Editing Vote counting (section)

==General issues==

===Interpretation, in any counting method===
[[File:2018 Vote by mail envelopes being sorted in Santa Clara County.webm|thumb|Sorting vote by mail envelopes, San Jose, Santa Clara County, California, 2018]]
[[File:Afgan Ballot.jpg|thumb|Afghan Ballot]]
Election officials or optical scanners decide if a ballot is valid before tallying it. Reasons why it might not be valid include: more choices selected than allowed; incorrect voter signature or details on ballots received by mail, if allowed; lack of poll worker signatures, if required; forged ballot (wrong paper, printing or security features); stray marks which could identify who cast the ballot (to earn payments); and blank ballots, though these may be counted separately as abstentions.<ref name="ace"/>

For paper ballots officials decide if the voter's intent is clear, since voters may mark lightly, or circle their choice, instead of marking as instructed. The ballot may be visible to observers to ensure agreement, by webcam or passing around a table,<ref name="ace"/> or the process may be private. In the US only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia give anyone but officials a legal right to see ballot marks during hand counting.<ref name="vvstates">{{Cite web |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/state-audit-laws/ |title=State Audit Laws |date=2017-02-10 |website=Verified Voting |language=en-US |access-date=2018-04-02 |archive-date=2020-01-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200104201852/https://www.verifiedvoting.org/state-audit-laws/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>
For optical scans, the software has rules to interpret voter intent, based on the darkness of marks.<ref name="yakima"/> Software may ignore circles around a candidate name, and paper dust or broken sensors can cause marks to appear or disappear, not where the voter intended.

Officials also check if the number of voters checked in at the polling place matches the number of ballots voted, and that the votes plus remaining unused ballots matches the number of ballots sent to the polling place. If not, they look for the extra ballots, and may report discrepancies.<ref name="ace"/>

===Secure storage to enable counts in future===
[[File:AEC-Senate-ballots-sealed-1.jpg|thumb|Australia-Senate-ballots-sealed]]
[[File:AEC-HoR-ballots-sealed-2.jpg|thumb|Australia-ballots-sealed]]
[[File:AEC-HoR-ballots-sealed-3.jpg|thumb|Australia-ballots-sealed]]

If ballots or other paper or electronic records of an election may be needed for counting or court review after a period of time, they need to be stored securely.

Election storage often uses [[Tamper-evident technology#Seals and signatures|tamper-evident seals]],<ref name="eac-phys">{{Cite web |url=https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/260.pdf |archive-url=https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20170327214637/https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/260.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 27, 2017 |title=Chapter 3. PHYSICAL SECURITY |website=US Election Assistance Commission |access-date=April 24, 2018 }}</ref><ref name="wp">{{Cite web |url=https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/RLAwhitepaper12.pdf |title=Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits: Why and How |last1=Lindeman |first1=Mark|first2=Jennie|last2= Bretschneider|first3= Sean|last3= Flaherty|first4= Susannah|last4=Goodman|first5=Mark|last5=Halvorson|first6= Roger |last6=Johnston|first7= Ronald L.|last7=Rivest|first8=Pam|last8=Smith|first9=Philip B.|last9=Stark |date=October 1, 2012 |website=University of California at Berkeley |pages=3, 16 |access-date=April 9, 2018}}</ref> 
although seals can typically be removed and reapplied without damage, especially in the first 48 hours.<ref name="seals"/> Photos taken when the seal is applied can be compared to photos taken when the seal is opened.<ref name="hoover">{{Cite web |url=https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/lhc18.pdf |title=An Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits and Evidence-Based Elections Prepared for the Little Hoover Commission |last=Stark |first=Philip |date=July 26, 2018 |website=University of California, Berkeley |access-date=August 16, 2019}}</ref>
Detecting subtle tampering requires substantial training.<ref name="seals">{{Cite news |url=http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug12/Choose_Use_Seals.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130224233221/http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug12/Choose_Use_Seals.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=February 24, 2013 |title=How to Choose and Use Seals |last=Johnston |first=Roger G. |author2=Jon S. Warner |date=July 31, 2012 |work=Army Sustainment |access-date=May 4, 2018}}</ref><ref name="freeman2017">{{Cite web |last=Coherent Cyber |publisher=Freeman, Craft McGregor Group |date=August 28, 2017 |title=Security Test Report ES&S Electionware 5.2.1.0 |url=http://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/ess/evs5210/ess5210-sec.pdf |pages=9 |via=California Secretary of State}}</ref><ref name="stauffer">{{Cite web |last=Stauffer |first=Jacob |date=November 4, 2016 |title=Vulnerability & Security Assessment Report Election Systems &Software's Unity 3.4.1.0 |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ESS-red-team-CA-2016.pdf |via=Freeman, Craft, MacGregor Group for California Secretary of State}}</ref> Election officials usually take too little time to examine seals, and observers are too far away to check seal numbers, though they could compare old and new photos projected on a screen. If seal numbers and photos are kept for later comparison, these numbers and photos need their own secure storage. Seals can also be forged. Seals and locks can be cut so observers cannot trust the storage. If the storage is breached, election results cannot be checked and corrected.

