Editing Collective action (section)

===Equilibrium mechanisms===

There are many mechanisms (social and psychological) that have been identified to underlie the consensus making process.<ref name="Baronchelli (2017)"/> They have been used to both explain the emergence of spontaneous consensus and understand how to facilitate an equilibrium between individuals and can be grouped according to their role in the process.

* Facilitation of Equilibrium
** Communication<ref name="ReferenceA">{{cite journal |last1=Garrod |first1=Simon |last2=Doherty |first2=Gwyneth |date=1994 |title=Conversation, co-ordination and convention: An empirical investigation of how groups establish linguistic conventions |pmid=7842633 |journal=Cognition |volume=53 |issue=3 |pages=181–215 |doi=10.1016/0010-0277(94)90048-5 |s2cid=26766644 }}</ref>
** Punishment of Deviants<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Boyd |first1=Robert |last2=Richerson |first2=Peter |date=1992 |title=Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222465471 |journal=Ethology and Sociobiology |volume=13 |issue=3 |pages=171–195 |doi=10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-Y }}</ref>
** Positive Payoffs<ref name="Schelling 1960">{{cite book |last=Schelling |first=Thomas |date=1960 |title=The strategy of conflict |url=http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674840317 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=9780674840317 }}</ref>
** [[Conformity]] Bias<ref>{{cite book |last=Asch |first=Solomon |editor-last=Aronson |editor-first=Elliot |title=Readings about the social animal |publisher=Macmillan |date=1955 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/readingsaboutso000aron/page/17 17–26] |chapter=Opinions and social pressure |isbn=9780716759669 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/readingsaboutso000aron |url=https://archive.org/details/readingsaboutso000aron/page/17 }}</ref>
* Selection of Alternatives
** Logical Reflection<ref>{{cite book |last1=Harsanyi |first1=John |last2=Selten |first2=Reinhard |date=1988 |title=A general theory of equilibrium selection in games |url=https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/general-theory-equilibrium-selection-games |publisher=MIT Press Books |page=1 |isbn=9780262582384 }}</ref>
** Psychological and shared biases<ref name="Schelling 1960"/>
** Chance (when all alternatives are equivalent)<ref>{{cite journal |last=Young |first=H Peyton |s2cid=155064244 |date=1996 |title=The economics of convention |jstor=2138484 |journal=The Journal of Economic Perspectives |volume=10 |issue=2 |pages=105–122 |doi=10.1257/jep.10.2.105 |doi-access=free }}</ref>