彪与红卫兵.jpg|thumb|250px|right|A public appearance of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman [[Lin Biao]] among Red Guards, in Beijing, during the Cultural Revolution (November 1966)]]

To regain political supremacy in the PRC, Mao launched the [[Cultural Revolution]] in 1966 to counter the Soviet-style bureaucracies (personal-power-centres) that had become established in education, agriculture, and industrial management. Abiding Mao's proclamations for universal ideological orthodoxy, schools and universities closed throughout China when students organized themselves into politically radical [[Red Guards (China)|Red Guards]]. Lacking a leader, a political purpose, and a social function, the ideologically discrete units of Red Guards soon degenerated into political factions, each of whom claimed to be more Maoist than the other factions.<ref>''Dictionary of Wars'', Third Edition (2007), George Childs Kohn, Ed., pp.&nbsp;122–223.</ref> 

In establishing the ideological orthodoxy presented in the [[Little Red Book]] (''Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung''), the political violence of the Red Guards provoked civil war in parts of China, known as the [[Violent Struggle|violent struggle]], which Mao suppressed with the [[People's Liberation Army]] (PLA), who imprisoned the fractious Red Guards. Moreover, when Red Guard factionalism occurred within the PLA – Mao's base of political power – he dissolved the Red Guards, and then reconstituted the CCP with the new generation of Maoists who had endured and survived the Cultural Revolution that [[purge]]d the "anti-communist" old generation from the party and from China.<ref name="The Columbia Encyclopedia 1993. p.&nbsp;696">''The Columbia Encyclopedia'', Fifth Edition. Columbia University Press:1993. p.&nbsp;696.</ref>

As social engineering, the Cultural Revolution reasserted the political primacy of [[Maoism]], but also stressed, strained, and broke the PRC's relations with the USSR and the West.<ref>''Dictionary of Historical Terms'', Second Edition, Chris Cook, Ed. Peter Bedrick Books: New York:1999, p.&nbsp;89.</ref> The Soviet Union ridiculed and criticized Mao's Cultural Revolution fiercely,<ref>{{Cite web |title=Pravda, The Anti-Soviet Policy of Communist China, Feb. 16, 1967 |url=https://china.usc.edu/pravda-anti-soviet-policy-communist-china-feb-16-1967 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240714074826/https://china.usc.edu/pravda-anti-soviet-policy-communist-china-feb-16-1967 |archive-date=2024-07-14 |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=University of Southern California |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=McGuire |first=Elizabeth |date=2001-05-01 |title=China, the Fun House Mirror: Soviet Reactions to the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969 |url=https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0fs1526m |journal=Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies |language=en}}</ref> and some publications in USSR and Eastern Bloc also compared Mao meeting Red Guards on [[Tiananmen]] to [[Adolf Hitler]] giving speeches to his supporters.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Bai |first=Hua |date=2016-05-18 |title=文革与苏联 红卫兵成贬义 毛形象恶劣 |trans-title=Cultural Revolution and the Soviet Union: Red Guards' negative meaning and Mao's poor image |url=https://www.voachinese.com/a/3334409.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241130110228/https://www.voachinese.com/a/3334409.html |archive-date=2024-11-30 |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=[[Voice of America]] |language=zh}}</ref> Geopolitically, despite their querulous "Maoism vs. Marxism–Leninism" disputes about interpretations and practical applications of Marxism–Leninism, the USSR and the PRC advised, aided, and supplied [[North Vietnam]] during the [[Vietnam War]],<ref>''The Red Flag: A History of Communism'' (2009) p.&nbsp;461.</ref> which Mao had defined as a peasant revolution against foreign imperialism. In socialist solidarity, the PRC allowed safe passage for the Soviet Union's ''matériel'' to North Vietnam to prosecute the war against the US-sponsored [[South Vietnam|Republic of Vietnam]], until 1968, after the Chinese withdrawal.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://alphahistory.com/vietnamwar/chinese-and-soviet-involvement/|title=CHINESE AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM|date=20 June 2019}}</ref><ref>''Dictionary of Historical Terms'', Second Edition, Chris Cook, Ed. Peter Bedrick Books: New York:1999, p.&nbsp;218.</ref>
=== Siege of the Soviet embassy in Beijing===
In August 1966 the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the first of several notes to the Chinese embassy in Moscow protesting aggressive Chinese behavior near the [[Embassy of Russia, Beijing|Soviet embassy in Beijing]]. On January 25, 1967 the Chinese visiting the [[Lenin Mausoleum]] on [[Moscow]] [[Red Square]] jumped over a barrier and began chanting Mao quotes. Then one Chinese allegedly hit a Soviet woman, and a scuffle took place. After this incident new outrages against the Soviet embassy in Beijing began. The threat of physical danger caused the Soviets to evacuate women and children from their embassy in Beijing in February 1967. Even as the women and children were boarding the plane, they were harassed by hostile [[Red Guards (China)|Red Guards]].<ref>[https://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/2001_02-mcgu.pdf CHINA, THE FUN HOUSE MIRROR: SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1966-1969]</ref><ref>[http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/2709-1975-Borisov-JHS.pdf Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945-1970]</ref>