Experienced testers can usually bypass all physical security systems.<ref name="sevold"/> Locks<ref name="eff-delayed">There are several sources on lock vulnerabilities:
*Lockpicking is widely [[locksport|taught and practiced]]: {{Cite news |url=https://slate.com/human-interest/2013/03/locksport-the-strange-things-that-happen-at-a-lock-picking-convention.html |title=The Strange Things That Happen at a Lock-picking Convention |last=Vanderbilt |first=Tom |date=March 12, 2013|work=Slate |access-date=August 15, 2019 |language=en}} 
*Different techniques apply to electronic locks: {{Cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-locks-cyber-exclusive-idUSKCN1UW26Z |title=Exclusive: High-security locks for government and banks hacked by researcher |last=Menn |first=Joseph |date=August 6, 2019 |work=Reuters |access-date=August 16, 2019 |language=en}} 
*More on electronic locks: {{Cite magazine |url=https://www.wired.com/2017/08/the-hotel-hacker/ |title=Inside an Epic Hotel Room Hacking Spree |last=Greenberg |first=Andy |date=August 29, 2017 |magazine=Wired |access-date=August 16, 2019 |language=en-US |issn=1059-1028}} 
*There are no statistics on how often criminals enter rooms undetected, but [[Sneak and peek warrant|law enforcement]] often does so, so ability to enter rooms undetected is widespread: {{Cite web |url=https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/peekaboo-i-see-you-government-uses-authority-meant-terrorism-other-uses |title=Peekaboo, I See You: Government Authority Intended for Terrorism is Used for Other Purposes |last=Tien |first=Lee |date=October 26, 2014 |website=Electronic Frontier Foundation |language=en |access-date=August 15, 2019}}</ref> 
and cameras<ref name="ifsec">Security camera flaws have been covered extensively: 
*{{Cite web |url=https://www.ifsecglobal.com/cyber-security/how-to-hack-a-security-camera/ |title=How to hack a security camera. It's alarmingly simple |last=Bannister |first=Adam |date=October 7, 2016 |website=IFSEC Global, Security and Fire News and Resources |access-date=August 16, 2019}} 
*{{Cite news |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/02/u-s-military-spends-millions-on-dangerous-chinese-tech-with-known-cyber-risks/ |title=Official Cybersecurity Review Finds U.S. Military Buying High-Risk Chinese Tech (Updated) |last=Doffman |first=Zak |work=Forbes |access-date=August 14, 2019 |language=en}} 
*{{Cite web |url=https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/10/hacking_securit.html |title=Hacking Security Cameras - Schneier on Security |last=Schneier |first=Bruce |date=October 8, 2007 |website=www.schneier.com |access-date=August 16, 2019}} 
*{{Cite web |url=https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/06/11/critical-flaws-found-in-amcrest-security-cameras/ |title=Critical flaws found in Amcrest security cameras |last=Dunn |first=John |date=June 11, 2019 |website=Naked Security |language=en |access-date=August 16, 2019}}</ref>
are vulnerable before and after delivery.<ref name="sevold"/>
Guards can be bribed or blackmailed. Insider threats<ref name="cleveland">{{Cite news |url=https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2007/11/elections_board_workers_to_tak.html |title=Elections board workers take plea deal |last=Turner |first=Karl |date=November 5, 2007 |work=Cleveland Plain Dealer |access-date=August 17, 2019 |language=en-US}}</ref><ref name="recountnow">{{Cite web |url=http://votewell.homestead.com/clark_county_report.pdf |title=Report on the 2016 Presidential Recount in Clark County, Nevada. Page 20. |last=Recount Now |date=January 11, 2017|website=Internet Archive |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190812144903/http://votewell.homestead.com/clark_county_report.pdf |access-date=August 17, 2019|archive-date=2019-08-12 }}</ref>
and the difficulty of following all security procedures are usually under-appreciated, and most organizations do not want to learn their vulnerabilities.<ref name="sevold">{{Cite web |url=http://losspreventionmedia.com/insider/retail-security/physical-security-threats-and-vulnerabilities/ |title=Physical Security Threats and Vulnerabilities - LPM |last=Seivold |first=Garett |date=April 2, 2018 |website=losspreventionmedia.com |language=en-US |access-date=April 24, 2018}}</ref>

