Editing Precedent (section)

==Application==

===Development===
Early English [[Common law#Disambiguate statute|common law]] did not have or require the ''stare decisis'' doctrine for a range of legal and technological reasons:
* During the formative period of the [[Common law#Disambiguate statute|common law]], the royal courts constituted only one among many fora in which in the English could settle their disputes. The royal courts operated alongside and in competition with ecclesiastic, manorial, urban, mercantile, and local courts.
* Royal courts were not organised into a hierarchy; instead, different royal courts (exchequer, common pleas, king's bench, and chancery) were in competition with each other.
* Substantial law on almost all matters was neither legislated nor codified, eliminating the need for courts to interpret legislation.
* Common law's main distinctive features and focus were not substantial law, which was customary law, but procedural.
* The practice of citing previous cases was not to find binding legal rules but as evidence of custom.
* Customary law was not a rational and consistent body of rules and did not require a system of binding precedent.
* Before the printing press, the state of the written records of cases rendered the ''stare decisis'' doctrine utterly impracticable.

These features changed over time, opening the door to the doctrine of ''stare decisis'':
{{Blockquote| By the end of the eighteenth century, the [[common law]] courts had absorbed most of the business of their nonroyal competitors, although there was still internal competition among the different [[common law]] courts themselves. During the nineteenth century, legal reform movements in both England and the United States brought this to an end as well by merging the various [[common law]] courts into a unified system of courts with a formal hierarchical structure. This and the advent of reliable private case reporters made adherence to the doctrine of ''stare decisis'' practical and the practice soon evolved of holding judges to be bound by the decisions of courts of superior or equal status in their jurisdiction.<ref>{{cite book|title=Hayek, the Common Law, and Fluid Drive|first=John|last=Hasnas|publisher=NYU Journal of Law & Liberty|volume=1|pages=92–93|url=http://faculty.msb.edu/hasnasj/GTWebSite/NYUFinal.pdf|access-date=2012-06-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150124010837/http://faculty.msb.edu/hasnasj/gtwebsite/NYUFinal.pdf|archive-date=2015-01-24|url-status=dead}}</ref>}}

===United States legal system===

Over time courts in the United States and especially its Supreme Court developed a large body of [[Judicial opinion|judicial decisions]] which are called "precedents". These "[r]ules and principles established in prior cases inform the Court's future decisions."<ref name="20180924EveryCRSReport.comOverrulingConstitutionalPrecedent" /> The adherence to rules and principles created in past cases as a foundation for future decisions by the courts is called ''stare decisis''. The United States Supreme Court considers stare decisis not only as an important [[Doctrine#Legal usage|doctrine]], but also "the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion."<ref name="VasquezvHillery">{{cite web |title=Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986), at 266 |url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/474/254/ |publisher=Justia US Supreme Court Center |access-date=3 November 2020 |date=14 January 1986}}</ref> ''Stare decisis'' aims to bolster the legitimacy of the judicial process and foster the rule of law. It does so by strengthening stability, certainty, predictability, consistency and uniformity in the application of the law to cases and litigants.<ref name="20180924EveryCRSReport.comOverrulingConstitutionalPrecedent" /> By adhering to ''stare decisis'' the Supreme Court attempts to preserve its role "as a careful, unbiased, and predictable decisionmaker that decides cases according to the law rather than the Justices' individual policy preferences."<ref name="20180924EveryCRSReport.comOverrulingConstitutionalPrecedent">{{cite web |author1=[[Congressional Research Service]] |title=The Supreme Court's Overruling of Constitutional Precedent |url=https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45319.html|website=EveryCRSReport.com |access-date=3 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201016205136/https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45319.html |archive-date=16 October 2020 |date=24 September 2018}}</ref> In ''[[Vasquez v. Hillery]]'' (1986) the Supreme Court stated succinctly that stare decisis "contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact" by maintaining the notion "that bedrock principles are founded in the law, rather than in the proclivities of individuals."<ref name="VasquezvHillery" />

''Stare decisis'' reduces the number and scope of legal questions that the court must resolve in litigation. It is therefore a time saver for judges and litigants. Once a court has settled a particular question of law it has established a precedent. Thanks to ''stare decisis'' lawsuits can be quickly and efficiently dismissed because legal battles can be resolved through recourse to rules and principles established prior decisions. ''Stare decisis'' can thus encourage parties to settle cases out of court and thereby enhance judicial efficiency.<ref name="20180924EveryCRSReport.comOverrulingConstitutionalPrecedent" />