=== Border conflict ===
{{Main|Sino-Soviet border conflict}}
[[File:China USSR E 88.jpg|thumb|upright=1.1|The Sino-Soviet split allowed minor border disputes to escalate to firefights for areas of the Argun and Amur rivers (Damansky–Zhenbao is southeast, north of the lake (2 March – 11 September 1969).]]
In the late 1960s, the continual quarrelling between the CCP and the CPSU about the correct interpretations and applications of Marxism–Leninism escalated to small-scale warfare at the [[China–Russia border|Sino-Soviet border]].<ref name="Lüthi, Lorenz M. 2008 p. 340">Lüthi, Lorenz M. ''The Sino-Soviet split: Cold War in the Communist World'' (2008), p. 340.</ref>

In 1966, for diplomatic resolution, the Chinese revisited the national matter of the Sino-Soviet border demarcated in the 19th century, but originally imposed upon the [[Qing dynasty]] by way of unequal treaties that annexed Chinese territory to the [[Russian Empire]]. Despite not asking the return of territory, the PRC asked the USSR to acknowledge formally and publicly that such an historic injustice against China (the 19th-century border) was dishonestly realized with the 1858 [[Treaty of Aigun]] and the 1860 [[Convention of Peking]]. The Soviet government ignored the matter.

In 1968, the [[Soviet Army]] had massed along the {{convert|4380|km|mi|adj=on}} border with the PRC, especially at the [[Xinjiang]] frontier, in [[Northwest China|north-west China]], where the Soviets might readily induce the [[Turkic peoples]] into a separatist insurrection. In 1961, the USSR had stationed 12 divisions of soldiers and 200 aeroplanes at that border. By 1968, the Soviet Armed Forces had stationed six divisions of soldiers in [[Outer Mongolia]] and 16 divisions, 1,200 aeroplanes, and 120 medium-range missiles at the Sino-Soviet border to confront 47 light divisions of the Chinese Army. By March 1969, the border confrontations [[Sino-Soviet border conflict|escalated]], including fighting at the [[Ussuri|Ussuri River]], the [[Zhenbao Island incident]], and [[Tielieketi]].<ref name="Lüthi, Lorenz M. 2008 p. 340"/>

After the border conflict, "spy wars" involving numerous espionage agents occurred on Soviet and Chinese territory through the 1970s.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s: What KGB Counterintelligence Knew, Part I {{!}} Wilson Center|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/soviet-chinese-spy-wars-1970s-what-kgb-counterintelligence-knew-part-i|access-date=29 September 2021|website=www.wilsoncenter.org|language=en|archive-date=29 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210929034413/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/soviet-chinese-spy-wars-1970s-what-kgb-counterintelligence-knew-part-i|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=The Soviet-Chinese Spy Wars in the 1970s: What KGB Counterintelligence Knew, Part II {{!}} Wilson Center|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/soviet-chinese-spy-wars-1970s-what-kgb-counterintelligence-knew-part-ii|access-date=29 September 2021|website=www.wilsoncenter.org|language=en|archive-date=29 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210929034402/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/soviet-chinese-spy-wars-1970s-what-kgb-counterintelligence-knew-part-ii|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1972, the Soviet Union also [[Renaming of geographical objects in the Russian Far East|renamed placenames in the Russian Far East]] to the [[Russian language]] and [[Russification|Russified]] [[Toponymy|toponyms]], replacing the native and/or Chinese names.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Saparov |first=Arseny |date=2003-01-01 |title=The alteration of place names and construction of national identity in Soviet Armenia |journal=Cahiers du monde russe. Russie - Empire russe - Union soviétique et États indépendants |language=fr |volume=44 |issue=1 |pages=179–198 |doi=10.4000/monderusse.8604 |issn=1252-6576 |quote=The deterioration of Russian-Chinese relations in December 1972 resulted in the replacement of Chinese place-names in the border districts (Charles B. Peterson, art. cit.: 15-24). Up to 500 place-names were changed in the Far East. (B.A. Diachenko, "Pereimenovaniia v primor'e," in Vsesoiuznaia nauchno-prakticheskaia konferentsiia "Istoricheskie nazvaniia -- pamiatniki kul'tury" 17-20 aprelia 1989. Tezisy dokladov i soobshchenii (Moscow, 1989): 111.|doi-access=free }}</ref>