Security recommendations include preventing access by anyone alone,<ref name="bp2018">{{Cite web |url=https://electionaudits.org/files/Audit%20Principles%20and%20Best%20Practices%202018.pdf |title=Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Tabulation Audits |date=2018 |website=ElectionAudits.org |access-date=August 12, 2019}}</ref>
which would typically require two hard-to-pick locks, and having keys held by independent officials if such officials exist in the jurisdiction; having storage risks identified by people other than those who design or manage the system; and using background checks on staff.<ref name="eac-phys"/>

No US state has adequate laws on physical security of the ballots.<ref name="evote">{{Cite conference |book-title=Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Electronic Voting |last=Benaloh|display-authors=etal|title=Public Evidence from Secret Ballots |year=2017 |isbn=9783319686875 |location=Cham, Switzerland |pages=122 |oclc=1006721597 |arxiv=1707.08619}}</ref>

Starting the tally soon after voting ends makes it feasible for independent parties to guard storage sites.<ref name="sleep">Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) policy calls for independent foreign officials to sleep with ballots, and allows parties to do so:
*{{Cite web |url=https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6e84.html |title=Municipal Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina |last=International Crisis Group (ICG) |date=September 10, 1997 |website=RefWorld |language=en |access-date=August 12, 2019 }}
*{{Cite web |url=http://www.ohr.int/ohr_archive/ohr-srt-news-summary-7-september-1998/ |title=OHR SRT News Summary, September 7, 1998 |date=September 7, 1998 |website=Office of the High Representative (Bosnia+Herzegovina) |language=en-US |access-date=August 12, 2019 }}
Turkish opposition sleeping with balllots:
*{{Cite news |url=https://ahvalnews.com/local-elections/turkeys-opposition-sleeping-beside-ballots-safeguard-democracy |title=Turkey's opposition sleeping beside ballots to safeguard democracy |date=April 4, 2019 |work=Ahval |access-date=August 12, 2019 |language=en |archive-date=August 12, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190812170256/https://ahvalnews.com/local-elections/turkeys-opposition-sleeping-beside-ballots-safeguard-democracy |url-status=dead }}
*{{Cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/world/europe/turkey-erdogan-election-loss.html |title=A Political Quake in Turkey as Erdogan's Party Loses in His Home Base of Support |last=Gall |first=Carlotta |date=April 1, 2019 |work=The New York Times |access-date=August 12, 2019 |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331 }}
Republicans guarded warehouse of voted ballots in 2000 in Florida and had state police lock up ballots in New Mexico:
*{{Cite web |url=https://adst.org/2016/10/2000-presidential-election-florida-recount/ |title=The 2000 Presidential Election – The Florida Recount |last=Cobb |first=Sue |date=2016-10-17 |website=Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training |language=en-US |access-date=2020-03-11 }}
*{{Cite news |last=Baker |first=Deborah |url=https://www.abqjournal.com/elex/apvotes10-31-04.htm |title=ABQjournal: Contentious 2000 Election Closest in N.M. History |date=2004-10-31 |work=Albuquerque Journal |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210607181458/https://www.abqjournal.com/elex/apvotes10-31-04.htm |access-date=2020-03-11 |archive-date=2021-06-07 }}</ref>

