Editing Great Leap Forward (section)

===Long-term impact===

The long-term impact of the Great Leap Forward extended beyond immediate famine and loss of life. The policies and their disastrous outcomes led to significant changes in Chinese society and governance. In rural areas, the effects on education and women's labor roles were profound. The collapse of agricultural production systems and the communal structure led to a reevaluation of economic strategies in subsequent decades. Rural education suffered due to the upheaval, and while women were initially mobilized into the workforce, the ensuing chaos often negated these advances. Dali Yang explains, "The Great Leap Forward's failure necessitated significant policy shifts, leading to a more pragmatic approach in China's economic reforms."{{sfnp|Yang|1996|pp=150-170}}

<gallery class="center" widths="250px" heights="250px">
File:Global famines history.jpg|Global famines history
File:Total number of deaths by age globally for both sexes combined 1950–2017.png|The Great Leap Forward produced a significant spike in the global number of deaths (1950–2017)<ref name="Dicker2018">{{Cite journal |last=Dicker |first=Daniel |year=2018 |title=Global, regional, and national age-sex-specific mortality and life expectancy, 1950–2017: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017 |journal=The Lancet |volume=392 |issue=10159 |pages=1684–1735 |doi=10.1016/S0140-6736(18)31891-9 |pmc=6227504 |pmid=30496102}}</ref>
</gallery>

