Editing Trusted Computing (section)

===Users unable to override===
Some opponents of Trusted Computing advocate "owner override": allowing an owner who is confirmed to be physically present to allow the computer to bypass restrictions and use the secure I/O path. Such an override would allow remote attestation to a user's specification, e.g., to create certificates that say Internet Explorer is running, even if a different browser is used. Instead of preventing software change, remote attestation would indicate when the software has been changed without owner's permission.

[[Trusted Computing Group]] members have refused to implement owner override.<ref>{{cite magazine | url = http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/7055 | title = Give TCPA an Owner Override | magazine = Linux Journal | author = Schoen, Seth | date = 2003-12-01 | access-date = 2007-02-07 | author-link = Seth Schoen }}</ref>  Proponents of trusted computing believe that owner override defeats the trust in other computers since remote attestation can be forged by the owner. Owner override offers the security and enforcement benefits to a machine owner, but does not allow them to trust other computers, because their owners could waive rules or restrictions on their own computers. Under this scenario, once data is sent to someone else's computer, whether it be a diary, a DRM music file, or a joint project, that other person controls what security, if any, their computer will enforce on their copy of those data. This has the potential to undermine the applications of trusted computing to enforce DRM, control cheating in online games and attest to remote computations for [[grid computing]].