=== Nuclear China with the US and the USSR ===

==== US strategy on China's nuclear development ====
{{see also|Two Bombs, One Satellite}}
In the early 1960s, the United States feared that a "nuclear China" would imbalance the bi-polar Cold War between the US and the USSR. To keep the PRC from achieving the geopolitical status of a nuclear power, the US administrations of both [[John F. Kennedy]] and [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] considered ways either to sabotage or to attack directly the [[China and weapons of mass destruction|Chinese nuclear program]] — aided either by [[Republic of China (1949-present)|Republic of China]] based in Taiwan or by the USSR. To avert nuclear war, Khrushchev refused the US offer to participate in a US-Soviet pre-emptive attack against the PRC.
<ref name="jstor2626706">{{cite journal |last1=Burr |first1=W. |last2=Richelson |first2=J. T. |year=2000–2001 |title=Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64 |journal=International Security |volume=25 |issue=3 |pages=54–99 |jstor=2626706 |url=https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/whether-strangle-baby-cradle-united-states-and-chinese-nuclear-program-1960-64 |doi=10.1162/016228800560525 |s2cid=57560352 |access-date=29 April 2019 |archive-date=30 April 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190430032544/https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/whether-strangle-baby-cradle-united-states-and-chinese-nuclear-program-1960-64 |url-status=live |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

To prevent the Chinese from building a nuclear bomb, the [[United States Armed Forces]] recommended indirect measures, such as diplomacy and propaganda, and direct measures, such as infiltration and sabotage, an invasion by the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan, maritime blockades, a South Korean invasion of North Korea, conventional air attacks against the nuclear production facilities, and dropping a nuclear bomb against a "selected CHICOM [Chinese Communist] target".<ref>LeMay, Curtis. "A Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability" (1963), in "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64 (2000)</ref> On 16 October 1964, the PRC detonated their first nuclear bomb, a uranium-235 [[Nuclear weapon design|implosion-fission device]],<ref name=":0">[https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/16-october-1964-first-chinese-nuclear-test "16 October 1964 – First Chinese nuclear test: CTBTO Preparatory Commission"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200222034939/https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/16-october-1964-first-chinese-nuclear-test/ |date=22 February 2020 }}. ''ctbto.org''. Retrieved 1 June 2017.</ref> with an explosive yield of 22 [[kiloton]]s of TNT;<ref>Oleg; Podvig, Pavel Leonardovich; Hippel, Frank Von (2004). [https://books.google.com/books?id=CPRVbYDc-7kC&pg=PA441 ''Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191017052346/https://books.google.be/books?id=CPRVbYDc-7kC&pg=PA441 |date=17 October 2019 }}. MIT Press. p. 441. {{ISBN|9780262661812}}.</ref> and publicly acknowledged the USSR's technical assistance in realizing [[596 (nuclear test)|Project 596]].<ref>{{cite web |title=CTBTO World Map |url=https://www.ctbto.org/map/#mode=nuclear |website=www.ctbto.org |access-date=31 January 2019 |archive-date=1 February 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190201065733/https://www.ctbto.org/map/#mode=nuclear |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Planned Soviet nuclear strike on China ====
[[File:Brezhnev-color.jpg|left|thumb|[[Leonid Brezhnev]], the leader of the Soviet Union from 1964-1982, held tough position towards China.]]
According to declassified sources from both the PRC and the United States, the Soviet Union planned to launch a massive nuclear strike on China after the [[Zhenbao Island incident]] in 1969.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":6">{{Cite web |date=August 28, 1969 |title=27. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d27 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241010040418/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d27 |archive-date=2024-10-10 |access-date= |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":9">{{Cite web |date=2011 |title=59. Editorial Note |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d59 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241217085844/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d59 |archive-date=2024-12-17 |access-date= |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":11">{{Cite web |date=2010-05-13 |title=USSR planned nuclear attack on China in 1969 |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100516014916/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/7720461/USSR-planned-nuclear-attack-on-China-in-1969.html |archive-date=2010-05-16 |access-date= |website=[[The Daily Telegraph|The Telegraph]] |language=en}}</ref> Soviet diplomat [[Arkady Shevchenko]] also mentioned in his memoir that "the Soviet leadership had come close to using nuclear arms on China",<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Shevchenko |first=Arkady |author-link=Arkady Shevchenko |date=February 11, 1985 |title=Breaking with Moscow |url=https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,960276-15,00.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250114011523/https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0%2C33009%2C960276-15%2C00.html |archive-date=2025-01-14 |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]}}</ref> while many documents are still classified.<ref name=":28">{{Cite web |last=Wu |first=Riqiang |date=2010–2011 |title=Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics |url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156889/4%20Wu%20POSSEIV.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240717043921/https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156889/4%20Wu%20POSSEIV.pdf |archive-date=2024-07-17 |website=[[Georgia Institute of Technology]] |page=18-21}}</ref> As a turning point during the [[Cold War]], this crisis almost led to a major nuclear war, seven years after the [[Cuban Missile Crisis|Cuban missile crisis]].<ref name=":11" /><ref name=":10" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Yu |first=Miles |author-link=Miles Yu |date=December 13, 2022 |title=The 1969 Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts As A Key Turning Point Of The Cold War |url=https://www.hoover.org/research/1969-sino-soviet-border-conflicts-key-turning-point-cold-war |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241222132336/https://www.hoover.org/research/1969-sino-soviet-border-conflicts-key-turning-point-cold-war |archive-date=2024-12-22 |access-date=2024-12-30 |website=[[Hoover Institution]] |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":12">{{Cite journal |last=Rajagopalan |first=Rajesh |date=2000-06-01 |title=Deterrence and nuclear confrontations: The Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-soviet border war |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160008455225 |journal=Strategic Analysis |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=441–457 |doi=10.1080/09700160008455225 |issn=0970-0161|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Radchenko |first=Sergey |author-link=Sergey Radchenko |date=2019-03-02 |title=The Island That Changed History |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/opinion/soviet-russia-china-war.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250101053207/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/opinion/soviet-russia-china-war.html |archive-date=2025-01-01 |access-date=2025-01-03 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> 