==== Methods of estimating the death toll and methods of identifying the sources of the error ====
{| class="wikitable sortable" style="float: right; margin:10px; border:1"
|+ Estimates of Great Chinese Famine death toll
|-
! scope="col" | Deaths<br>(millions)
! scope="col" | Author(s)
! scope="col" | Year
|-
|15
|Houser, Sands, and Xiao{{sfnp|Houser |Sands |Xiao |2009}}{{efn|This estimate concludes that the excess death count by manmade causes numbers some 10.3 million, 69% of the total estimated deaths.}}
|2005
|-
|18
|Yao<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Yao |first=Shujie |year=1999 |title=A Note on the Causal Factors of China's Famine in 1959–1961 |journal=Journal of Political Economy |volume=107 |issue=6 |pages=1365–1369 |doi=10.1086/250100 }}</ref>
|1999
|-
| 23 || Peng{{sfnp|Peng|1987|pp=648–649}} || 1987
|-
| 27 || Coale{{sfnp|Coale|1984|p=7}}{{efn|Coale estimates 27 million deaths: 16 million from direct interpretation of official Chinese vital statistics followed by an adjustment to 27 million to account for under-counting.}} || 1984
|-
| 30 || Ashton, et al.<ref name="Ashton1984">{{harvp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|p=614}}. "Demographic evidence indicates that famine during 1958–61 caused almost 30 million premature deaths in China and reduced fertility very significantly. Data on food availability suggest that, in contrast to many other famines, a root cause of this one was a dramatic decline in grain output that continued for several years, involving a drop in output of more than 25 percent in 1960–61. Causes of this drop are found in both natural disaster and government policy."</ref>|| 1984
|-
| 30 || Banister{{sfnp|Banister|1987|pp=85, 118}} || 1987
|-
| 30 || Becker{{sfnp|Becker|1998|pp=270, 274}} || 1996
|-
| 32.5 || Cao<ref>{{harvp|Dikötter|2010|pp=324–325}}. Dikötter cites {{Cite book |last=Cao |first=Shuji |title=Da Jihuang (1959–1961): nian de Zhongguo renkou |publisher=Shidai guoji chuban youxian gongsi |year=2005 |location=Hong Kong |page=281 |language=zh |trans-title=The Great Famine: China's Population in 1959–1961}}</ref> || 2005
|-
| 36 || Yang{{sfnp|Yang|2012k|p=430}} || 2008
|-
| 38 || Chang and Halliday{{sfnp|Chang|Halliday|2005|p={{page needed|date=June 2024}}}}{{efn|[[Stuart Schram]] believes their estimate "may well be the most accurate".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Schram |first=Stuart |author-link=Stuart Schram |title=Mao: The Unknown Story |journal=The China Quarterly |issue=189 |page=207}}</ref>}} || 2005
|-
| 38 || Rummel<ref>{{Cite web |last=Rummel |first=R. J. |date=10 October 2005 |title=Reevaluating China's Democide to 73,000,000 |url=http://democraticpeace.wordpress.com/2008/11/24/reevaluating-chinas-democide-to-73000000/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180630190029/https://democraticpeace.wordpress.com/2008/11/24/reevaluating-chinas-democide-to-73000000/ |archive-date=30 June 2018 |access-date=12 February 2013 |website=Democratic Peace |type=blog}}</ref> || 2008
|-
| 45 minimum || Dikötter<ref name="Dikötter2010 p. xii">{{harvp|Dikötter|2010|pp=xii–xiii, 333|loc="at least 45 million people died unnecessarily"; "6 to 8 percent of the victims were tortured to death or summarily killed—amounting to at least 2.5 million people"; "a minimum of 45 million excess deaths"}}.</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=O'Neill |first=Mark |date=5 September 2010 |title=45 million died in Mao's Great Leap Forward, Hong Kong historian says in new book |url=http://www.scmp.com/article/723956/revisiting-calamitous-time |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161023142821/http://www.scmp.com/article/723956/revisiting-calamitous-time |archive-date=23 October 2016 |access-date=2 December 2016 |website=South China Morning Post |quote=At least 45 million people died unnecessary deaths during China's Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1962, including 2.5 million tortured or summarily killed, according to a new book by a Hong Kong scholar. Mao's Great Famine traces the story of how Mao Zedong's drive for absurd targets for farm and industrial production and the reluctance of anyone to challenge him created the conditions for the countryside to be emptied of grain and millions of farmers left to starve.}}</ref>|| 2010
|-
|43 to 46 || Chen<ref>{{harvp|Becker|1996|pp=271–272}}. From an interview with Chen Yizi.</ref> || 1980
|-
|55 || Yu Xiguang<ref name="Grangereau2011" /><ref>{{Cite book |last=Yu |first=Xiguang |title=Da Yuejin Kurezi |publisher=Shidai chaoliu chubanshe |year=2005 |location=Hong Kong |language=zh}}{{page needed|date=June 2024}}</ref> || 2005
|}
Some outlier estimates include 11 million by [[Utsa Patnaik]], an Indian Marxist economist,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Patnaik |first=Utsa |date=9 November 2018 |title=Ideological Statistics: Inflated Death Rates of China's Famine, the Russian one Ignored |url=http://www.socialisteconomist.com/2018/11/ideological-statistics-inflated-death.html |website=Socialist Economist |access-date=11 December 2021 |archive-date=26 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221226175450/http://www.socialisteconomist.com/2018/11/ideological-statistics-inflated-death.html |url-status=live }}</ref> 3.66 million by Chinese mathematician Sun Jingxian ({{zhi|c=孙经先}})<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sun |first=Jingxian |date=April 2016 |title=Population Change during China's 'Three Years of Hardship' (1959 to 1961) |url=https://rpb115.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2375/CCPS2(1)-Sun.pdf |journal=Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations |volume=2 |issue=1 |pages=453–500 |archive-date=9 December 2021 |access-date=11 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211209003958/https://rpb115.nsysu.edu.tw/var/file/131/1131/img/2375/CCPS2%281%29-Sun.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> and 2.6–4 million by Chinese historian and political economist Yang Songlin ({{zhi|c=杨松林}}).<ref>{{Cite book |last=Yang |first=Songlin |title=Telling the Truth: China's Great Leap Forward, Household Registration and the Famine Death Tally |publisher=Springer |year=2021 |isbn=978-981-16-1660-0 |location=Singapore |doi=10.1007/978-981-16-1661-7 }}{{page needed|date=June 2024}}</ref>

The number of famine deaths during the Great Leap Forward has been estimated with different methods. Banister, Coale, and Ashton et al. compare age cohorts from the 1953, 1964, and 1982 censuses, yearly birth and death records, and results of the 1982 1:1000 fertility survey. From these they calculate excess deaths above a death rate interpolated between pre- and post-Leap death rates. All involve corrections for perceived errors inherent in the different data sets.{{sfnp|Banister|1987|pp=118–120}}{{sfnp|Coale|1984|pp=1, 7}}{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|pp=613, 616–619}} Peng uses reported deaths from the vital statistics of 14 provinces, adjusts 10% for under reporting, and expands the result to cover all of China assuming similar mortality rates in the other provinces. He uses 1956/57 death rates as the baseline death rate rather than an interpolation between pre- and post-GLF death rates.{{sfnp|Peng|1987|pp=645, 648–649}}{{efn|Peng used the pre-Leap death rate as a base line under the assumption that the decrease after the Great Leap to below pre-Leap levels was caused by Darwinian selection during the massive deaths of the famine. He writes that if this drop was instead a continuation of the decreasing mortality in the years prior to the Great Leap, his estimate would be an underestimate.}}

