Editing Containerization (section)

=== Hazards ===
Containers are actively used for smuggling and trafficking illicit goods and people. Drugs, antiques, weapons, undeclared merchandise, jewellery, human beings, wildlife, counterfeit products, as well as chemical, radioactive and biological materials, are illegally transported via containers.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last1=Bueger |first1=Christian |title=Understanding maritime security |last2=Edmunds |first2=Timothy |date=2024 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-776718-4 |series=Oxford scholarship online Political Science |location=New York, NY}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Greenland |first=Fiona |date=2017-11-07 |title=Free ports and steel containers: The <i>corpora delicti</i> of artefact trafficking |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/02757206.2017.1397648 |journal=History and Anthropology |volume=29 |issue=1 |pages=15–20 |doi=10.1080/02757206.2017.1397648 |issn=0275-7206|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-11-22 |title=Inspection of shipping containers at Belgium port turns up 4.78 tons of cocaine, weapons and $193,000 in cash – CBS News |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cocaine-shipping-containers-antwerp-port-belgium/ |access-date=2024-12-22 |publisher=CBS News |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Moloney |first1=Georgia Kate |last2=Chaber |first2=Anne-Lise |date=2024-04-03 |title=Where are you hiding the pangolins? screening tools to detect illicit contraband at international borders and their adaptability for illegal wildlife trafficking |journal=PLOS ONE |language=en |volume=19 |issue=4 |pages=e0299152 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0299152 |doi-access=free |issn=1932-6203 |pmc=10990205 |pmid=38568991|bibcode=2024PLoSO..1999152M }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-12-12 |title=Wildlife Trafficking: Why battling this illicit trade is crucial {{!}} ICE |url=https://www.ice.gov/features/wildlife |access-date=2024-12-22 |website=ice.gov |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Oral |first1=Ferhan |last2=Paker |first2=Serim |date=2023-12-20 |title=Risk Assessment for Maritime Container Transportation Security |url=https://doi.org/10.4274/jems.2023.80148 |journal=Journal of ETA Maritime Science |volume=11 |issue=4 |pages=304–316 |doi=10.4274/jems.2023.80148 |issn=2147-2955|doi-access=free }}</ref> Additionally, there are concerns about terrorists using containers to transport weapons of mass destruction (WMD). <ref>{{Citation |last=Bowley |first=Robin |title=Preventing terrorist targeting of ships |date=2022-12-23 |work=Preventing Terrorist Attacks at Sea |pages=84–124 |url=https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429320958-4 |access-date=2024-12-22 |place=London |publisher=Routledge |doi=10.4324/9780429320958-4 |isbn=978-0-429-32095-8|url-access=subscription }}</ref> However, these concerns remain hypothetical.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lehr |first=Peter |title=Routledge handbook of naval strategy and security |date=2016 |publisher=Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group |isbn=978-1-315-73257-2 |editor-last=Bruns |editor-first=Sebastian |series=Routledge handbooks |location=London New York, N.Y |pages=202–214 |chapter=(No) princes of the sea: reflections on maritime terrorism |editor-last2=Krause |editor-first2=Joachim}}</ref>

