Editing Democratic peace theory (section)

==Criticism==
There are several logically distinguishable classes of criticism.{{sfn|Pugh|2005}} They usually apply to no wars or few MIDs between democracies, not to little systematic violence in established democracies. In addition, there have been a number of [[List of wars between democracies|wars between democracies]]. The [[1987–1989 JVP insurrection]] in [[Sri Lanka]] is an example in which [[politicide]] was committed by a democratic regime, resulting in the deaths of at least 13,000 and 30,000 suspected JVP members or alleged supporters.{{sfn|Harff|2017|pp=117–118}}

===Statistical significance===
One study has argued that there have been as many wars between democracies as one would expect between any other couple of states. Its authors conclude that the argument for democratic peace "rests in an ambiguity", since empirical evidence not confirm neither deny democratic pacifism, and strongly relies upon what degree of democracy makes a government democratic; according to them "because perfect democracy is infeasible, one can always sidestep counter-evidence by raising the bar of democracy".{{sfn|Schwartz|Skinner|2002}}

Others state that, although there may be some evidence for democratic peace, the data sample or the time span may be too small to assess any definitive conclusions.{{sfn|Spiro|1994}}{{sfn|Gowa|1999}}{{sfn|Small|Singer|1976}} For example, Gowa finds evidence for democratic peace to be insignificant before 1939, because of the too small number of democracies, and offers an alternate [[#Realist explanations|realist explanation]] for the following period.{{sfn|Gowa|1999}} Gowa's use of statistics has been criticized, with several other studies and reviews finding different or opposing results.{{sfn|Gelpi|Griesdorf|2001}}{{sfn|Ray|2003}} However, this can be seen as the longest-lasting criticism to the theory; as noted earlier, also some supporters agree that the statistical sample for assessing its validity is limited or scarce, at least if only full-scale wars are considered.{{Citation needed|date=January 2023}}

According to one study, which uses a rather restrictive definition of democracy and war, there were no wars between jointly democratic couples of states in the period from 1816 to 1992. Assuming a purely random distribution of wars between states, regardless of their democratic character, the predicted number of conflicts between democracies would be around ten. So, Ray argues that the evidence is statistically significant, but that it is still conceivable that, in the future, even a small number of inter-democratic wars would cancel out such evidence.{{sfn|Ray|2003}}{{efn|The 1999 [[Kargil War]], subsequent to the period considered, does satisfy the objective requirements for democracy and war set in Ray's study.}}

===Peace comes before democracy===
{{Main|Territorial peace theory}}
The [[territorial peace theory]] argues that peace leads to democracy more than democracy leads to peace. This argument is supported by historical studies showing that peace almost always comes before democracy and that states do not develop democracy until all border disputes have been settled. These studies indicate that there is strong evidence that peace causes democracy but little evidence that democracy causes peace.{{sfn|Gibler|Owsiak|2017}}

The hypothesis that peace causes democracy is supported by psychological and cultural theories. [[Christian Welzel|Christian Welzel's]] [[Freedom Rising|human empowerment theory]] posits that existential security leads to emancipative cultural values and support for a democratic political organization.{{sfn|Welzel|2013}} This also follows from the so-called [[Theory of Regal and Kungic Societal Structures|regality theory]] based on [[evolutionary psychology]].

The [[territorial peace theory]] explains why countries in conflict with their neighbor countries are unlikely to develop democracy. The democratic peace theory is more relevant for peace between non-neighbor countries and for relations between countries that are already at peace with each other.{{sfn|Owsiak|2019}}

===Third factors causing both democracy and peace===
Several other theories argue that [[Omitted-variable bias|omitted variables]] explain both peace and democracy. 
Variables that may explain both democracy and peace include [[Institutional liberalism|institutions]], [[Capitalist peace|commerce]], [[Economic interdependence|interdependence]], [[alliance]]s, [[Pax Americana|US world dominance]] and [[political stability]].{{sfn|Reiter|2017}}{{sfn|Hobson|2017}}{{sfn|Rosato|2003}}{{sfn|Downes|Sechser|2012}}

These theories are further explained under [[Democratic peace theory#Other explanations|Other explanations]].

