Editing Philosophical methodology (section)

== Relation to other fields ==
=== Science ===
The methods of philosophy differ in various respects from the methods found in the [[natural science]]s. One important difference is that philosophy does not use experimental data obtained through measuring equipment like telescopes or cloud chambers to justify its claims.<ref name="DalyIntroduction"/><ref name="VeryShortIntro"/><ref name="Ichikawa">{{cite web |last1=Ichikawa |first1=Jonathan |title=Chris Daly: An Introduction to Philosophical Methods |url=https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/an-introduction-to-philosophical-methods/ |website=Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews |access-date=22 February 2022 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="MacmillanPhilosophy"/> For example, even philosophical naturalists emphasizing the close relation between philosophy and the sciences mostly practice a form of armchair theorizing instead of gathering empirical data.<ref name="OvergaardMethodology">{{cite book |last1=Overgaard |first1=Søren |last2=D’Oro |first2=Giuseppina |title=The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology |date=2017 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-54736-0 |pages=1–10 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-philosophical-methodology/introduction/03C3CBE35E1E1FD54E29AD2D5E1C4D48 |chapter=Introduction}}</ref> [[Experimental philosophy|Experimental philosophers]] are an important exception: they use methods found in social psychology and other empirical sciences to test their claims.<ref name="OvergaardMethodology"/><ref name="StanfordExperimental"/><ref name="Plakias"/>

One reason for the methodological difference between philosophy and science is that philosophical claims are usually more speculative and cannot be verified or falsified by looking through a telescope.<ref name="MacmillanPhilosophy"/> This problem is not solved by citing works published by other philosophers, since it only defers the question of how their insights are justified. An additional complication concerning [[testimony]] is that different philosophers often defend mutually incompatible claims, which poses the challenge of how to select between them.<ref name="DalyIntroduction">{{cite book |last1=Daly |first1=Christopher |title=An Introduction to Philosophical Methods |date=20 July 2010 |publisher=Broadview Press |isbn=978-1-55111-934-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wilaDwAAQBAJ |language=en |chapter=Introduction}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Green |first1=Christopher R. |title=Epistemology of Testimony |url=https://iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 March 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Leonard |first1=Nick |title=Epistemological Problems of Testimony |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 March 2022 |date=2021}}</ref> Another difference between scientific and philosophical methodology is that there is wide agreement among scientists concerning their methods, testing procedures, and results. This is often linked to the fact that science has seen much more progress than philosophy.<ref name="DalyHandbook"/><ref name="Dever"/>

=== Epistemology ===
An important goal of philosophical methods is to assist philosophers in attaining knowledge.<ref name="Dever"/> This is often understood in terms of [[evidence]].<ref name="DalyIntroduction"/><ref name="OvergaardMethodology"/> In this sense, philosophical methodology is concerned with the questions of what constitutes philosophical evidence, how much support it offers, and how to acquire it. In contrast to the empirical sciences, it is often claimed that [[empirical evidence]] is not used in justifying philosophical theories, that philosophy is less about the empirical world and more about how we think about the empirical world.<ref name="DalyIntroduction"/> In this sense, philosophy is often identified with [[conceptual analysis]], which is concerned with explaining concepts and showing their interrelations. Philosophical naturalists often reject this line of thought and hold that empirical evidence can confirm or disconfirm philosophical theories, at least indirectly.<ref name="DalyIntroduction"/>

Philosophical evidence, which may be obtained, for example, through [[intuition]]s or [[thought experiment]]s, is central for justifying basic principles and axioms.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Brown |first1=Jessica |title=Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence |journal=Dialectica |date=2011 |volume=65 |issue=4 |pages=493–516 |doi=10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01282.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BROTEI-3}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Pailos |first1=Federico Mathías |title=Intuition as Philosophical Evidence |journal=Essays in Philosophy |date=2012 |volume=13 |issue=1 |pages=297–310 |doi=10.5840/eip201213117 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/PAIIAP|hdl=11336/194769 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> These principles can then be used as premises to support further conclusions. Some approaches to philosophical methodology emphasize that these arguments have to be [[Validity (logic)|deductively valid]], i.e. that the truth of their premises ensures the truth of their conclusion.<ref name="DalyHandbook">{{cite book |last1=Daly |first1=Chris |title=The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods |date=2015 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |isbn=978-1-137-34455-7 |pages=1–30 |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 |language=en |chapter=Introduction and Historical Overview|doi=10.1057/9781137344557_1 }}</ref> In other cases, philosophers may commit themselves to working hypotheses or norms of investigation even though they lack sufficient evidence. Such assumptions can be quite fruitful in simplifying the possibilities the philosopher needs to consider and by guiding them to ask interesting questions. But the lack of evidence makes this type of enterprise vulnerable to criticism.<ref name="Dever"/>