===Secure transport and internet===

The ballots can be carried securely to a central station for central tallying, or they can be tallied at each polling place, manually or by machine, and the results sent securely to the central elections office. Transport is often accompanied by representatives of different parties to ensure honest delivery. Colorado transmits voting records by internet from counties to the Secretary of State, with hash values also sent by internet to try to identify accurate transmissions.<ref name="co-25">{{Cite web |url=https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/rule_making/CurrentRules/8CCR1505-1/Rule25.pdf |title=Rule 25. Post-election audit |website=Colorado Secretary of State |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>

[[Postal voting]] is common worldwide, though France stopped it in the 1970s because of concerns about ballot security. Voters who receive a ballot at home may also hand-deliver it or have someone else to deliver it. The voter may be forced or paid to vote a certain way,<ref name="pickles"/> or ballots may be changed or lost during the delivery process,<ref name="bbc-mawrey">{{Cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/west_midlands/4406575.stm |title=Judge upholds vote-rigging claims |date=2005-04-04 |work=BBC |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en-GB}}</ref>
<ref name="mawrey2004">{{Cite web |url=http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/2384.htm |title=Judgment of Commissioner Mawrey QC Handed down on Monday 4th April 2005 in the matters of Local Government elections for the Bordesley Green and Aston Wards of the Birmingham City Council both held on 10th June 2004 |last=Mawrey |first=Richard |date=2010-11-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101101071354/http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/2384.htm |access-date=2020-02-18|archive-date=2010-11-01 }}</ref>
or delayed so they arrive too late to be counted or for signature mis-matches to be resolved.<ref name="fl1">{{Cite web|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/thousands-mailed-ballots-florida-were-not-counted-n946306|title=Thousands of mailed ballots in Florida were not counted|website=NBC News|date=11 December 2018 |language=en|access-date=2019-03-27}}</ref>
<ref name="fl2">{{Cite web|url=https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article218654810.html|title=If you vote by mail in Florida, it's 10 times more likely that ballot won't count|website=miamiherald|language=en|access-date=2019-03-27}}</ref>