On August 18, 1969, Boris N. Davydov, the Second Secretary of the [[Embassy of Russia, Washington, D.C.|Soviet Embassy to the United States]], brought up the idea of a Soviet attack on China's nuclear installations, during a luncheon in Washington.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" /> According to Chinese sources, then [[Soviet Ambassador to the United States|Soviet ambassador to the US]], [[Anatoly Dobrynin]], met with [[Henry Kissinger]] on August 20 and informed him of the Soviets' intention to launch a nuclear strike on China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":10" /> On August 21, the US sent out a secret telegram to its [[embassies]] worldwide warning that "the Soviets have set in motion an extensive series of measures" which could "permit them a variety of military options".<ref>{{Cite web |date=1969-08-21 |title=Outgoing Telegram |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.11.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090903202126/http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.11.pdf |archive-date=2009-09-03 |website=The George Washington University |publisher=United States Department of State}}</ref>  

The United States authorities subsequently informed certain [[News media in the United States|US news media]] regarding the possible Soviet attack, and the latter made the reports public on August 28 and the following days.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":6" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":21">{{Cite web |last=Gerson |first=Michael S. |date=November 2010 |title=The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict—Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969 |url=https://www.cna.org/reports/2010/d0022974.a2.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241218120231/https://www.cna.org/reports/2010/d0022974.a2.pdf |archive-date=2024-12-18 |website=[[Center for Naval Analyses]]}}</ref> Among them were a report appearing on ''[[The Washington Post]]'' on August 28,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Roberts |first=Chalmers M. |date=1969-08-28 |title=Russia Reported Eying Strikes at China A-Sites |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01284A001800110052-9.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250111060458/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01284A001800110052-9.pdf |archive-date=2025-01-11 |website=[[CIA]] |publisher=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref> with another one reportedly mentioning further details that the Soviet Union had planned to launch nuclear missiles onto major Chinese cities including [[Beijing]], [[Changchun]] and [[Anshan]], as well as China's nuclear sites including [[Jiuquan]], [[Xichang]] and [[Lop Nur]].<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":28" /><ref name=":8" /> Meanwhile, unusual Soviet military activity in the [[Far East]] was detected by the US intelligence in the late August, with Soviet's ''[[Pravda]]'' on August 28 warning that a war with Communist China, if broke out, would involve "lethal armaments and modern means of delivery" and "would leave no continent untouched."<ref name=":28" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=[[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan)|Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] |date=1969-10-01 |title=Foreign Views |url=https://taiwantoday.tw/Politics/Taiwan-Review/6124/Foreign--Views |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250113100709/https://taiwantoday.tw/Politics/Taiwan-Review/6124/Foreign--Views |archive-date=2025-01-13 |access-date=2025-01-13 |website=[[Taiwan Today]] |language=en}}</ref> Besides the United States, the Soviet Union also approached a number of other foreign governments, including its Communist allies, and asked for their opinions and reactions if the Soviet were to launch nuclear strike against China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" /><ref name=":21" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Schumann |first=Anna |date=2023-11-13 |title=Fact Sheet: The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute |url=https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-sino-soviet-border-dispute/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240909112503/https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-sino-soviet-border-dispute/ |archive-date=2024-09-09 |access-date=2024-12-30 |website=[[Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation]] |language=en}}</ref>
[[File:Muhammed Ayub Khan and Alexei Kosygin (cropped).jpg|thumb|Alexei Kosygin, Premier of the Soviet Union from 1964-1980]]