===Wars against non-democracies===
Critics of Democratic Peace theory note that liberal states often engage in conflicts with non-liberal states they deem "rogue," "failed," or "evil."<ref name=":05">{{Cite book |last=Meng |first=Wenting |title=Developmental Peace: Theorizing China's Approach to International Peacebuilding |date=2024 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=9783838219073 |series=Ibidem |pages=21}}</ref> Several studies fail to confirm that democracies are less likely to wage war than autocracies if wars against non-democracies are included.{{sfn|Cashman|2013|loc=Chapter 5}}

[[Edward Gibbon]] stressed that the principal conquests of the Romans were achieved under the republic; and the emperors, for the most part, were satisfied with preserving those dominions which had been acquired by the policy of the Senate, the active emulation of the consuls, and the martial enthusiasm of the people.<ref>Madden, Thomas F. (2008). ''Empires of Trust: How Rome Built—and America Is Building—a New World''. (Dutton Adult), p 197.</ref>

===Signalling===
The notion that democracies can [[Audience cost|signal intentions more credibly]] has been disputed.{{sfn|Downes|Sechser|2012}}

===Criticism of definitions, methodology and data===
Some authors criticize the definition of democracy by arguing that states continually reinterpret other states' regime types as a consequence of their own objective interests and motives, such as economic and security concerns.{{sfn|Rosato|2003}} For example, one study reports that Germany was considered a democratic state by Western opinion leaders at the end of the 19th century; yet in the years preceding World War I, when its relations with the United States, France and Britain started deteriorating, Germany was gradually reinterpreted as an autocratic state, in absence of any actual regime change.{{sfn|Oren|1995}}{{sfn|Joas|Knöbl|2013|p=226}} Shimmin moves a similar criticism regarding the western perception of Milosevic's Serbia between 1989 and 1999.{{sfn|Shimmin|1999}} Rummel replies to this criticism by stating that, in general, studies on democratic peace do not focus on other countries' perceptions of democracy; and in the specific case of Serbia, by arguing that the limited credit accorded by western democracies to Milosevic in the early 1990s did not amount to a recognition of democracy, but only to the perception that possible alternative leaders could be even worse.{{sfn|Rummel|1999}}

Some democratic peace researchers have been criticized for ''post hoc'' reclassifying some specific conflicts as non-wars or political systems as non-democracies without checking and correcting the whole data set used similarly. Supporters and opponents of the democratic peace agree that this is bad use of statistics, even if a plausible case can be made for the correction.{{sfn|Bremer|1992}}{{sfn|Gleditsch|1995}}{{sfn|Gowa|1999}} A military affairs columnist of the newspaper ''Asia Times'' has summarized the above criticism in a journalist's fashion describing the theory as subject to the [[no true Scotsman]] problem: exceptions are explained away as not being between "real" democracies or "real" wars.{{sfn|''Asia Times''|2006}}

Some democratic peace researchers require that the executive result from a substantively contested election. This may be a restrictive definition: For example, the National Archives of the United States notes that "For all intents and purposes, [[George Washington]] was unopposed for election as President, both in 1789 and 1792". (Under the original provisions for the [[United States Electoral College|Electoral College]], there was no distinction between votes for president and Vice-president: each elector was required to vote for two distinct candidates, with the runner-up to be vice-president. Every elector cast one of his votes for Washington,{{sfn|National Archives and Records Administration|n.d.}} John Adams received a majority of the other votes; there were several other candidates: so the election for vice president was contested.)

Spiro made several other criticisms of the statistical methods used.{{sfn|Spiro|1994}} Russett and a series of papers described by Ray responded to this, for example with different methodology.{{sfn|Russett|Layne|Spiro|Doyle|1995}}{{sfn|Ray|2003}}

Sometimes the datasets used have also been criticized. For example, some authors have criticized the Correlates of War data for not including civilian deaths in the battle deaths count, especially in civil wars.{{Citation needed|date=January 2023}} Cohen and Weeks argue that most fishing disputes, which include no deaths and generally very limited threats of violence, should be excluded even from the list of military disputes.{{sfn|Cohen|Weeks|2006}} Gleditsch made several criticisms to the Correlates of War data set, and produced a revised set of data.{{sfn|Gleditsch|Christiansen|Hegre|2004}} Maoz and Russett made several criticisms to the Polity I and II data sets, which have mostly been addressed in later versions.{{sfn|Maoz|Russett|1993}}

