Editing Cognitive model (section)

=====Embodied cognition=====
In the context of dynamical systems and [[embodied cognition]], representations can be conceptualized as indicators or mediators.  In the indicator view, internal states carry information about the existence of an object in the environment, where the state of a system during exposure to an object is the representation of that object.  In the mediator view, internal states carry information about the environment which is used by the system in obtaining its goals. In this more complex account, the states of the system carries information that mediates between the information the agent takes in from the environment, and the force exerted on the environment by the agents behavior.  The application of open dynamical systems have been discussed for four types of classical embodied cognition examples:<ref>Hotton, S., & Yoshimi, J. (2011). [https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01151.x Extending dynamical systems theory to model embodied cognition]. Cognitive Science, 35, 444-479. doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01151.x</ref>   
# Instances where the environment and agent must work together to achieve a goal, referred to as "intimacy". A classic example of intimacy is the behavior of simple agents working to achieve a goal (e.g., insects traversing the environment).  The successful completion of the goal relies fully on the coupling of the agent to the environment.<ref>Haugeland, J. (1996). [https://philpapers.org/rec/HAUMEA Mind embodied and embedded]. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Having thought: Essays in the metaphysics of mind (pp. 207-237). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.</ref>
# Instances where the use of external artifacts improves the performance of tasks relative to performance without these artifacts. The process is referred to as "offloading".  A classic example of offloading is the behavior of [[Scrabble]] players; people are able to create more words when playing Scrabble if they have the tiles in front of them and are allowed to physically manipulate their arrangement.  In this example, the Scrabble tiles allow the agent to offload [[working memory]] demands on to the tiles themselves.<ref>Maglio, P., Matlock, T., Raphaely, D., Chernickym B., & Kirsh, D. (1999). [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David_Kirsh/publication/2518995_Interactive_Skill_in_Scrabble/links/0912f51230e9fea0bb000000/Interactive-Skill-in-Scrabble.pdf Interactive skill in scrabble]. In M. Hahn & S. C. Stoness (Eds.), Proceedings of twenty-first annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society, (pp. 326-330). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.</ref>
# Instances where a functionally equivalent external artifact replaces functions that are normally performed internally by the agent, which is a special case of offloading.  One famous example is that of human (specifically the agents Otto and Inga) navigation in a complex environment with or without assistance of an artifact.<ref>Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). [https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/1312/TheExtendedMind.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y The extended mind]. Analysis, 58(1), 7-19.</ref>
# Instances where there is not a single agent. The individual agent is part of larger system that contains multiple agents and multiple artifacts. One famous example, formulated by [[Edwin Hutchins|Ed Hutchins]] in his book ''Cognition in the Wild'', is that of navigating a naval ship.<ref>Hutchins, E., (1995). [https://books.google.com/books?id=CGIaNc3F1MgC Cognition in the wild]. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.</ref>
The interpretations of these examples rely on the following [[Reason|logic]]: (1) the total system captures embodiment; (2) one or more agent systems capture the intrinsic dynamics of individual agents; (3) the complete behavior of an agent can be understood as a change to the agent's intrinsic dynamics in relation to its situation in the environment; and (4) the paths of an open dynamical system can be interpreted as representational processes.  These embodied cognition examples show the importance of studying the emergent dynamics of an agent-environment systems, as well as the intrinsic dynamics of agent systems.  Rather than being at odds with traditional cognitive science approaches, dynamical systems are a natural extension of these methods and should be studied in parallel rather than in competition.