Several Supreme Court decisions were overruled by subsequent decisions since 1798.<ref>{{cite web |title=Table of Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decisions |url=https://constitution.congress.gov/resources/decisions-overruled/ |website=constitution.congress.gov |publisher=[[Library of Congress]] |access-date=3 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201031062050/https://constitution.congress.gov/resources/decisions-overruled/ |archive-date=31 October 2020}}</ref> In doing so the Supreme Court has time and time again made several statements regarding stare decisis.<ref name="20180924EveryCRSReport.comOverrulingConstitutionalPrecedent" /> The following is a non-exhaustive list of examples of these statements:<ref name="20180924EveryCRSReport.comOverrulingConstitutionalPrecedentFootnotes">{{cite web |author1=[[Congressional Research Service]] |title=The Supreme Court's Overruling of Constitutional Precedent; see Footnotes 43-44, 47, 48 and 69 |url=https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45319.htmlt |website=EveryCRSReport.com |access-date=3 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201016205136/https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45319.html |archive-date=16 October 2020 |date=24 September 2018}}</ref>
* ''[[Citizens United v. FEC]]'', 558 U.S. 310, at 378 (2010) ([[John Roberts|Roberts, J.]], concurring): "[Stare decisis'] greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of law. It follows that in the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more damage to this constitutional ideal than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from that precedent." (citations omitted)
* ''[[Planned Parenthood v. Casey|Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey]]'', 505 U.S. 833, at 854 (1992): "[T]he very concept of the [[rule of law]] underlying [[United States Constitution|our own Constitution]] requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable." (citations omitted)
* ''[[Alleyne v. United States]]'', 570 U.S. 99, 118 (2013) ([[Sonia Sotomayor|Sotomayor, J.]], [[Concurring opinion|concurring]]): "We generally adhere to our prior decisions, even if we questions their soundness, because doing so 'promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process'."
* ''Hilton v. South Carolina Public. Railway Commission'', 502 U.S. 197, at 202 (1991): "Adherence to precedent promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority."
* ''[[Payne v. Tennessee]]'', 501 U.S. 808, at 827 (1991): "Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process."
* ''[[Vasquez v. Hillery]]'', 474 U.S. 254, at 265-66 (1986): "[T]he important doctrine of stare decisis [is] the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. That doctrine permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law, rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact."
* ''[[Taylor v. Sturgell]]'', 553 U.S. 880, at 903 (2008): "''[S]tare decisis'' will allow courts swiftly to dispose of repetitive suits&nbsp;..."
* ''[[Payne v. Tennessee]]'', 501 U.S. 808, at 834 (1991) ([[Antonin Scalia|Scalia, J.]], concurring): "What would enshrine power as the governing principle of this Court is the notion that an important constitutional decision with plainly inadequate rational support must be left in place for the sole reason that it once attracted a [majority of the Court]."
* ''[[Civil Rights Act of 1991#Background|Patterson v. McLean Credit Union]]'', 491 U.S. 164, at 172 (1989): "Our precedents are not sacrosanct, for we have overruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been established."
* ''[[Smith v. Allwright]]'', 321 U.S. 649, at 665 (1944): "[W]hen convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedents. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions."
* ''[[Janus v. AFSCME|Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, County, & Mun. Employees]]'', 585 U.S. ___, No. 16-1466, [[Slip op.|slip op]]. at 34 (2018): "We will not overturn a past decision unless there are strong grounds for doing so."
* ''[[Planned Parenthood v. Casey|Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey]]'', 505 U.S. 833, at 864 (1992) (plurality opinion): "[A] decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided." The [[plurality opinion]] in ''Casey'' stated also that reexamining precedent requires more than "a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently".
* '' Arizona v. Rumsey'', 467 U.S. 203, at 212 (1984): "Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of ''stare decisis'' demands special justification."

''Stare decisis'' applies to the [[Holding (law)|holding]] of a case, rather than to [[obiter dicta]] ("things said by the way"). As the [[United States Supreme Court]] has put it: "dicta may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but are not binding".<ref>[http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/99-859.html Central ''Green Co. v. United States''], 531 U.S. 425 (2001), quoting ''Humphrey's Executor v. United States'', 295 U. S. 602, 627 (1935).</ref>

In the U.S. Supreme Court, the principle of stare decisis is most flexible in constitutional cases, as observed by Justice Brandeis in his landmark dissent in ''Burnet'' (as quoted at length above).<ref>''Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.'', 285 U.S. 393, 406–407, 410 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).</ref> For example, in the years 1946–1992, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed itself in about 130 cases.<ref>Congressional Research Service,[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/html/scourt.html Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decision] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120113032452/http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/html/scourt.html |date=13 January 2012 }} (1992).</ref> The U.S. Supreme Court has further explained as follows:

{{Blockquote|[W]hen convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment, and not upon legislative action, this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions.|source=''[[Smith v. Allwright]]'', 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)(Reed, S.F.).<ref>{{cite web|url=http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&court=US&case=/us/321/649.html |title=FindLaw &#124; Cases and Codes |publisher=Caselaw.lp.findlaw.com |access-date=2012-11-02}}</ref>}}

The Court has stated that where a court gives multiple reasons for a given result, each alternative reason that is "explicitly" labeled by the court as an "independent" ground for the decision is not treated as "simply a dictum".<ref>See ''O'Gilvie v. United States'', 519 U.S. 79, 84 (1996).</ref>