The most comprehensive critique points out that "democracy" is rarely defined, never refers to substantive democracy, is unclear about causation, has been refuted in more than 100 studies, fails to account for some 200 deviant cases, and has been promoted ideologically to justify one country seeking to expand democracy abroad.{{sfn|Haas|2014}} Most studies treat the complex concept of "democracy" as a bivariate variable rather than attempting to dimensionalize the concept. Studies also fail to take into account the fact that there are dozens of types of democracy, so the results are meaningless unless articulated to a particular type of democracy or claimed to be true for all types, such as consociational or economic democracy, with disparate datasets.

===Microfoundations===
Recent work into the democratic norms explanations shows that the microfoundations on which this explanation rest do not find empirical support. Within most earlier studies, the presence of liberal norms in democratic societies and their subsequent influence on the willingness to wage war was merely assumed, never measured. Moreover, it was never investigated whether or not these norms are absent within other regime-types. Two recent studies measured the presence of liberal norms and investigated the assumed effect of these norms on the willingness to wage war. The results of both studies show that liberal democratic norms are not only present within liberal democracies, but also within other regime-types. Moreover, these norms are not of influence on the willingness to attack another state during an interstate conflict at the brink of war.{{sfn|Bakker|2017}}{{sfn|Bakker|2018}}

Sebastian Rosato argues that democratic peace theory makes several false assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that democratic populaces will react negatively to the costs of war upon them. However, in modern wars casualties tend to be fairly low and soldiers are largely volunteers, meaning they accept the risks of fighting, so their families and friends, whom the cost of their death falls on heaviest, are less likely to criticise the government than the families and friends of conscripted soldiers. Secondly, democratic peace theory ignores the role of nationalism; democratic populaces are just as likely to be influenced by nationalist sentiment as anyone else and if a democratic populace believes that a war is necessary for their nation, the populace will support it. Lastly, democratic leaders are as likely to guide public opinion as they are to follow it. Democratic leaders are often aware of the power of nationalist sentiment and thus seek to encourage it when it comes to war, arguing that war is necessary to defend or spread the nation's way of life. Democratic leaders may even have an advatange over authoritarians in this regard, as they can be seen as more legitimately representative. Rosato argues that this does not just apply to wars of defence but also aggression; democratic populaces can be roused by nationalist feelings to support aggressive wars if they are seen as in the national interest.{{sfn|Rosato|2003}}

Rosato also argues that authoritarian leaders have a reduced incentive to go to war because civilian control over the military is less guaranteed in autocracies; there is always the risk the military could subvert civilian leadership and a war which results in defeat could swiftly result in a coup. Even military dictators run the risk of internal dissent within the armed forces. Autocratic leaders in general also risk unleashing political and social turmoil that could destroy them if they go to war. Conversely, bellicose democratic leaders can rely on the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the democratic process, as pacifist actors in democracies will need to respect the legitimacy of a democratically elected government. If pro-war groups can capture the organs of the state in a democracy legitimately, then anti-war groups will have little means of opposing them outside of extra-constitutional means, which would likely backfire and cause the anti-war groups to lose legitimacy.{{sfn|Rosato|2003}}

A 2017 study found that public opinion in China showed the same reluctance in going to war as publics in democratic states, which suggests that publics in democratic states are not generally more opposed to war than publics in authoritarian states.{{sfn|Bell|Quek|2017}}

===Limited consequences===
The peacefulness may have various limitations and qualifiers and may not actually mean very much in the real world.

Democratic peace researchers do in general not count as wars conflicts which do not kill a thousand on the battlefield; thus they exclude for example the bloodless [[Cod Wars]]. However, research has also found a peacefulness between democracies when looking at lesser conflicts.

Liberal democracies have less of these wars than other states after 1945. This might be related to changes in the perception of non-European peoples, as embodied in the [[Universal Declaration of Human Rights]].{{sfn|Ravlo|Gleditsch|2000}}

Related to this is the human rights violations committed against [[Indigenous peoples|native people]], sometimes by liberal democracies. One response is that many of the worst crimes were committed by non-democracies, like in the European colonies before the nineteenth century, in King [[Leopold II of Belgium]]'s privately owned [[Congo Free State]], and in [[Joseph Stalin]]'s [[Soviet Union]]. The United Kingdom abolished slavery in British territory in 1833, immediately after the [[Reform Act 1832]] had significantly enlarged the franchise. (Of course, the abolition of the slave trade had been enacted in 1807; and many DPT supporters would deny that the UK was a liberal democracy in 1833 when examining interstate wars.)