Houser, Sands, and Xiao in their 2005 research study using "provincial-level demographic panel data and a Bayesian empirical approach in an effort to distinguish the relative importance of weather and national policy on China's great demographic disaster" conclude that "in aggregate, from 1959 to 1961 China suffered about 14.8 million excess deaths. Of those, about 69% (or 10.3 million) seem attributable to effects stemming from national policies."{{sfnp|Houser|Sands|Xiao|2009|p=156}}

Cao uses information from "local annals" to determine for each locality the expected population increase from normal births and deaths, the population increase due to migration, and the loss of population between 1958 and 1961. He then adds the three figures to determine the number of excess deaths during the period 1959–1961.{{sfnp|Yang|2012k|p=427}} Chang and Halliday use death rates determined by "Chinese demographers" for the years 1957–1963, subtract the average of the pre-and post-Leap death rates (1957, 1962, and 1963) from the death rates of each of the years 1958–1961, and multiply each yearly excess death rate by the year's population to determine excess deaths.{{sfnp|Chang|Halliday|2005|p=438}}

[[Chen Yizi]], a top adviser to [[CCP General Secretary]] [[Zhao Ziyang]] and former head of the Institute for Economic Structural Reform,<ref>{{Cite news |date=2014-04-25 |title=Chen Yizi, a Top Adviser Forced to Flee China, Dies at 73 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/world/asia/chen-yizi-a-top-adviser-forced-to-flee-china-dies-at-73.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241202235611/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/26/world/asia/chen-yizi-a-top-adviser-forced-to-flee-china-dies-at-73.html |archive-date=2 December 2024 |access-date= |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en }}</ref> concluded 43 million died in the famine after conducting a county-by-county review of deaths in five provinces and performing extrapolation.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Strauss |first1=Valerie |last2=Southerl |first2=Daniel |date=July 17, 1994 |title=HOW MANY DIED? NEW EVIDENCE SUGGESTS FAR HIGHER NUMBERS FOR THE VICTIMS OF MAO ZEDONG'S ERA |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190925173059/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/07/17/how-many-died-new-evidence-suggests-far-higher-numbers-for-the-victims-of-mao-zedongs-era/01044df5-03dd-49f4-a453-a033c5287bce/ |archive-date=2019-09-25 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref> Chen was part of a large investigation group led by the Institute for Economic Structural Reform which "visited every province and examined internal Party documents and records".{{sfnp|Becker|1996|pp=271–272}}

Becker, Rummel, [[Frank Dikötter|Dikötter]], and Yang each compare several earlier estimates. Becker considers Banister's estimate of 30 million excess deaths to be "the most reliable estimate we have".{{sfnp|Becker|1998|pp=270, 274}} Rummel initially took Coale's 27 million as a "most likely figure",{{sfnp|Rummel|1991|p=248}} then accepted the later estimate of 38 million by Chang and Halliday after it was published.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Rummel |first=Rudy J. |year=2005 |editor-last=Ciolek |editor-first=T. Matthew |title=Reevaluated democide totals for 20th C. and China |url=http://www.ciolek.com/spec/rummel-on-democide-2005.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140827070539/http://www.ciolek.com/SPEC/rummel-on-democide-2005.html |archive-date=27 August 2014 |access-date=22 October 2016 |via=Asia Pacific Research Online}}</ref> Dikötter judged Chen's estimate of 43 to 46 million to be "in all likelihood a reliable estimate".{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|p=333}} He also claimed that at least 2.5 million of these deaths were caused by beatings, tortures, or summary executions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bianco |first=Lucien |date=30 July 2011 |title=Frank Dikötter, Mao's Great Famine, ''The History of China's most devastating catastrophe, 1958–62'' |journal=China Perspectives |volume=2011 |issue=2 |pages=74–75 |doi=10.4000/chinaperspectives.5585 |doi-access=free}}</ref> On the other hand, Daniel Vukovich asserts that this claim is coming from a problematic and unverified reference, because Chen simply threw that number as an "estimate" during an interview and because Chen hasn't published any scholarly work on the subject.{{sfnp|Vukovich|2013|p=70}} Yang takes Cao's, Wang Weizhi's, and Jin Hui's estimates ranging from 32.5 to 35 million excess deaths for the period 1959–1961, adds his own estimates for 1958 (0.42 million) and 1962 (2.23 million) "based on official figures reported by the provinces" to get 35 to 37 million, and chooses 36 million as a number that "approaches the reality but is still too low".{{sfnp|Yang|2012k|p=430}}