As a result, the PRC soon entered the phase of war preparation.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8">{{Cite web |date=2010-05-23 |title=1969年，苏联欲对中国实施核打击 |trans-title=In 1969, the Soviet Union wanted to launch a nuclear strike on China |url=https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2010-05-23/095817551950s.shtml |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241209060523/https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2010-05-23/095817551950s.shtml |archive-date=2024-12-09 |access-date= |website=[[Sina Corporation|Sina]] |publisher=[[Changsha Evening News]] |language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":21" /> On September 11, 1969, [[Alexei Kosygin]], then [[Premier of the Soviet Union]], briefly met with Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] in Beijing after attending the funeral of [[Ho Chi Minh]] in [[Vietnam]], in order to de-escalate the tension.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22" /> On September 16, however, [[Victor Louis (journalist)|Victor Louis]], a Soviet journalist with a [[KGB]] background, again claimed in ''[[The Evening News (London newspaper)|The Evening News]]'' that the Soviet Union might launch a nuclear airstrike against China.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":9" /><ref name=":10">{{Cite web |last1=Lewis |first1=John Wilson |author-link1=John Wilson Lewis |last2=Xue |first2=Litai |date=2010-10-26 |title=1969年中国安危系于千钧一发——苏联核袭击计划胎死腹中 |trans-title=In 1969, China's security was at a critical moment——Soviet nuclear attack plan aborted |url=http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK10/cr604.gb.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241202202634/http://www.cnd.org/cr/ZK10/cr604.gb.html |archive-date=2024-12-02 |access-date= |website=China News Digest |publisher=领导者 |language=zh}}</ref><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22" /> [[Chiang Kai-shek]], then [[President of the Republic of China]], also recorded numerous outreaches from Victor Louis in 1968 and 1969 on potential cooperation to attack the Communist PRC and re-gain control of [[mainland China]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Tai |first=Paul H. |date=July 2, 2010 |title=The Russia Option |url=https://www.hoover.org/research/russia-option |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220823202656/https://www.hoover.org/research/russia-option |archive-date=2022-08-23 |access-date=2025-01-13 |website=[[Hoover Institution]] |language=en}}</ref> In the late September, both the USSR and the PRC went on to conduct nuclear tests, with China successfully conducting its first [[underground nuclear test]] on September 22.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2011 |title=67. Editorial Note |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d67 |url-status=live |archive-url=http://web.archive.org/web/20241103111455/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d67 |archive-date=2024-11-03 |access-date= |website=United States Department of State |language=en}}</ref> The PRC leadership initially anticipated a Soviet attack on October 1, the [[National Day of China|National Day of PRC]], but when the attack did not come, they soon received new classified intelligence and formed another anticipation of October 20, the scheduled starting day of border negotiations with the Soviets.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":21" /><ref name=":22">{{Cite journal |last=Lüthi |first=Lorenz M. |date=2012 |title=Restoring Chaos to History: Sino-Soviet-American Relations, 1969 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23510691 |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=210 |issue=210 |pages=378–397 |doi=10.1017/S030574101200046X |jstor=23510691 |issn=0305-7410}}</ref> 

[[File:Tiananmen palace 1967.jpg|thumb|From left to right: [[Zhou Enlai]], Mao Zedong and [[Lin Biao]] (1967). Zhou and Lin were holding the ''[[Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung|Little Red Book]]'' on [[Tiananmen]], at the height of the [[Cultural Revolution]]. ]]

On October 14, 1969, the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] released an urgent notification of evacuation to the [[Party and state leaders]] in Beijing, requiring all leaders to leave Beijing by October 20 (they eventually returned to Beijing in 1971 after the [[Lin Biao incident|Lin Biao Incident]]), with Mao travelling to [[Wuhan]] (returned to Beijing in April 1970) and [[Lin Biao]] travelling to [[Suzhou, Jiangsu|Suzhou]].<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8" /><ref name=":13">{{Cite web |title=中国共产党大事记·1969年 |trans-title=Major events of the Chinese Communist Party (1969) |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64164/4416087.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240806101132/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64164/4416087.html |archive-date=2024-08-06 |access-date= |website=[[People's Daily|People's Net]] |language=zh}}</ref> All central government and military agencies were moved to underground nuclear-proof castles in [[Western Hills]] of Beijing, with Zhou Enlai remaining in charge.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":28" /><ref name=":8" /> On October 17, Lin Biao issued an emergency order to put all [[People's Liberation Army]] personnel on combat alert, and on October 18, Lin's followers released the order as "[[Order Number One (Lin Biao)|Order Number One]]".<ref name=":21" /><ref name=":13" /><ref name=":02">{{Citation |last=Xu |first=Jinzhou |title=9 Analysis of 1969's "Order Number One" |date=2015-01-01 |work=Selected Essays on the History of Contemporary China |pages=168–193 |url=https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004292673/B9789004292673_010.xml |access-date=2025-01-03 |publisher=Brill |language=en |isbn=978-90-04-29267-3}}</ref> Over 940,000 soldiers, together with more than four thousand planes and over six hundred ships received the evacuation order, while important documents and archives were relocated from Beijing to southwestern China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":28" /><ref name=":8" /> 

