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Chinese unification
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=== Republic of China in Taiwan === {{Further|Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity}} In 2019, 89% of Taiwanese opposed a 'One Country, Two Systems' unification with the PRC, more than double the opposition at the beginning of the millennium, when polls consistently found 30% to 40% of all residents were opposed, even with more preferential treatments.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Mainland Affairs Council: MAC Press Release No. 94 |date=2019 |title=Growing Majority in Taiwan Reject the CCP's "One Country, Two Systems" and Oppose Beijing's Military and Diplomatic Suppression |work=Mainland Affairs Council |url=https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&sms=E828F60C4AFBAF90&s=FCC754F2C0A6E0B9 |access-date=29 March 2024 |archive-date=29 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240329011855/https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&sms=E828F60C4AFBAF90&s=FCC754F2C0A6E0B9 |url-status=live }}</ref> At that time the majority supported so-called "status quo now".<ref>{{Cite web |date=22 March 2009 |title=Mainland Affairs Council-How Taiwan People View Cross-Strait Relations (2000–02) |url=https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/cp.aspx?n=509551B32E5A1640&Create=1 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171108095148/https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/cp.aspx?n=509551B32E5A1640&Create=1 |archive-date=8 November 2017 |access-date=8 November 2017 |website=[[Mainland Affairs Council]]}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Flannery |first=Russell |date=6 September 1999 |title=Taiwan Poll Reflects Dissatisfaction With China's Unification Formula |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB936558108311548704 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171108205114/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB936558108311548704 |archive-date=8 November 2017 |access-date=8 November 2017 |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |language=en-US |issn=0099-9660}}</ref> While dominating international focus on Taiwanese politics, unification is generally not the deciding issue in Taiwanese political campaigns and elections.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Diplomat |first=Euhwa Tran, The |title=Taiwan's 2016 Elections: It's Not About China |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/taiwans-2016-elections-its-not-about-china/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171108151819/https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/taiwans-2016-elections-its-not-about-china/ |archive-date=8 November 2017 |access-date=8 November 2017 |work=[[The Diplomat (magazine)|The Diplomat]] |language=en-US}}</ref> A majority of the population supports the status quo, mostly in order to avoid a military confrontation with PRC, but a sizable proportion supports a [[Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign|name rectification]] campaign.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yu |first=Ching-hsin |date=15 March 2017 |title=The centrality of maintaining the status quo in Taiwan elections |url=https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-centrality-of-maintaining-the-status-quo-in-taiwan-elections/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171108095037/https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-centrality-of-maintaining-the-status-quo-in-taiwan-elections/ |archive-date=8 November 2017 |access-date=8 November 2017 |work=[[Brookings Institution]] |language=en-US}}</ref> Opponents of "One Country, Two Systems" cite its implementation in Hong Kong, where despite promises of high levels of autonomy, the PRC government has gradually increased its control of Hong Kong through restricting elections and increasing control over media and policy.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Beijing's crackdown on Hong Kong is alienating Taiwan- Nikkei Asian Review |url=https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Beijing-s-crackdown-on-Hong-Kong-is-alienating-Taiwan |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171108094558/https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Beijing-s-crackdown-on-Hong-Kong-is-alienating-Taiwan |archive-date=8 November 2017 |access-date=8 November 2017 |work=[[Nikkei Asia]] |language=en}}</ref> The [[2020 Hong Kong national security law|National Security Law]] and the related crackdowns further diminished Taiwanese support for such a system.<ref name=":1" /> The Taiwanese pro-unification minority has at times been vocal in media and politics. For the 2004 presidential election the unification question gained some attention as different political parties were discussing the issue. A series of demonstrations, some of which were organized by pro-unification minorities, gained significant attention.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Corcuff |first=Stéphane |date=1 May 2004 |title=The Supporters of Unification and the Taiwanisation Movement |journal=[[China Perspectives]] |language=en |volume=2004 |issue=3 |doi=10.4000/chinaperspectives.2942 |issn=2070-3449 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Since the 1990s, the share of Taiwanese residents identifying as Chinese has fallen significantly, and the number identifying exclusively as Taiwanese has grown. A majority have identified as Taiwanese-only since 2009. Those identifying exclusively as Chinese fell from 25.5% in 1992 to 4.0% in 2008. Those identifying as both Chinese and Taiwanese fell from 46.4 in 1992 to 31.0% in 2024. Those identifying exclusively as Taiwanese has grown from 17.6% in 1992 to 63.4 in 2024.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Election Study Center, NCCU-Taiwanese / Chinese Identity |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961 |access-date=2024-03-29 |website=esc.nccu.edu.tw |language=zh-TW |archive-date=6 March 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210306094327/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961 |url-status=live }}</ref> Over the same period, the share who support independence has grown slightly from 46.5% to 48.9%, and those who support unification has fallen from 20.0% to 6.9% in 2024. Within those who support independence, the share support independence as soon as possible has fallen. Those who support maintaining the status quo indefinitely has grown from 9.8% to 34.1%.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland(1994/12~2024/12) |url=https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |access-date=2025-04-15 |website=esc.nccu.edu.tw |language=zh-TW |archive-date=26 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211026231952/https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7801&id=6963 |url-status=live }}</ref>
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