Estimates contain several sources of error. National census data was not accurate and even the total population of China at the time was not known to within 50 to 100 million people.{{sfnp|Rummel|1991|p=235}} The statistical reporting system had been taken over by party cadre from statisticians in 1957,{{sfnp|Banister|1987|p=13}} making political considerations more important than accuracy and resulting in a complete breakdown in the statistical reporting system.{{sfnp|Banister|1987|p=13}}{{sfnp|Peng|1987|p=656}}{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|p=630}}{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|p=132}}{{sfnp|Becker|1996|p=267}} Population figures were routinely inflated at the local level, often in order to obtain increased rations of goods.{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|p=333}} During the Cultural Revolution, a great deal of the material in the State Statistical Bureau was burned.{{sfnp|Banister|1987|p=13}}

According to [[Jasper Becker]], under-reporting of deaths was also a problem. The death registration system, which was inadequate before the famine,{{sfnp|Banister|1987|p=85}} was completely overwhelmed by the large number of deaths during the famine.{{sfnp|Banister|1987|p=85}}{{sfnp|Becker|1996|pp=268–269}}{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|p=327}} In addition, he claims that many deaths went unreported so that family members of the deceased could continue to draw the deceased's food ration and that counting the number of children who both were born and died between the 1953 and 1964 censuses is problematic.{{sfnp|Becker|1996|pp=268–269}} However, Ashton, et al. believe that because the reported number of births during the GLF seems accurate, the reported number of deaths should be accurate as well.{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|p=617}} Massive internal migration made both population counts and registering deaths problematic,{{sfnp|Becker|1996|pp=268–269}} though Yang believes the degree of unofficial internal migration was small{{sfnp|Yang|2012|p=430}} and Cao's estimate takes internal migration into account.{{sfnp|Yang|2012k|p=427}}

Coale's, Banister's, Ashton et al.'s, and Peng's figures all include adjustments for demographic reporting errors, though Dikötter, in his book ''[[Mao's Great Famine]]'', argues that their results, as well as Chang and Halliday's, Yang's, and Cao's, are still underestimates.{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|p=324. (Dikötter does not mention Coale on this page)}} The System Reform Institute's (Chen's) estimate has not been published and therefore it cannot be verified.{{sfnp|Yang|2012k|p=427}}

==== Causes of the famine and responsibility for it ====
The policies of the Great Leap Forward, the failure of the government to respond quickly and effectively to famine conditions, as well as Mao's insistence on maintaining high grain export quotas in the face of clear evidence of poor crop output were responsible for the famine. There is disagreement over how much, if at all, weather conditions contributed to the famine.

Significant amounts of agricultural labor had been transferred for steel production, resulting in a shortage of agricultural workers.<ref name="Marquis2022">{{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |author-link1=Christopher Marquis |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |date=15 November 2022 |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |page=147 |jstor=j.ctv3006z6k }}</ref> Approximately 10% of crops could not be harvested as a result.<ref name="Marquis2022" />