According to a number of sources, U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]] decided to intervene in the end, and on October 15, the Soviet side was informed that the United States would launch a nuclear attack on approximately 130 cities in the Soviet Union if the latter attacked China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":7" /><ref name=":11" /><ref name=":10" /><ref name=":8" /> The U.S. government confirmed that "the U.S. military, including its nuclear forces, secretly went on alert" in October 1969, known as the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test]], and that Nixon indeed once considered using nuclear weapons.<ref name=":9" /> Kissinger recalled in his memoirs that the United States "raised our profile somewhat to make clear that we were not indifferent to these Soviet threats."<ref name=":9" /> Eventually, the Soviet Union abandoned its planned attack on China.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":11" /> Researchers and scholars have also speculated that the U.S. authorities might have ordered a nuclear alert in October 1969 in order to deter a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on China, and such speculation, according to [[Scott Sagan]] and [[Jeremi Suri]], "appears logically to be the most likely one".<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":26">{{Cite journal |last1=Sagan |first1=Scott D. |last2=Suri |first2=Jeremi |date=2003 |title=The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137607 |journal=International Security |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=156–158 |doi=10.1162/016228803321951126 |jstor=4137607 |issn=0162-2889|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name=":62">{{Cite web |last=Aftergood |first=Steven |date=2011-10-25 |title=Purpose of 1969 Nuclear Alert Remains a Mystery |url=https://fas.org/publication/1969_nuclear_alert/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240912163147/https://fas.org/web/20240912163147/https://fas.org/publication/1969_nuclear_alert/ |archive-date=2024-09-12 |access-date=2025-01-14 |website=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |language=en-US}}</ref> However, there were also evidence and arguments that the nuclear alert was Nixon's effort to influence [[Vietnam War|events in North Vietnam]].<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":26" /><ref name=":62" /> 

In the early 1970, the Chinese military eventually lowered their alert level.<ref name=":10" /> Since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union had replaced the US as the primary focus of Chinese nuclear developments.<ref name=":12" /><ref name=":14">{{Cite web |last=Tan |first=Lu |date=2010-02-05 |title=北京地下城往事：毛主席九字方针"深挖洞"(图) |trans-title=Stories of the underground city in Beijing: Chairman Mao's nine-word guideline |url=https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/news/2010/02-05/2111098.shtml |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240613053610/https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/news/2010/02-05/2111098.shtml |archive-date=2024-06-13 |access-date= |website=[[China News Service]] |publisher=[[Beijing Youth Daily]] |language=zh}}</ref> Throughout the 1970s, aware of the Soviet nuclear threat, the PRC built large-scale underground bomb shelters, such as the [[Underground City (Beijing)|Underground City]] in Beijing, and the military bomb shelters of [[Underground Project 131]], a command center in [[Hubei]], and the [[816 Nuclear Military Plant]], in the [[Fuling District]] of [[Chongqing]].<ref name=":14" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Zhiyong |date=April 15, 2005 |title=Beijing's Underground City |url=http://www.china.org.cn/english/travel/125961.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241211095658/http://www.china.org.cn/english/travel/125961.htm |archive-date=2024-12-11 |access-date=2024-12-30 |website=[[China Internet Information Center]]}}</ref>

=== Military buildup and geopolitical pragmatism ===
[[File:President Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong.jpg|thumb|To counter the USSR, Chairman Mao met with US President Nixon, and established Sino-American rapprochement, in 1972.]]
Since October 1969, the USSR and the PRC had engaged in decade-long diplomatic negotiations over border issues.<ref name=":17">{{Cite web |last=Zhou |first=Xiaopei |title=我看中苏关系近四十年变迁 |trans-title=My view on the Sino-Soviet relation of nearly forty years |url=http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/68742/112510/112512/6785024.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210609131847/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/68742/112510/112512/6785024.html |archive-date=2021-06-09 |website=[[People's Daily|People's Net]] |language=zh}}</ref> Meanwhile, both sides also continued to increase their military buildup along the border throughout the 1970s.<ref name=":15">{{Cite web |date=December 1982 |title=China Strengthens Its Force on the Soviet Front |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP03T02547R000101110001-8.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250103202058/https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP03T02547R000101110001-8.pdf |archive-date=2025-01-03 |website=[[CIA]] |page=3}}</ref><ref name=":16">{{Cite web |last=Elleman |first=Bruce |date=1996-04-20 |title=Sino-Soviet Relations and the February 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Conflict |url=https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/1996_Symposium/96papers/elleviet.php |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241204064717/https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/events/1996_Symposium/96papers/elleviet.php |archive-date=2024-12-04 |access-date= |website=[[Texas Tech University]]}}</ref> It is estimated that the USSR had placed 1 million to 1.2 million troops along the Soviet-China border (also the Mongolia-China order),<ref name=":15" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Chen |first=Qimao |date=1999 |title=18. Sino-Russian relations after the break-up of the Soviet Union |url=https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI99Chu/SIPRI99Chu18.pdf |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231211132323/https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI99Chu/SIPRI99Chu18.pdf |archive-date=2023-12-11 |website=[[SIPRI]]}}</ref> and the PRC had placed as many as 1.5 million troops along the border.<ref name=":16" />