As Colin Starger has pointed out, the contemporary rule of stare decisis descended from Brandeis's landmark dissent in ''Burnet'' would later split into strong and weak conceptions as a result of the disagreement between Chief Justice [[William Rehnquist]] and Associate Justice [[Thurgood Marshall]] in ''[[Payne v. Tennessee]]'' (1991).<ref name="Starger_Page29">{{cite book |last1=Starger |first1=Colin |editor1-last=Peters |editor1-first=Christopher J. |title=Precedent in the United States Supreme Court |date=2013 |publisher=Springer Science+Business Media |location=Dordrecht |isbn=978-94-007-7950-1 |pages=19–46 |chapter=The Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doctrine|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zAbFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA29}} Available via SpringerLink.</ref> The strong conception requires a "special justification" to overrule challenged precedent beyond the fact the precedent was "wrongly decided", while the weak conception holds that a precedent can be overruled if it suffers from "bad reasoning".<ref name="Starger_Page29" />

The opinion of Chief Justice John Roberts in the case ''[[June Medical Services, LLC v. Russo]]'' provides a clear statement of the strong conception of ''stare decisis''. In this case, the Court upheld, by a 5–4 margin, their 2016 decision in ''[[Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt]]'' that struck down a similar Texas law requiring doctors who perform abortions to have the right to admit patients at a nearby hospital. Roberts wrote, "The legal doctrine of ''stare decisis'' requires us, absent special circumstances, to treat like cases alike." Roberts provided the fifth vote to uphold the 2016 decision, even though he felt it was wrongly decided.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://casetext.com/case/june-medical-services-l-l-c-v-russo |title=June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo  |access-date=2020-06-29}}</ref>

===English legal system===
The doctrine of binding precedent or ''stare decisis'' is basic to the English legal system. Special features of the English legal system include the following:

====The Supreme Court's ability to override its own precedent====
The British [[Judicial functions of the House of Lords|House of Lords]], as the court of last appeal outside Scotland before it was replaced by the [[Supreme Court of the United Kingdom|UK Supreme Court]], was not strictly bound to always follow its own decisions until the case ''[[London Street Tramways v London County Council]]'' [1898] AC 375. After this case, once the Lords had given a ruling on a point of law, the matter was closed unless and until Parliament made a change by statute. This is the most strict form of the doctrine of ''stare decisis'' (one not applied, previously, in [[Common law#Disambiguate civil law|common law]] jurisdictions, where there was somewhat greater flexibility for a court of last resort to review its own precedent).

This situation changed, however, after the House of Lords issued the [[Practice Statement]] of 1966. The House of Lords decided to allow itself to adapt English law to meet changing social conditions. In ''[[R v G]]'' [2003] UKHL 50, the House of Lords overruled its 1981 decision in ''[[R v Caldwell]]'', which had allowed the Lords to establish [[mens rea]] ("guilty mind") by measuring a defendant's conduct against that of a "reasonable person", regardless of the defendant's actual state of mind.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/r-v-g-recklessness.php|title=R v G (2003) – recklessness in criminal law|website=www.lawteacher.net|language=en|access-date=7 June 2019}}</ref>

However, the Practice Statement was seldom applied by the House of Lords, usually only as a last resort. Up to 2005,{{update inline|date=March 2020}} the House of Lords rejected its past decisions no more than 20 times.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cOUpZcAfZWoC&q=However,+the+Practice+Statement+has+been+seldom+applied+by+the+House+of+Lords,+usually+only+as+a+last+resort.+As+of+2005,+the+House+of+Lords+has+rejected+its+past+decisions+no+more+than+20+times&pg=PA112|title=Textbook on Legal Methods, Legal Systems and Research|last=Saha|first=Tushar Kanti|date=2010|publisher=Universal Law Publishing|isbn=9788175348936|language=en}}</ref> They were reluctant to use it because they feared to introduce uncertainty into the law. In particular, the Practice Statement stated that the Lords would be especially reluctant to overrule themselves in criminal cases because of the importance of certainty of that law. The first case involving criminal law to be overruled with the Practice Statement was ''[[Anderton v Ryan]]'' (1985), which was overruled by ''[[R v Shivpuri]]'' (1986), two decades after the Practice Statement. Remarkably, the precedent overruled had been made only a year before, but it had been criticised by several academic lawyers. As a result, [[Lord Bridge]] stated he was "undeterred by the consideration that the decision in ''Anderton v Ryan'' was so recent. The Practice Statement is an effective abandonment of our pretension to infallibility. If a serious error embodied in a decision of this House has distorted the law, the sooner it is corrected the better."<ref>Martin, Jacqueline (2005). ''The English Legal System'' (4th ed.), p. 25. London: Hodder Arnold. {{ISBN|0-340-89991-3}}.</ref> Still, the House of Lords has remained reluctant to overrule itself in some cases; in ''R v Kansal'' (2002), the majority of House members adopted the opinion that ''R v Lambert'' had been wrongly decided and agreed to depart from their earlier decision.

====Distinguishing precedent on legal (rather than fact) grounds====
A precedent does not bind a court if it finds there was a lack of care in the original "Per Incuriam". For example, if a statutory provision or precedent had not been brought to the previous court's attention before its decision, the precedent would not be binding.{{cn|date=May 2022}}