Editing Lockheed U-2 (section)

====Initial overflights of Communist territory====
The British government in January 1956 approved the U-2's deployment from [[RAF Lakenheath]]. NACA announced that the USAF [[Air Weather Service]] would use a Lockheed-developed aircraft to study the weather and cosmic rays at altitudes up to 55,000&nbsp;feet; accordingly, the first CIA detachment of U-2s ("Detachment A") was known publicly as the 1st Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (WRSP-1). The death in April 1956, however, of British agent [[Lionel Crabb]] while examining Soviet ships in [[Portsmouth]] harbor embarrassed the British government, which asked the United States to postpone the Lakenheath flights. To avoid delays, in June 1956, Detachment A moved to [[Wiesbaden]], Germany, without approval from the [[West Germany|German government]], while [[Giebelstadt Army Airfield]] was prepared as a more permanent base.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=93–95}}

Eisenhower remained concerned that despite their great intelligence value, overflights of the Soviet Union might cause a war. While the U-2 was under development, at the [[Geneva Summit (1955)|1955 Geneva Summit]] he proposed to [[Nikita Khrushchev]] that the Soviet Union and the United States would each grant the other country airfields to use to photograph military installations. Khrushchev rejected the "Open Skies" proposal.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Eisenhower |title=Mandate for Change, 1953–56. |date=1963 |publisher=Heinemann |isbn=978-0434225804 |page=521}}</ref>

The CIA told the president that the Soviets could not track high-altitude U-2 flights; this belief was based on studies using old Soviet radar systems and American systems that were not as effective at high altitudes as current Soviet systems, of which the U.S. was not aware. Knutson later said that "the U-2 was really quite invisible to American radar, but Russian radar were a little different—better, you might say". Although the Office of Scientific Intelligence issued a more cautious report in May 1956 that stated that detection was possible, it believed that the Soviets could not consistently track the aircraft. Dulles further told Eisenhower, according to presidential aide [[Andrew Goodpaster]], that in any aircraft loss the pilot would almost certainly not survive. With such assurances and the growing demand for accurate intelligence regarding the alleged "[[bomber gap]]" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, in June 1956 Eisenhower approved 10 days of overflights.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=96–100}}{{r|cnncoldwarknutson}}

The first U-2 overflight had already occurred, using the existing authorization of air force overflights over Eastern Europe. On 20 June 1956, a U-2 flew over Poland and East Germany, with more flights on 2 July. When Eisenhower refused to approve the U-2's flight over Soviet airspace, the CIA turned to a foreign power, [[MI6]], the British Secret Intelligence Service, to request authorization from [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom]] [[Harold Macmillan]], who approved the flights.<ref>Stephen Dorril, "MI6, Inside The Secret World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service" (New York: Free Press, 2000), pp. 659–660</ref> The fact that radar had—contrary to the CIA's expectations—successfully tracked the aircraft worried Eisenhower, but he approved the first Soviet overflight, Mission 2013 on 4 July. U-2 Article 347's main targets were the Soviet submarine construction program in [[Leningrad]], and counting the numbers of the new [[Myasishchev M-4]] "Bison" bomber.

Soviet radar monitored the U-2 incursion into Soviet airspace in real-time, with radar tracking starting from the time the aircraft crossed into East German airspace. Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]] was informed immediately.{{citation needed|date=February 2023}}. While contemplating appropriate retaliatory steps, he ordered Soviet Ambassador to Washington, [[Georgy Zarubin]], to protest vehemently to the U.S. State Department that very day, explaining that the recent trust-building to ease tensions between the two countries was undermined by the overflight provocations.<ref>Monte Reel, "A Brotherhood of Spies: The U2 and the CIA's Secret War," (New York: Anchor Books, 2019), pp. 118–122</ref>

A second flight on 5 July continued searching for Bisons, took photographs of Moscow (the only ones taken by the program), and flew over cloud-covered<ref>{{cite book |last1=Gruntman |first1=Mike |title=Intercept 1961: the birth of Soviet missile defense |year=2015 |location=Figs 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 |isbn=978-1624103490 |pages=73–78 |edition=First}}</ref> rocket factories at Kaliningrad and Khimki. Eisenhower knew from the earlier overflights that his hope of no Soviet detection was unrealistic, but ordered that the overflights stop if the aircraft could be tracked. The CIA found that the Soviets could not consistently track the U-2s and therefore did not know that Moscow and Leningrad had been overflown. The aircraft's photographs showed tiny images of MiG-15s and MiG-17s attempting and failing to intercept the aircraft, proving that the Soviets could not shoot down an operational U-2.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=100–108}} Knutson recalled that the "constant stream of Russian fighters" trying to shoot down the U-2 during overflights was sometimes "so thick" that they interfered with photographs. Repeatedly failing for years to stop the aircraft embarrassed the USSR, which made diplomatic protests against the flights but did not publicize the penetration of Soviet territory.{{r|cnncoldwarknutson}}

U-2 missions from Wiesbaden would depart westward in order to gain altitude over friendly territory before turning eastward at operational altitudes. The NATO Air Defence mission in that area included [[No. 1 Air Division RCAF (Europe)]], which operated the [[Canadair Sabre]] Mark 6 from bases in northeastern France. This aircraft had a service ceiling of 54,000&nbsp;feet and numerous encounters between the U-2 and RCAF 'ZULU' alert flights have been recorded for posterity.<ref>Gummeson, Ray. [https://web.archive.org/web/20090929093601/http://www.pinetreeline.org/metz/other/otherm9d-1.html "RCAF F-86 and U-2 Encounters."] (archived) ''Pinetree Line Website'', March 2004. Retrieved: 25 October 2012.</ref>