The first diplomatic negotiation took place in Beijing on October 20, 1969, attended by the deputy foreign ministers from both sides.<ref name=":13" /> Despite the border demarcation remaining indeterminate, the meetings restored Sino-Soviet diplomatic communications, which by 1970 allowed Mao to understand that the PRC could not simultaneously fight the US and the USSR while suppressing internal disorders throughout China.<ref name=":17" /> In July 1971, the US advisor for national security, [[Henry Kissinger]], went to Beijing to arrange for President [[Richard Nixon]]'s [[1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China|visit to China]]. Kissinger's Sino-American rapprochement offended the USSR, and Brezhnev then convoked a summit-meeting with Nixon, which re-cast the bi-polar geopolitics of the US-Soviet cold war into the tri-polar geopolitics of the PRC-US-USSR cold war. As relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States improved, so too did relations between the Soviet Union and the by now largely unrecognised Republic of China in Taiwan, although this thaw in diplomatic relations stopped well short of any Soviet official recognition of Taiwan.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Share |first1=M. |date=6 September 2010 |title=From Ideological Foe to Uncertain Friend: Soviet Relations with Taiwan, 1943-82 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713999981 |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |volume=3 |issue=2 |pages=1–34 |doi=10.1080/713999981 |s2cid=154822714 |access-date=15 February 2023|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Concerning the Sino-Soviet disputes about the demarcation of {{convert|4380|km}} of territorial borders, [[Propaganda in the Soviet Union|Soviet propaganda]] agitated against the PRC's complaint about the unequal 1858 [[Treaty of Aigun]] and the 1860 [[Convention of Peking]], which cheated Imperial China of territory and natural resources in the 19th century. To that effect, in the 1972–1973 period, the USSR deleted the Chinese and Manchu place-names – Iman (伊曼, Yiman), Tetyukhe (野猪河, yĕzhūhé), and Suchan – from the map of the [[Russian Far East]], and replaced them with the Russian place-names: [[Dalnerechensk]], [[Dalnegorsk]], and [[Partizansk]], respectively.<ref name=stephan>Stephan, John J. ''The Russian Far East: A History'', Stanford University Press:1996. {{ISBN|0-8047-2701-5}} [https://books.google.com/books?id=Jce4rBWjG5wC Partial text] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160617144953/https://books.google.com/books?id=Jce4rBWjG5wC |date=17 June 2016 }} on Google Books. pp.&nbsp;18–19, 51.</ref><ref>Connolly, Violet ''Siberia Today and Tomorrow: A Study of Economic Resources, Problems, and Achievements'', Collins:1975. [https://books.google.com/books?id=osW5AAAAIAA Snippet view only] on Google Books.</ref> To facilitate social acceptance of such cultural revisionism, the [[Printed media in the Soviet Union|Soviet press]] misrepresented the historical presence of [[Ethnic Chinese in Russia|Chinese people]] – in lands gained by the [[Russian Empire]] – which provoked Russian violence against the local Chinese populations; moreover, politically inconvenient exhibits were removed from museums,<ref name=stephan /> and vandals covered with cement the [[Jurchen script|Jurchen-script]] stele, about the [[Jin dynasty (1115–1234)|Jin dynasty]], in [[Khabarovsk]], some 30 kilometres from the Sino-Soviet border, at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers.<ref>Georgy Permyakov (Георгий ПЕРМЯКОВ) ''The Ancient Tortoise and the Soviet Cement'' ([http://85.114.94.194/page.php?page=1787&date_id_num=2000-04-30&year=2000&month=04&day_id=27 «Черепаха древняя, цемент советский»]{{dead link|date=December 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}), ''Tikhookeanskaya Zvezda'', 30 April 2000</ref>

