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Vote counting
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===Interpretation, in any counting method=== [[File:2018 Vote by mail envelopes being sorted in Santa Clara County.webm|thumb|Sorting vote by mail envelopes, San Jose, Santa Clara County, California, 2018]] [[File:Afgan Ballot.jpg|thumb|Afghan Ballot]] Election officials or optical scanners decide if a ballot is valid before tallying it. Reasons why it might not be valid include: more choices selected than allowed; incorrect voter signature or details on ballots received by mail, if allowed; lack of poll worker signatures, if required; forged ballot (wrong paper, printing or security features); stray marks which could identify who cast the ballot (to earn payments); and blank ballots, though these may be counted separately as abstentions.<ref name="ace"/> For paper ballots officials decide if the voter's intent is clear, since voters may mark lightly, or circle their choice, instead of marking as instructed. The ballot may be visible to observers to ensure agreement, by webcam or passing around a table,<ref name="ace"/> or the process may be private. In the US only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia give anyone but officials a legal right to see ballot marks during hand counting.<ref name="vvstates">{{Cite web |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/state-audit-laws/ |title=State Audit Laws |date=2017-02-10 |website=Verified Voting |language=en-US |access-date=2018-04-02 |archive-date=2020-01-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200104201852/https://www.verifiedvoting.org/state-audit-laws/ |url-status=dead }}</ref> For optical scans, the software has rules to interpret voter intent, based on the darkness of marks.<ref name="yakima"/> Software may ignore circles around a candidate name, and paper dust or broken sensors can cause marks to appear or disappear, not where the voter intended. Officials also check if the number of voters checked in at the polling place matches the number of ballots voted, and that the votes plus remaining unused ballots matches the number of ballots sent to the polling place. If not, they look for the extra ballots, and may report discrepancies.<ref name="ace"/>
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