Editing Deterrence theory (section)

===Stages of US policy of deterrence===
The US policy of deterrence during the [[Cold War]] underwent significant variations.

==== Containment ====
The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by the [[containment]] of communism, an aggressive stance on behalf of the US especially on [[developing nations]] under its [[sphere of influence]]. The period was characterized by numerous [[proxy wars]] throughout most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. One notable conflict was the [[Korean War]]. [[George F. Kennan]], who is taken to be the founder of this policy in his [[Long Telegram]], asserted that he never advocated military intervention, merely economic support, and that his ideas were misinterpreted as espoused by the general public.

==== Détente ====
With the [[Vietnam War#U.S. exit and final campaigns, 1973–1975|US drawdown]] from Vietnam, the normalization of US relations with China, and the [[Sino-Soviet Split]], the policy of containment was abandoned and a new policy of [[détente]] was established, with peaceful co-existence was sought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although all of those factors contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of [[mutual assured destruction]] (MAD). Therefore, the period of détente was characterized by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, which lasted from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. The doctrine of mutual nuclear deterrence then characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and relations with Russia until the onset of the [[Cold War II#Russo-Western tensions|New Cold War]] in the early 2010s. Since then, relations have been less clear.

==== Reagan era ====
A third shift occurred with US President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s arms build-up during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify the policy by concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the post-1979 [[Iranian Revolution|revolutionary]] government of [[Iran]]. Similar to the old policy of containment, the US funded several proxy wars, including support for [[Saddam Hussein]] of [[Iraq]] during the [[Iran–Iraq War]],<ref>{{Cite web |date=2013-05-22 |title=Lessons from America’s First War with Iran |url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/lessons-from-americas-first-war-with-iran/ |access-date=2025-04-21 |website=Brookings |language=en-US}}</ref> support for the [[mujahideen]] in [[Afghanistan]], who were fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, and several anticommunist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow of the [[Sandinista]] government in [[Nicaragua]]. The funding of the [[Contras]] in Nicaragua led to the [[Iran-Contra Affair]], while overt support led to a ruling from the [[International Court of Justice]] against the United States in ''[[Nicaragua v. United States]]''.

The final expression of the full impact of deterrence during the cold war can be seen in the agreement between Reagan and [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] in 1985. They "agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.".

While the army was dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took on a broader multinational dimension. The US policy on deterrence after the Cold War was outlined in 1995 in the document called "[[Essentials of Post–Cold War Deterrence]]".<ref name="Nautilus">
{{Cite web
 |url         = http://www.nautilus.org/archives/nukestrat/USA/Advisory/essentials95.html
 |title       = The Nautilus Institute Nuclear Strategy Project: US FOIA Documents
 |url-status     = dead
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20081208035653/http://www.nautilus.org/archives/nukestrat/USA/Advisory/essentials95.html
 |archive-date = December 8, 2008
}}</ref> It explains that while relations with Russia continue to follow the traditional characteristics of MAD, but the US policy of deterrence towards nations with minor nuclear capabilities should ensure by threats of immense retaliation (or even [[pre-emptive war|pre-emptive action]]) not to threaten the United States, its interests, or allies. The document explains that such threats must also be used to ensure that nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining [[chemical]] or [[biological weapons]]. The current tensions with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs are caused partly by the continuation of the policy of deterrence.