=== Rivalry in the Third World ===
In the 1970s, the ideological rivalry between the PRC and the USSR extended into the countries of Africa, Asia and of the Middle East, where each socialist country funded the vanguardism of the local [[Marxism–Leninism|Marxist–Leninist]] parties and militias. Their political advice, financial aid, and military assistance facilitated the realization of [[wars of national liberation]], such as the [[Ogaden War]] between Ethiopia and Somalia (also linked to the [[Ethiopian Civil War]], [[Somali Rebellion]] and [[Eritrean War of Independence]]); the [[Rhodesian Bush War]] between white European colonists and anti-colonial black natives; the aftermath of the Bush War, the Zimbabwean [[Gukurahundi]] massacres; the [[Angolan Civil War]] between competing national-liberation groups of guerrillas, which proved to be a US–Soviet [[proxy war]]; the [[Mozambican Civil War]]; and the [[Palestinian political violence|guerrilla factions fighting for the liberation of Palestine]]. In [[Thailand]], the pro-Chinese front organizations were based upon the local [[Thai Chinese|Chinese minority population]], and thus proved politically ineffective as a Maoist revolutionary vanguard.<ref>{{cite book|author=Gregg A. Brazinsky|title=Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=t_IxDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA252|year=2017|publisher=University of North Carolina Press|page=252|isbn=9781469631714|access-date=15 October 2017|archive-date=19 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200819230458/https://books.google.com/books?id=t_IxDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA252|url-status=live}}</ref>

During the Sino-Soviet split, Vietnam initially sought to balance relations with China on one hand and the USSR on the other.<ref name=":Wang">{{Cite book |last=Wang |first=Frances Yaping |title=The Art of State Persuasion: China's Strategic Use of Media in Interstate Disputes |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197757512}}</ref>{{Rp|page=93}} Vietnamese leadership was to divided over which of the countries to support.<ref name=":Wang" />{{Rp|page=93}} The pro-Soviet group led by [[Lê Duẩn]] eventually developed momentum, especially as China sought to improve [[China–United States relations|its relations with the United States]], which Vietnamese leadership viewed as a betrayal of the [[China–Vietnam relations|China-Vietnam relationship]].<ref name=":Wang" />{{Rp|page=93}} Vietnam's increasing closeness with the USSR in turn alarmed Chinese leadership, which feared encirclement by the USSR.<ref name=":Wang" />{{Rp|pages=93–94}} This contributed to China's decision to invade Vietnam, beginning the [[Sino-Vietnamese War|1979 Sino-Vietnamese War]].<ref name=":Wang" />{{Rp|pages=93–94}}

=== Occasional cooperation ===
{{see also|International participation in the Vietnam War#Soviet Union|China in the Vietnam War}}
[[File:Ceausescu.jpg|thumb|[[Deng Xiaoping]], [[Nicolae Ceaușescu]] and [[Leonid Brezhnev]] attending the 9th Congress of the [[Romanian Communist Party]] in [[Bucharest]] in July 1965.]]
At times, the "competition" led to the USSR and PRC supporting the same factions in concert, such as when both countries supported [[North Vietnam]] during the [[Vietnam War]]. Both Soviet and Chinese support was vital for the supply of [[NLF and PAVN logistics and equipment|logistics and equipment to the NLF and PAVN]]. Most of the supplies were Soviet, sent through China overland.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The Vietnam War - CCEA - GCSE History Revision - CCEA|url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/z8kw3k7/revision/8|access-date=27 July 2021|website=BBC Bitesize|language=en-GB|archive-date=27 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210727024025/https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/z8kw3k7/revision/8|url-status=live}}</ref> Some analyses find that Chinese economic aid was larger than that of the Soviets as early as 1965–1968.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=MEHTA|first=HARISH C.|date=2012|title=Soviet Biscuit Factories and Chinese Financial Grants: North Vietnam's Economic Diplomacy in 1967 and 1968|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/44376154|journal=Diplomatic History|volume=36|issue=2|pages=301–335|doi=10.1111/j.1467-7709.2011.01024.x|jstor=44376154|issn=0145-2096|access-date=27 July 2021|archive-date=27 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210727024025/https://www.jstor.org/stable/44376154|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}}</ref> One estimate finds that 1971–1973, the PRC sent the largest amount of aid constituting 90 billion [[Renminbi|yuan]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Roberts|first=Priscilla Mary|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=anotqEyBmqQC&pg=PA303|title=Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia|date=2006|publisher=Stanford University Press|isbn=978-0-8047-5502-3|pages=303–311|language=en|access-date=11 August 2021|archive-date=26 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220126034046/https://books.google.com/books?id=anotqEyBmqQC&pg=PA303|url-status=live}}</ref> Soviet supplies flowed freely through China from before 1965 until 1969, when they were cut off. In 1971 however, China encouraged Vietnam to seek more supplies from the Soviet Union. 

From 1972, Chinese premier [[Zhou Enlai]] encouraged expeditions of Soviet rail trips, missile shipments, allowed 400 Soviet experts to pass to Vietnam, and on 18 June 1971, reopened Soviet freight in Chinese ports. China then agreed to all Vietnamese requests of allowing Soviet warehouses to store materiel for shipment to Vietnam. The result was a solid, and relatively continuous Communist Bloc support for North Vietnam during the Sino-Soviet split.<ref name=":1" /> However, some of the surmounting Soviet and Chinese tensions would grow into the [[Sino-Vietnamese War]] in 1979.<ref name=":1" />