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Semantics
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=== Ideational === [[File:Ideational theory of meaning.svg|thumb|alt=Diagram of ideational theories|Ideational theories identify meaning with the [[mental states]] of language users.]] Ideational theories, also called mentalist theories, are not primarily interested in the reference of expressions and instead explain meaning in terms of the mental states of language users.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chapman|Routledge|2009}} | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=Β§ 3.1 Mentalist Theories}} }}</ref> One historically influential approach articulated by [[John Locke]] holds that expressions stand for [[idea]]s in the speaker's mind. According to this view, the meaning of the word ''dog'' is the idea that people have of dogs. Language is seen as a medium used to transfer ideas from the speaker to the audience. After having learned the same meaning of signs, the speaker can produce a sign that corresponds to the idea in their mind and the perception of this sign evokes the same idea in the mind of the audience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chapman|Routledge|2009}} | {{harvnb|Holm|Karlgren|1995|p=22}} | {{harvnb|Appiah|Gutmann|1998|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ylp_omhIPssC&pg=PA34 34]}} | {{harvnb|Pearce|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=inhXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA194 194β195]}} }}</ref> A closely related theory focuses not directly on ideas but on [[intention]]s.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chapman|Routledge|2009}} | {{harvnb|Pearce|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=inhXEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA194 194β195]}} | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=Β§ 3.1.1 The Gricean Program}} }}</ref> This view is particularly associated with [[Paul Grice]], who observed that people usually communicate to cause some reaction in their audience. He held that the meaning of an expression is given by the intended reaction. This means that communication is not just about decoding what the speaker literally said but requires an understanding of their intention or why they said it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chapman|Routledge|2009}} | {{harvnb|Glock|2012|p=52}} | {{harvnb|Speaks|2021|loc=Β§ 3.1.1 The Gricean Program}} | {{harvnb|Feng|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_AgDSh5c1QcC&pg=PA11 11β12]}} }}</ref> For example, telling someone looking for petrol that "there is a garage around the corner" has the meaning that petrol can be obtained there because of the speaker's intention to help. This goes beyond the literal meaning, which has no explicit connection to petrol.<ref>{{harvnb|Feng|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_AgDSh5c1QcC&pg=PA19 19]}}</ref>
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