Hermann and Kegley Jr. argue that interventions between democracies are more likely to happen than projected by an expected model.{{sfn|Hermann|Kegley, Jr.|1995}} They further argue that democracies are more likely to intervene in other liberal states than against countries that are non-democracies.{{sfn|Hermann|Kegley, Jr.|1996}} Finally, they argue that these interventions between democracies have been increasing over time and that the world can expect more of these interventions in the future.{{sfn|Hermann|Kegley, Jr.|1995}}{{sfn|Hermann|Kegley, Jr.|1996}}{{sfn|Hermann|Kegley, Jr.1997}} The methodology used has been criticized and more recent studies have found opposing results.{{sfn|Gleditsch|Christiansen|Hegre|2004}}

Rummel argues that the continuing increase in democracy worldwide will soon lead to an end to wars and [[democide]], possibly around or even before the middle of this century.{{sfn|Democratic Peace Clock|n.d.}} The fall of [[Communism]] and the increase in the number of democratic states were accompanied by a sudden and dramatic decline in total warfare, interstate wars, [[ethnic]] wars, [[revolutionary]] wars, and the number of [[refugees]] and [[displaced person]]s.{{sfn|Center for Systemic Peace|2006}} One report claims that the two main causes of this decline in warfare are the end of the Cold War itself and [[decolonization]]; but also claims that the three Kantian factors have contributed materially.{{sfn|''Human Security Report 2005''}}

===Historical periods===
Economic historians Joel Mokyr and Hans-Joachim Voth argue that democratic states may have been more vulnerable to conquest because the rulers in those states were too heavily constrained. Absolutist rulers in other states could, however, operate more freely.{{sfn|Mokyr|Voth|2010|pp=25–26}}

===Covert operations and proxy wars===
Critics of the democratic peace theory have pointed to covert operations and military interventions between democracies, and argued that these interventions indicate that democracies do not necessarily trust and respect each other.{{sfn|Rosato|2003}} Alexander B. Downes and Lary Lauren Lilley argue that covert operations conducted by democratic states has different implications depending on which version of democratic peace theory one adheres to. They argue that covert operations are inconsistent with variants of democratic peace theory that emphasize norms and checks-and-balances, but that covert operations may be more consistent with versions of democratic peace theory that rely on [[selectorate theory]]'s notion of large versus small winning coalitions.{{sfn|Downes|Lilley|2010}}

A 2015 study by Michael Poznansky reconciles findings that democracies engage in covert interventions against one another by arguing that democracies do so when they expect another state's democratic character to break down or decay.{{sfn|Poznansky|2015}}

A 2022 study found that democracies rarely wage proxy wars against fellow democracies: "strong democratic institutions prevent elected leaders from engaging in proxy war against sister regimes, and embargo violations tend to occur when democratic institutions are weak."{{sfn|Grauer|Tierney|2022}}

===Information manipulation===
Chaim Kaufmann argues that the lead-up to the Iraq War demonstrates that constraints on war in democracies may hinge on whether democratic governments can control and manipulate information, and suppress intelligence findings that run counter to administration rhetoric, as well as whether there is a strong opposition party and powerful media.{{sfn|Kaufmann|2004}}

===Coup by provoking a war===
Many democracies become non-democratic by war, as being aggressed or as aggressor (quickly after a coup), sometimes the coup leader worked to provoke that war.

[[Carl Schmitt]] wrote on how to overrule a Constitution: "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception."{{sfn|Schmitt|1985 [1922]|loc=Chapter 1}} Schmitt, again on the need for internal (and foreign) enemies because they are useful to persuade the people not to trust anyone more than the Leader: "As long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy. Every state provides, therefore, some kind of formula for the declaration of an internal enemy." Whatever opposition will be pictured and intended as the actual foreign enemy's puppet.{{sfn|Schmitt|2008 [1927]|p=46}}