Editing TrueCrypt (section)

=== Physical security ===
TrueCrypt documentation states that TrueCrypt is unable to secure data on a computer if an attacker physically accessed it and TrueCrypt is used on the compromised computer by the user again (this does not apply to a common case of a stolen, lost, or confiscated computer).<ref>{{cite web | title =Physical Security | work =TrueCrypt Documentation | publisher =TrueCrypt Foundation | url =http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=physical-security | archive-url =https://archive.today/20120913113052/http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=physical-security | url-status =dead | archive-date =13 September 2012 | access-date =24 May 2014 }}</ref> The attacker having physical access to a computer can, for example, install a hardware/software [[keylogger]], a [[Bus mastering|bus-mastering]] device capturing [[RAM|memory]], or install any other malicious [[Hardware Trojan (computing)|hardware]] or [[malware|software]], allowing the attacker to capture unencrypted data (including encryption keys and passwords), or to decrypt encrypted data using captured passwords or encryption keys. Therefore, physical security is a basic premise of a secure system. Attacks such as this are often called "[[Evil Maid attack|evil maid attacks]]".<ref>{{cite web | last =Schneier | first =Bruce | author-link =Bruce Schneier | title ="Evil Maid" Attacks on Encrypted Hard Drives | publisher =Schneier on Security | date =23 October 2009 | url =https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/10/evil_maid_attac.html | access-date = 24 May 2014 }}</ref>