[[Yang Jisheng (journalist)|Yang Jisheng]], a former CCP member and former reporter for the official Chinese news agency ''[[Xinhua]]'', puts the blame squarely on [[Maoist]] policies and the political system of [[totalitarianism]],<ref name="Branigan2013" /> such as diverting agricultural workers to steel production instead of growing crops, and exporting grain at the same time.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yu |first=Verna |date=18 November 2008 |title=Chinese author of book on famine braves risks to inform new generations |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/world/asia/18iht-famine.1.18785257.html?pagewanted=all |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190226022150/https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/world/asia/18iht-famine.1.18785257.html?pagewanted=all |archive-date=26 February 2019 |work=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Applebaum |first=Anne |author-link=Anne Applebaum |date=12 August 2008 |title=When China Starved |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/11/AR2008081102015.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121107055147/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/11/AR2008081102015.html |archive-date=7 November 2012 |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]}}</ref> During the course of his research, Yang uncovered that some 22 million tons of grain was held in public granaries at the height of the famine, reports of starvation went up the bureaucracy only to be ignored by top officials, and the authorities ordered that statistics be destroyed in regions where population decline became evident.<ref>{{Cite magazine |last=Link |first=Perry |date=13 January 2011 |title=China: From Famine to Oslo |url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jan/13/china-famine-oslo/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151126192536/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jan/13/china-famine-oslo/ |archive-date=26 November 2015 |magazine=[[The New York Review of Books]]}}</ref> Using Henan as an example, Yang documents that inflated reports claimed production of 1200 jin per mu, while the actual production was closer to 600 jin per mu, resulting in excessive grain requisitions and local starvation, nearly 6% of the population passed away.{{sfnp|Yang|2012|p=38}} In the later book, Yang states, "36 million Chinese starved to death in the years between 1958 and 1962, while 40 million others failed to be born, which means that "China's total population loss during the Great Famine then comes to 76 million."<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mirsky |first=Jonathan |date=7 December 2012 |title=Unnatural Disaster |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/books/review/tombstone-the-great-chinese-famine-1958-1962-by-yang-jisheng.html |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220319191607/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/books/review/tombstone-the-great-chinese-famine-1958-1962-by-yang-jisheng.html |archive-date=19 March 2022 |access-date=12 May 2022 |work=The New York Times}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine 1958–1962, by Yang Jisheng, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2012, 629 pp. |url=https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&=&context=gsp&=&sei-redir=1&referer=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.bing.com%252Fsearch%253Fq%253Dtombstone%252Bby%252BYang%252BJisheng%2526FORM%253DAWRE#search=%22tombstone%20by%20Yang%20Jisheng%22 |access-date=12 May 2022 |archive-date=12 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220512192344/https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&=&context=gsp&=&sei-redir=1&referer=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.bing.com%252Fsearch%253Fq%253Dtombstone%252Bby%252BYang%252BJisheng%2526FORM%253DAWRE#search=%22tombstone%20by%20Yang%20Jisheng%22 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Economist [[Steven Rosefielde]] argues that Yang's account "shows that Mao's slaughter was caused in considerable part by terror-starvation; that is, voluntary manslaughter (and perhaps murder) rather than innocuous famine."<ref>[[Steven Rosefielde|Rosefielde, Steven]] (2009). ''Red Holocaust''. [[Routledge]]. p.&nbsp;114. {{ISBN|0-415-77757-7}}.</ref> Yang claims that local party officials were indifferent to the large number of people dying around them, as their primary concern was the delivery of grain, which Mao wanted to use to pay back debts to the USSR totaling 1.973&nbsp;billion [[Chinese yuan|yuan]]. In [[Xinyang]], people died of starvation at the doors of grain warehouses.<ref>O'Neill, Mark (2008). [http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328# A hunger for the truth: A new book, banned on the mainland, is becoming the definitive account of the Great Famine.] China Elections, 10 February 2012 {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120210190821/http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328 |date=10 February 2012 }}</ref> Mao refused to open the state granaries as he dismissed reports of food shortages and accused the "[[rightists]]" and the ''[[kulak]]s'' of conspiring to hide grain.{{sfnp|Becker|1998|p=86}}

From his research into records and talks with experts at the meteorological bureau, Yang concludes that the weather during the Great Leap Forward was not unusual compared to other periods and was not a factor.<ref name="Johnson2010">Johnson, Ian (2010). [http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/dec/20/finding-facts-about-maos-victims/ Finding the Facts About Mao's Victims] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151029002955/http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/dec/20/finding-facts-about-maos-victims/ |date=29 October 2015 }}. ''[[The New York Review of Books]]'' (Blog), 20 December 2010. Retrieved 4 September 2011. Johnson interviews Yang Jisheng. (Provincial and central archives).</ref> Yang also believes that the [[Sino-Soviet split]] was not a factor because it did not happen until 1960, when the famine was well under way.<ref name="Johnson2010" />

Mao's efforts to cool the Leap in late 1958 met resistance within the Party and when Mao proposed a scaling down of steel targets, "many people just wouldn't change and wouldn't accept it".<ref name="Joseph1986" /> Thus, according to historian Tao Kai, the Leap "wasn't the problem of a single person, but that many people had ideological problems". Tao also pointed out that "everyone was together" on the [[Anti-Rightist Campaign]] and only a minority didn't approve of the Great Leap's policies or put forth different opinions.<ref name="Joseph1986" /> The actions of the party under Mao in the face of widespread famine are reminiscent of Soviet policy nearly three decades earlier during the [[Soviet famine of 1932-33]]. At that time, the USSR exported grain for international propaganda purposes despite millions dying of starvation across southern areas of the Soviet Union.