Postal voting lowered turnout in California by 3%.<ref name="kousser-ca">{{Cite journal |url=http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ef55/4b60fc90c45bfd24add2e0f5ab7b5af95aac.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190306234735/http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ef55/4b60fc90c45bfd24add2e0f5ab7b5af95aac.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=2019-03-06 |title=Does Voting by Mail Increase Participation? Using Matching to Analyze a Natural Experiment |last=Kousser |first=Thad |author2=Megan Mullin |date=2007-07-13 |journal=Political Analysis |volume=15 |issue=4 |pages=428–445 |doi=10.1093/PAN/MPM014 |s2cid=33267753 |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>
It raised turnout in Oregon only in Presidential election years by 4%, turning occasional voters into regular voters, without bringing in new voters.<ref name="berinsky">{{Cite journal |url=http://web.mit.edu/berinsky/www/whovotesbymail.pdf |last=BERINSKY  |first=ADAM J. |author2=NANCY BURNS |author3=MICHAEL W. TRAUGOTT |title=Who Votes by Mail?: A Dynamic Model of the Individual-Level Consequences of Voting-by-Mail Systems |date=2001 |journal=Public Opinion Quarterly |volume=65 |issue=2 |pages=178–197 |doi=10.1086/322196 |pmid=11420755 |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>
Election offices do not mail to people who have not voted recently, and letter carriers do not deliver to recent movers they do not know, omitting mobile populations.<ref name="slater">{{Cite web|url=https://www.nonprofitvote.org/documents/2011/02/vote-by-mail-doesnt-deliver-slater.doc|title=Vote-by-Mail Doesn't Deliver|last=Slater|first=Michael |author2=Teresa James|work=NonprofitVote.org|date=2007-06-29|access-date=2020-02-18|archive-date=2017-05-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170510114256/http://www.nonprofitvote.org/documents/2011/02/vote-by-mail-doesnt-deliver-slater.doc|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Some jurisdictions let ballots be sent to the election office by email, fax, internet or app.<ref name="ncsl">{{Cite web |url=https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/internet-voting.aspx |title=Electronic Transmission of Ballots |website=National Conference of State Legislatures |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref> 
Email and fax are highly insecure.<ref name="fax">{{Cite web |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/email-fax/ |title=What About Email and Fax? |website=Verified Voting |last=Jefferson |first=David |language=en-US |access-date=2020-02-18 |archive-date=2020-02-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200218231508/https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/email-fax/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>
Internet so far has also been insecure, including in [[Electronic voting in Switzerland|Switzerland]],<ref name="zetter-swiss">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/experts-find-serious-problems-with-switzerlands-online-voting-system-before-public-penetration-test-even-begins/ |title=Experts Find Serious Problems With Switzerland's Online Voting System |date=2019-02-21 |work=Vice |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en}}</ref>
Australia,<ref name="cso">{{Cite news |last=Porup |first=J. M. |url=https://www.csoonline.com/article/3269297/online-voting-is-impossible-to-secure-so-why-are-some-governments-using-it.html |title=Online voting is impossible to secure. So why are some governments using it? |date=2018-05-02 |work=CSO |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en}}</ref>
and [[Electronic voting in Estonia|Estonia]].<ref name="est">{{Cite web |url=https://estoniaevoting.org/ |title=Independent Report on E-voting in Estonia - A security analysis of Estonia's Internet voting system by international e-voting experts. |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>
Apps try to verify the correct voter is using the app by name, date of birth and signature,<ref name="parks">{{Cite news |last=Parks |first=Miles |url=https://www.npr.org/2020/01/22/798126153/exclusive-seattle-area-voters-to-vote-by-smartphone-in-1st-for-u-s-elections |title=Exclusive: Seattle-Area Voters To Vote By Smartphone In 1st For U.S. Elections |date=2020-01-22 |work=NPR |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en}}</ref>
which are widely available for most voters, so can be faked; or by name, ID and video selfie, which can be faked by loading a pre-recorded video.<ref name="sc-voatz"/> Apps have been particularly criticized for operating on insecure phones, and pretending to more security during transmission than they have.<ref name="zetter-voatz">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/sloppy-mobile-voting-app-used-in-four-states-has-elementary-security-flaws/ |title='Sloppy' Mobile Voting App Used in Four States Has 'Elementary' Security Flaws |date=2020-02-13|work=Vice |access-date=2020-02-18 |language=en}}</ref>
<ref name="mit-voatz">{{Cite web |url=https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SecurityAnalysisOfVoatz_Public.pdf |title=The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain: A Security Analysis of Voatz, the First Internet Voting Application Used in U.S. Federal Elections |last=Specter |first=Michael A. |author2=James Koppel |author3=Daniel Weitzner |date=2020-02-12 |website=MIT |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>
<ref name="sc-voatz">{{Cite web |url=https://cse.sc.edu/~buell/blockchain-papers/documents/WhatWeDontKnowAbouttheVoatz_Blockchain_.pdf |title=What We Don't Know About the Voatz "Blockchain" Internet Voting System |last=Jefferson |first=David |date=2019-05-01 |website=University of South Carolina |access-date=2020-02-18}}</ref>