Editing First day on the Somme (section)

===Plan===

British planning for the offensive had begun in April, with a Fourth Army proposal for a methodical advance to the high ground around Thiepval and thence to the Bapaume–Péronne road. Haig had exhaustive negotiations with Joffre and rejected the concept in favour of the capture of the ridge north of Péronne to assist a French crossing of the Somme further south. Diversion of French divisions to Verdun and the assumption by the British of the main role in the offensive, led to revisions of the plan towards an ambitious attempt at strategic attrition, through a breakthrough and a battle of manoeuvre with distant objectives.{{sfn|Philpott|2009|pp=118–130}} The French Sixth Army, in ''GAN'', was the last of the three French armies originally intended for the Somme, the [[Tenth Army (France)|Tenth Army]] and [[Second Army (France)|Second Army]] having been sent to Verdun. Joffre placed [[French XX Corps|XX Corps]] north of the river, next to the British [[XIII Corps (United Kingdom)|XIII Corps]], the southernmost Fourth Army formation.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|p=264}} British plans were made by a process of negotiation between Haig and General [[Henry Rawlinson, 1st Baron Rawlinson|Henry Rawlinson]], the Fourth Army commander. Haig became more optimistic at what could be achieved early in an offensive, given the examples of [[Gorlice–Tarnów Offensive|Gorlice-Tarnów]] in 1915 and at Verdun early in 1916.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=260–261}} Rawlinson favoured a methodical attack from the beginning of the offensive, in which belts of the German defences about {{cvt|2000|yd}} deep, would be pulverised by artillery and then occupied by infantry. An attempt to reach deeper objectives towards the German second position, risked infantry being counter-attacked beyond the cover of field artillery but had the advantage of exploiting a period when German artillery was being withdrawn.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=255–256}}{{efn|Gary Sheffield criticised Rawlinson for pessimism over Haig's idea of a mixed force of infantry, cavalry and artillery, which Sheffield called a "bold and imaginative" response to the failures of 1915, justified by precedent and foreshadowing later forms of mobile warfare.{{sfn|Sheffield|2011|p=167}}}}

[[File:British plan Somme 1 July 1916.png|thumb|{{centre|Anglo-French objectives, north bank of the Somme, 1 July 1916}}]]
On 16 April, Rawlinson announced the objectives to the corps commanders, in which [[III Corps (United Kingdom)|III]], [[X Corps (United Kingdom)|X]] and [[VIII Corps (United Kingdom)|VIII corps]] would capture [[Pozières]], Grandcourt and [[Serre-lès-Puisieux|Serre]] on the first day and XIII and [[XV Corps (United Kingdom)|XV corps]] would have objectives to be agreed later. On 19 April, Rawlinson wrote that an attempt to reach the German second line on the first day was doubtful, an extension of the attack in the south on [[Montauban-de-Picardie|Montauban]] required another division and the inclusion of Gommecourt to the north, was beyond the resources of the Fourth Army. Rawlinson also wrote that long bombardment was dependent on the French, the availability of ammunition and the endurance of gun-crews; the exploitation of a successful attack would need a substantial number of fresh divisions.{{sfn|Edmonds|1993|pp=255–258}}

The process of discussion and negotiation also took place between Rawlinson and the corps commanders and between corps and divisional commanders. For the first time daily objectives were set, rather than an unlimited advance and discretion was granted in the means to achieve them. When the frontage of attack had been decided, corps headquarters settled the details and arranged the building of the infrastructure of attack: dugouts, magazines, observation posts, telephone lines, roads, light railways, tramways and liaison with neighbouring corps and the RFC. For the first time, the army headquarters co-ordinated the artillery arrangements with an Army Artillery Operation Order, in which tasks and timetable were laid down and corps artillery officers left to decide the means to achieve them.{{sfn|Simpson|2001|p=52}}{{efn|Andrew Simpson disagreed with Tim Travers' claim in ''The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and The Emergence of Modern War 1900–1918'' (1987) that discussion was unwelcome in the BEF, after a comparison of five of the corps involved in the attack of 1 July, which demonstrated "a consistent pattern of consultation between the army commanders and their subordinates at corps and between the latter and their divisional commanders. Objectives would be agreed between army and corps, resources allocated and divisions expected to come up with the actual plans of attack".{{sfn|Simpson|2001|p=80}}}}

On 16 June, Haig discussed the Anglo-French intentions for the campaign, which were to relieve pressure on the French at Verdun, assist Italy and Russia by preventing the transfer of divisions from the Western Front and to inflict losses on the {{lang|de|Westheer}} (German army in the west), through the capture of Pozières Ridge from Montauban to the Ancre, the area from the Ancre to Serre to protect the flank, then exploit the position gained according to circumstances. If German resistance collapsed, an advance east would be pressed far enough to pass through the German defences and the attack would turn north, to envelop the German defences as far as Monchy le Preux near Arras, with cavalry on the outer flank to defend against a counter-attack. Should a continuation of the advance beyond the first objective not be possible, the main effort could be transferred elsewhere, while the Fourth Army continued to mount local attacks.{{sfn|Edmonds|Wynne|2010|pp=84–85}}

On 28 June, the Fourth Army headquarters instructed that if the Germans collapsed, the closest infantry would exploit without waiting for cavalry; the [[19th (Western) Division|19th (Western)]] and [[49th (West Riding) Infantry Division|49th (West Riding)]] divisions (in local reserve) would be committed along the Albert–Bapaume road and parallel to it to the north. The cavalry, which had assembled {{cvt|5|mi}} west of Albert, was not to move until roads had been cleared for their advance.{{sfn|Edmonds|Wynne|2010|pp=150–151}} Haig had formulated a plan in which success of any magnitude could be exploited but Rawlinson had a much more modest intention of small advances onto high ground and pauses to consolidate, to repulse German counter-attacks, which led to an "unhappy compromise".{{sfn|Sheffield|2011|p=167}}