Editing Substance theory (section)

==Religious philosophy==
===Christianity===
The Christian writers of antiquity adhered to the Aristotelian conception of substance. Their peculiarity was the use of this idea for the discernment of theological nuances. [[Clement of Alexandria]] considered both material and spiritual substances: blood and milk; mind and soul, respectively.<ref>Clemens Alexandrinus, ''Stromata'', VIII, 6; IV, 32; VI, 6</ref> [[Origen]] may be the first theologian expressing Christ's similarity with the Father as [[consubstantiality]]. [[Tertullian]] professed the same view in the West.<ref>Tertulianus adversus Marcionem, lib. IV, 9, 7.</ref> The ecclesiastics of the Cappadocian group ([[Basil of Caesarea]], [[Gregory of Nazianzus]], [[Gregory of Nyssa]]) taught that the [[Trinity]] had a single substance in three hypostases individualized by the relations among them. In later ages, the meaning of "substance" became more important because of the dogma of the [[Eucharist]]. [[Hildebert|Hildebert of Lavardin]], [[archbishop of Tours]], introduced the term ''[[transubstantiation]]'' about 1080; its use spread after the [[Fourth Council of the Lateran]] in 1215.

According to [[Thomas Aquinas]], beings may possess substance in three different modes. Together with other Medieval philosophers, he interpreted God's epithet "[[El Shaddai]]" ([[Genesis 17]]:1) as self-sufficient and concluded that God's essence was identical with existence.<ref name="AquinasV">{{cite book |author=Thomas Aquinas |title=De ente et essentia |chapter=V |translator=Robert T. Miller | year=1997 |chapter-url=https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/aquinas-esse.asp|author-link=Thomas Aquinas }}</ref> Aquinas also deemed the substance of spiritual creatures identical with their essence (or form); therefore he considered each [[angel]] to belong to its own distinct species.{{citation needed|date=January 2020}} In Aquinas' view, composite substances consist of form and matter. Human substantial form, i.e. soul, receives its individuality from body.<ref>Thomas Aquinas, ''De ente et essentia'', VI; ''[[Summa Theologica]]'', q.29, a.1</ref>

===Jainism===
{{main|Dravya}}
===Buddhism===
{{main|Svabhava}}
[[Buddhism]] rejects the concept of substance. Complex structures are comprehended as an aggregate of components without any essence. Just as the junction of parts is called cart, so the collections of elements are called things.<ref>The Collection of Connected Discourses (Saṁyutta Nikāya), Translated from the Pāli by Bikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom Publications, [2000]. Part 1, 525–526; Part 2, 61 (1). {{ISBN|0-86171-168-8}}</ref> All formations are unstable (''aniccā'') and lacking any constant core or "self" (''anattā'').<ref>Aṅguttara Nikāya (The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha). A complete translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2012, III, 137</ref> Physical objects have no metaphysical substrate.<ref>Stcherbatsky Th. The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma". London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923, p. 12</ref> Arising entities hang on previous ones conditionally: in the notable teaching on interdependent origination, effects arise not as caused by agents but conditioned by former situations. Our senses, perception, feelings, wishes and consciousness are flowing, the view ''satkāya-dṛṣṭi'' of their permanent carrier is rejected as fallacious. The school of [[Madhyamaka]], namely [[Nāgārjuna]], introduced the idea of the ontological void (''śūnyatā''). The Buddhist metaphysics [[Abhidharma]] presumes particular forces which determine the origin, persistence, aging and decay of everything in the world. [[Vasubandhu]] added a special force making a human, called "''aprāpti''" or "''pṛthagjanatvam''".<ref>L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Traduit et annoté par Louis de la Vallée Poussin. Tome I. Paris: Paul Geithner, 1923, p. 179–191</ref> Because of the absence of a substantial soul, the belief in personal immortality loses foundation.<ref>The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (Majjhima Nikāya). Translated by Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli, Boston (MA): Wisdom Publications, 1995, Part 1, 22 (25)</ref> Instead of deceased beings, new ones emerge whose fate is destined by the [[Karma in Buddhism|karmic law]]. The [[Buddha]] admitted the empirical identity of persons testified by their birth, name, and age. He approved the authorship of deeds and responsibility of performers.<ref>Aṅguttara Nikāya, VI, 63 (5); III, 36 (1)</ref> The disciplinary practice in the [[Sangha]] including reproaches, confession and expiation of transgressions,<ref>The Book of Discipline (Vinaya-Pitaka). Vol. II (Sutta-Vibhanga). Translated by I. B. Horner. London: Luzac, 1957, ''passim''</ref> requires continuing personalities as its justification.