Editing USS Akron (section)

==Assessment==

For numerous reasons, in the opinion of Richard K. Smith,<ref name="Smith 1965. p 171">Smith (1965). p 171</ref> ''Akron'' never got the chance to show what she was capable of. Initially, the idea had been to use her as a scout for the fleet, just as the German Navy Zeppelins had been used during World War I] with her airplanes being simply useful auxiliaries capable of extending her range of vision or of defending her against attacking enemy aircraft.<ref>Smith (1965). p 177</ref> Gradually, in the minds of the more forward-thinking officers familiar with airship and scouting fleet operations, that was reversed, ''Macon'' and ''Akron'' came to be regarded as aircraft carriers, whose sole job was to get the scouting airplanes to the search area and then to support them in their flights.<ref name="Harrigan Report">Report by Senior Aviator, HTA Unit to CO, Akron ZRS4/A4-3, 15 December 1932, Record Group 72, BuAer General Correspondence (1925–1942), Box 5592, US National Archives</ref><ref>Smith (1965). pp 51 & 107</ref> The mothership herself should stay in the background, out of sight of enemy surface units, and act merely as a mobile advanced base for the airplanes, which should do all of the actual searching.<ref>Smith (1965). pp 28 & 29</ref> Any aircraft carrier could do that, but only an airship could do it so quickly, since her speed was at least twice that of a surface ship, enabling her to get to the scene or be switched from flank to flank quickly. However, she was an experimental ship, a prototype, and time was needed for the doctrine and suitable tactics to evolve, as well as for developing the techniques of navigating, controlling, and coordinating the scouts. At first, developments were hampered by inadequate radio equipment,<ref>Smith (1965). pp 49 & 51</ref> and the difficulties encountered by the scout pilots in navigating, scouting, and communicating from their cramped, open cockpits.<ref>Smith (1965). p 69</ref>

Some politicians, some senior officers, and some sections of the press seemed predisposed to judge the airship experiment a failure without regard to the evidence.<ref>Smith (1965). pp. 51, 53, 55, 59, etc.</ref> Even within the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics, many opposed spending so much on a single asset.<ref name="Smith 1965. p 171"/> Smith also asserts that political pressure inside and outside the Navy led to the ship being pushed too early to attempt too much.<ref>Smith (1965). p. 45 et al (especially p 56)</ref> Little allowance seems to have been made for the fact that this was a prototype, an experimental system, and that tactics for her use were being developed "on the hoof". As a result, the airship's performance in fleet exercises was not all that some had hoped, and gave an exaggerated impression of the ship's vulnerability and failed to demonstrate her strengths.<ref>Smith (1965). pp 59, 171 et al</ref>