Benjamin Valentino writes that like in the USSR during the [[Soviet famine of 1932–33|famine of 1932–33]], peasants were confined to their starving villages by a system of household registration,{{sfnp|Valentino|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LQfeXVU_EvgC&pg=PA127 127]}} and the worst effects of the famine were directed against enemies of the regime.{{sfnp|Valentino|2004|p=128}} Those labeled as "black elements" (religious leaders, rightists, rich peasants, etc.) in any previous campaign were given the lowest priority in the allocation of food, and therefore died in the greatest numbers.{{sfnp|Valentino|2004|p=128}} Drawing from Jasper Becker's book Hungry Ghosts, genocide scholar [[Adam Jones (Canadian scholar)|Adam Jones]] states that "no group suffered more than the Tibetans" from 1959 to 1962.<ref>[[Adam Jones (Canadian scholar)|Jones, Adam]] (2010). ''Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction''. [[Routledge]], 2nd edition (2010). p.&nbsp;96. {{ISBN|0-415-48619-X}}.</ref>

Ashton, et al. write that policies leading to food shortages, natural disasters, and a slow response to initial indications of food shortages were to blame for the famine. Policies leading to food shortages included the implementation of the commune system and an emphasis on non-agricultural activities such as backyard steel production.{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|pp=624–625}} Natural disasters included [[drought]], flood, typhoon, plant disease, and insect pest.{{sfnp|Ashton |Hill |Piazza |Zeitz|1984|p=629}} The slow response was in part due to a lack of objective reporting on the agricultural situation,{{sfnp|Ashton |Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|p=634}} including a "nearly complete breakdown in the agricultural reporting system".{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|p=630}}

This was partly caused by strong incentives for officials to over-report crop yields.{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|pp=613, 616–619}} According to Frank Dikötter, local officials frequently reported production figures 30-40% higher than the actual output to meet the central government's ambitious targets.{{sfnp|Dikötter|2010|p={{page needed|date=June 2024}}}} The unwillingness of the Central Government to seek international aid was a major factor; China's net grain exports in 1959 and 1960 would have been enough to feed 16 million people 2000 calories per day.{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|p=629}} Ashton, et al. conclude that "It would not be inaccurate to say that 30 million people died prematurely as a result of errors of internal policy and flawed international relations."{{sfnp|Ashton|Hill|Piazza|Zeitz|1984|p=634}}

Mobo Gao suggested that the Great Leap Forward's terrible effects came not from malignant intent on the part of the Chinese leadership at the time, but instead related to the structural nature of its rule, and the vastness of China as a country. Gao says "the terrible lesson learnt is that China is so huge and when it is uniformly ruled, follies or wrong policies will have grave implications of tremendous magnitude".{{sfnp|Gao|2007|p={{page needed|date=June 2024}}}}

In the official ''[[Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China]]'' passed in 1981, the Chinese Communist Party called the purge of the so-called anti-Party clique of Peng Dehuai and others as "entirely wrong" and cut short the process of the rectification of "Left" errors.<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/resolution-certain-questions-history-our-party-founding-peoples-republic-china |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241225024145/https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/resolution-certain-questions-history-our-party-founding-peoples-republic-china |archive-date=25 December 2024 |access-date=2024-12-28 |website=[[Wilson Center]] |language=en |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":18">{{Cite web |title=关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议 |url=http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024934_2.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191022175245/http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-06/23/content_1024934_2.htm |archive-date=22 October 2019 |access-date=23 April 2020 |website=The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China |language=zh}}</ref> The 1981 Resolution also states that, "it was mainly due to the errors of the Great Leap Forward and of the [[Anti-Right Deviation Struggle|struggle against 'Right opportunism']] together with a succession of natural calamities and the perfidious scrapping of contracts by the Soviet Government that our economy encountered serious difficulties between 1959 and 1961, which caused serious losses to our country and people."<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":18" />