There are several ways in which illicit goods are smuggled. One method involves forging documents to make a container appear as legal cargo.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Raymond |first=Catherine Zara |date=2006 |title=Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550500383225 |journal=Terrorism and Political Violence |volume=18 |issue=2 |pages=239–257 |doi=10.1080/09546550500383225 |hdl=10220/39829 |issn=0954-6553|hdl-access=free }}</ref> Another method is inserting illegal goods into a legitimate shipment, mixing legal and illegal items together.<ref name=":1">{{Citation |last1=McNicholas |first1=M.A. |title=Drug Smuggling via Maritime Cargo, Containers, and Vessels |date=2016 |work=Maritime Security |pages=207–260 |url=https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-803672-3.00007-8 |access-date=2024-12-22 |publisher=Elsevier |isbn=978-0-12-803672-3 |last2=Draughon |first2=G.R.|doi=10.1016/b978-0-12-803672-3.00007-8 |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name=":0" /> For example, in 2024, several shipments of drugs, either disguised as banana cargo or mixed with legal banana shipments, were discovered in Germany, Greece, Spain and Great Britain.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Germany: Hamburg police seize 2 tons of cocaine worth €100M – DW – 09/27/2024 |url=https://www.dw.com/en/germany-hamburg-police-seize-2-tons-of-cocaine-worth-100m/a-70347569 |access-date=2024-12-22 |website=dw.com |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Peachey |first=Paul |date=2024-08-06 |title=Greek anti-drugs officers seize cocaine hidden in container ship banana cargo |url=https://www.tradewindsnews.com/containers/greek-anti-drugs-officers-seize-cocaine-hidden-in-container-ship-banana-cargo/2-1-1688064 |access-date=2024-12-22 |website=TradeWinds {{!}} Latest shipping and maritime news |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-11-06 |title=Police seize record cocaine haul in banana shipment in Spain; woman arrested and 2 suspects at large – CBS News |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/record-cocaine-haul-banana-shipment-spain/ |access-date=2024-12-22 |publisher=CBS News |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Smith |first=Stephen |date=2024-02-23 |title=U.K. police find $568 million of cocaine hidden in bananas, shattering drug-seizure record – CBS News |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/568-million-cocaine-hidden-bananas-record-drug-seizure-uk-southampton/ |access-date=2024-12-22 |publisher=CBS News |language=en-US}}</ref> Criminal groups use legitimate fruit businesses as fronts for their narcotics operations, making fruit cargo a common method for concealing drugs.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Decoding the EU's most threatening criminal networks |date=2024 |publisher=Publications Office of the European Union |isbn=978-92-95236-25-7 |editor-last=Europol |location=Luxembourg}}</ref> Trafficking in wildlife parts, such as ivory, frequently involves altering the appearance of the goods. For instance, ivory has been known to be cut into the shape of chocolate bars or painted the colour of wood to avoid detection during X-ray inspections.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Rodway |first=Alexander |date=2024-10-30 |title=How giant rodents could rat on wildlife traffickers |url=https://edition.cnn.com/science/giant-african-rat-wildlife-traffickers-spc/index.html |access-date=2024-12-22 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref> Additionally, containers can be physically modified to hide illegal parcels, such as through the use of fake walls, secret compartments, hollowed-out rails, support beams and doors.<ref name=":1" />

The lack of capacity at ports to inspect containers increases the likelihood of smuggled goods going undetected. In African ports, especially West Africa, where most drug routes converge, only about 2% of all containers are inspected.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Lucia |first=Bird |date=21 April 2021 |title=West Africa's Cocaine Corridor: Building a subregional response |url=https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/west-africas-cocaine-corridor/ |access-date=2024-12-22 |website=Global Initiative |language=en}}</ref> Similarly, European ports check just 2–10% of incoming containers, leaving the majority unscreened and creating opportunities for trafficking.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=Criminal Networks in EU Ports: Risks and challenges for Law Enforcement |url=https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/publications/criminal-networks-in-eu-ports-risks-and-challenges-for-law-enforcement |access-date=2024-12-22 |website=Europol |language=en}}</ref>

Nevertheless, there are a number of security measures in place, notably the [[Container Security Initiative]] (CSI), a post-9/11 US-led programme. This initiative aims to pre-screen high-risk cargo before it reaches US territory. One of its primary goals is to prevent the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last=Yang |first=Yi-Chih |date=2010 |title=Impact of the container security initiative on Taiwan's shipping industry |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/03088839.2010.524737 |journal=Maritime Policy & Management |volume=37 |issue=7 |pages=699–722 |doi=10.1080/03088839.2010.524737 |issn=0308-8839|url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Citation |last1=Zhang |first1=Xufan |title=Maritime Security Measures and the Container Security Initiative (CSI) |date=2019 |work=Maritime Container Port Security |pages=13–57 |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03825-0_2 |access-date=2024-12-22 |place=Cham |publisher=Springer International Publishing |isbn=978-3-030-03824-3 |last2=Roe |first2=Michael|doi=10.1007/978-3-030-03825-0_2 |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Although the programme was initiated by the United States, by 2007, some 20 countries had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the US, leading to the implementation of CSI measures at 58 ports around the world. The CSI system includes non-intrusive pre-screening methods, such as X-ray and radiation screening, for high-risk cargo destined for the United States. As a result, more than 80% of containerised cargo bound for the United States is pre-screened.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" />